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Abstract 
Recently, the field of comparative political economy has turned to the Chinese economy. 
Coherent interpretation of the drivers and fundamental institutions of China’s economic 
system had been frustrated by the coexistence of, on the one hand, continuously 
developing capitalist institutions and a burgeoning market economy, and on the other, the 
persisting and proliferating authoritarian system of economic administration. Therefore, 
commonplace dichotomous frameworks of capitalism/ socialism, or coordinated/market 
economies are but of little avail.  
Building on concepts from regulation theory, this thesis argues that the current 
system is one wherein state and market institutions support a distinctively industrialist 
orientation. The Leninist apparatus of bureaucratic controls has come to instill a dynamic 
wherein economic performance begets political influence, and political stature commands 
control of capital. Financial markets complement industrial demands for capital, while the 
ostensibly ‘liberalist’ reorganization of the public sector and welfare system have 
attenuated the financial pressures on enterprise exerted by labor. As a result of the 
common interest of political actors and industrialists in the continuous expansion of 
productive capital, growth has occurred predominantly through investments in fixed 
capital. 
Stringent limitations exist which undermine achievement of long-term sustainability 
of the current state-industrialist nexus. Lack of compensatory mechanisms for 
disenfranchised constituents and the dearth of indigenous innovation are pertinent 
problems, and moreover, mutually reinforcing. On the one hand, without a continuous 
increase in relative surplus value (i.e. output per worker) a more egalitarian distribution of 
income seems unlikely, while on the other, the lack of individual purchasing power 
subverts intentions to transition towards a model of growth premised on domestic 
consumption. Indeed, exceptions exist (for example within the telecommunications 
industry, but ultimately growth in upstream sectors requires commensurate growth in 
downstream industries. The Chinese ‘variety of capitalism’ is indeed an idiosyncratic one, 
but seems to have exhausted its potential.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Chinese development: Practical implications and theoretical challenges 
The remarkable success of China’s economic development since the initiation of the 
policies of ‘reform and opening up’ (gaige kaifang) appears as an undisputed fact to all 
save for its staunchest detractors.
1
 Between 1978 - the year in which reforms commenced 
- and 2010, China’s gross domestic product increased more than twenty-fold, from 364.5 
billion to 40.26 trillion yuan (NBS, 2012, table 2-5).
2
 In that same period, average per 
capita GDP in constant units grew from 1,366 to 20,086 yuan, putting China well ahead 
of India, Indonesia and Thailand.
3
 While primary industry accounted for 28.2 per cent of 
GDP, and 69.6 per cent of employment in 1978, by 2010 these ratios had changed to 10.1 
and 35.6 per cent respectively. China’s economic rise has had implications which far 
transcend its national boundaries. In 2006 China became the world’s largest exporter,4 
and in 2010, China surpassed Japan to become the second largest economy (World Bank, 
2013). However, for a country which looms so large within the global economy, the 
drivers of its astonishing development have often been poorly understood. In particular, 
China’s obstinate defiance to attempts to reconcile it with extant conceptualizations of 
capitalism provides a profound challenge. 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the field of comparative capitalism,
5
 and in 
particular, to the budding literature that examines the fundamental characteristics of 
China’s economic system (Peck & Zhang 2013; McNally 2007, 2012; Fligstein & Zhang 
2011; Boyer 2012; Redding & Witt 2009) and its capacity to sustain innovation (Liu & 
                                                     
1 See for example (Young 2003). 
2 US$ 148.2 billion. and 5.93 trillion respectively at current prices (World Bank, 2013). 
3 US$ 155 and 4,430 at current prices (World Bank, 2013). 
4 A status reversed in 2012, when China’s account balance surplus was surpassed by that of Germany. 
5 The term ‘comparative capitalism’ is admittedly somewhat of a misnomer, comprising approaches which 
range from the neo-institutional to radical and Marxian economics and an equally broad spectrum of economic 
systems, but is used here in favor of ‘comparative political economy’ which designates a yet more theoretically 
and substantively diverse program of research. 
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White 2001; Gu and Lundvall 2006; Gu et al. 2009). From its revival in the 1990s 
(Becker 2009) comparative capitalism has developed into a diverse and prolific field. 
Driven by antipathy towards the empirical indifference of equilibrium and rational choice 
analyses (Aglietta 2000), this research sought to explain patterns of economic 
organization and productive outcomes through historical analyses of discrete institutional 
systems.  
Traditionally, developed economies have been the mainstay of studies of 
comparative capitalism. More recently, the economic development of a number of large 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) has challenged established precepts about the 
functioning of economic systems. These countries pursue trajectories of development that 
in many ways fit poorly with typologies inducted from Western capitalist economies (see 
Morgan 2011; Lane and Myant 2007; Schneider 2009). Although the structured approach 
of comparative capitalism provides analysis with a certain consistency, insights from 
studies on China have been varied, and in some cases contradictory. To an extent, this 
divergence is attributable to theoretical/ ideological premises that shape 
conceptualizations of the (capitalist) economic system and guide analytic foci. However, 
even those authors who work from within the same strand of comparative political 
economy at times reach contrasting conclusions about the fundamental features of 
China’s economic system. Lack of consensus about the structural features and driving 
forces of China’s economy emphasizes the scope for further empirical research and 
theoretical advancement within the framework of comparative political economy 
(Fligstein & Zhang 2011). The study of ‘deviant cases’ (such as China’s), which defy 
conventional understandings of national economic systems is clearly the way by which 
theoretical advancement can be made. Moreover, the importance of a sounder 
understanding of the structure and drivers of the Chinese economy extends beyond the 
theoretical, as China’s economic rise increasingly poses a challenge to the global 
hegemony of Western liberal capitalism. 
Three main questions guide this research. First, can a main coordinating mechanism 
be identified amongst the various institutional influences that are held to direct patterns of 
capital distribution over actors and processes of production and allocation? The second 
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question regards the sustainability of the endogenous dynamics of distributive patterns. 
Whether regularities in the allocation of capital will lead to over-accumulation and 
socio-economic divergence or will promote productivity and increase material wellbeing 
depends on innovation. The second main question this thesis seeks to answer regards the 
extent to which current patterns of capital distribution can be sustained by the extant 
capacity for innovation within the Chinese economic system. Bridging the first and 
second themes is the issue of comparative institutional advantage. Institutional 
arrangements predispose actors to engage in particular productive processes and detract 
from the pursuit of others. Have the allocative influences of China’s institutional 
architecture been accompanied by the commensurate development of coordinating and 
incentivizing mechanisms for innovations, giving rise to a distinct set of industrial 
competences?  
 This chapter begins with an overview of recent contributions to the comparative 
capitalism literature on China. These studies adhere to one of three general perspectives. 
The exceptionalist interpretation maintains that China’s economic system is the 
culmination of informal institutions, inherited through centuries of cultural transmittance, 
or the political apparatus- a legacy of China’s distinctive experience of Maoism-Leninism. 
While China’s economy has undeniably changed over the course of nearly four decades 
of modernization and integration within the global economy, dynamic change and 
exogenous influences are ultimately embedded within, and subordinate to indigenous 
social or political institutions. The transitionalist view holds that, while China’s economic 
institutions are indeed unique, thers idiosyncrasies owe to their transient and hybrid 
nature. According to this perspective, China is on a gradual but irreversible trajectory 
from socialism towards capitalism, spurred on by the self-reinforcing dynamics of market 
production and exchange. Finally, the universalist conception asserts that, there is a 
limited set of feasible economic archetypes. Universalist attempts to include China within 
extant taxonomies have resulted in classifications ranging from the ‘statist’ 
to ’‘market-based’. 
The divergence of these interpretations reflects certain inherent conceptual flaws. 
Using the concepts of ‘theoretical degrees of freedom’ (Campbell 1975) and ‘conceptual 
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stretching’ (Sartori 1970), it is argued that extant perspectives may be prone to either 
under-specification of the relevant attributes of economic systems, leading to 
indeterminate classifications and potentially incomplete analyses, or to over-specification, 
resulting in a mismatch between theoretical constructs and empirical observations. The 
varieties of capitalism literature
6
 (Dore et al., 1999; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Lazonick & 
O’Sullivan, 1995), which has recently come to extend its scope of analysis to China is a 
point in case. VoC’s analytic approach is firmly rooted within Western capitalism, causing 
it to assume certain conditions that are incongruent with the Chinese context. Fortunately, 
this problem is allayed by the theory of regulation (Amable 2003; Hollingsworth & 
Boyer 1997; Boyer 1988; Aglietta 2000). While arguably not sharing the mainstream 
success of varieties of capitalism (its impact largely confined to continental Europe), 
regulationist analysis appends the former by allowing for the simultaneous analysis of the 
economic implications and political qualities of patterns of production and exchange.  
 A related concern is the sustainability of such patterns, and by extension to the 
economic system at large. This depends ultimately on whether the utilization of capital 
results in the systematic increase of economic value, allowing for a virtuous circle of 
reinvestment and increased consumption. Most comparative literature duly acknowledges 
the importance of innovation. However, analytic emphasis on the reciprocity between 
economic institutions and patterns of capital distribution has in certain instances detracted 
from inquiry into the causes of technological development. These studies have taken for 
granted the incentives and coordinative mechanisms required for actors to engage in the 
research, development, diffusion and implementation of technologies. The literature on 
national systems of innovation has been very much pertained with the dynamics and 
institutions relevant to instilling within the overall economy the motivation and capacity 
for technological development. Nevertheless, the systemic incentives and coordinating 
mechanisms that govern the constellation of social relationships which comprise the 
national innovation system are embedded within those of the economic system at large. 
Joint consideration of both the patterns of capital allocation and innovative activity and 
the relevant institutional context allows for comprehensive analysis of the features, 
                                                     
6 Subsequently referred to as VoC 
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capacities and limitations of the Chinese economic system. 
 
The Chinese economy and insights from comparative capitalism 
In recent years comparative capitalism has turned to examining the institutions and social 
organization of the Chinese economy, heretofore predominantly the purview of specialist 
research. These studies have resulted in an array of categorizations of the Chinese 
economy and postulations regarding its main drivers. Generally, these interpretations 
accord with one of three perspectives. Exceptionalist views assert that China’s unique 
social and/ or political institutions cause its economy to intrinsically differ from other 
varieties. Transitionalist perspectives acknowledge China’s idiosyncratic status, but 
ascribe this to an institutional disequilibrium that will dissipate as the economy moves 
from one archetypal system to the other. Universalist interpretations hold that the Chinese 
economy ought to be understood as a member of a set of national systems belonging to 
one of a select number of ideal types. Below, the three perspectives will be discussed in 
more detail. 
 
The exceptionalist perspective 
While the exceptionalist literature is broad and diverse, its common dominator is the 
insistence on the inability of general analytic frameworks to account for the 
idiosyncrasies of the Chinese economy. Emphasis on the path-dependent and contextual 
evolution of the institutions that govern processes of production and exchange induce a 
tendency towards inductive concept development. For example, Redding and Witt’s 
(2006, 2009) analysis of the Chinese business system attempts to reconcile the emerging 
features of China’s capitalism - a transition from central to decentralized control and the 
substitution of the profit-motive for a general concern for welfare - with the informal 
institution of Confucianism. The analytic concerns underlying this analysis strongly 
resonate with the themes expounded in Weber’s seminal work, which juxtaposed the 
rational and functional orientation of economic organization of the West with the moral 
and relational qualities of production and exchange in China (Weber 1963). Thus, argue 
Redding and Witt, China’s economic system is characterized by ‘personalistic’ rather than 
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contractual association, precipitating a kind of ‘network capitalism’ (Redding & Witt 
2010, p.211), a preoccupation with position within the social hierarchy over the pursuit of 
profit as the overriding individual imperative, and the distinctly paternalistic quality of 
management-labor relations. 
 Others have come to focus not on China’s distinctive cultural heritage, but rather on 
the particular manner in which ongoing economic reforms have interspersed with the 
legacy of socialism. The latter encompasses an extensive hierarchical apparatus of state 
and Party organizations and an elaborate centralized system of personnel control that 
support the pervasive engagement of the Chinese Communist Party within all spheres of 
the economy and society (Lin 2011). However, decentralization, corporatization and 
marketization have prompted reconfiguration and functional transposition of socialist 
institutions. The growth of the market economy has been accompanied by a 
commensurate expansion of the constellation of Party committees perpetuating political 
control. Although within public industry, operational and financial authority has devolved 
into state-owned enterprise, leaders within enterprise and bureaucracy are controlled 
through the socialist system of personnel administration, ensuring strong reciprocity of 
industry and state and alignment of corporate and political objectives. Consequently, 
argues Lin, within China’s ‘centrally managed capitalism’, economic entitlement 
continues to be predicated on political influence rather than market institutions. 
 While reiterating the importance of central personnel controls, Xu (2011) contends 
that the dynamics of the central-local government dyad - rather than state-market 
relations - constitute the distinguishing feature of the Chinese economy. According to Xu, 
the devolution of fiscal control from center to provincial government in the initial stages 
of economic reform has brought about a condition of ‘regionally decentralized 
authoritarianism’, wherein central Party-state control is paired with extensive fiscal and 
regulatory authority of provincial government to promote fervent growth-based 
competition between localities. The exceptionalist literature highlights an array of 
institutional particularities, often overlooked or poorly understood in generalist accounts. 
However, the sheer diversity of institutional attributes that are purported to constitute the 
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main coordinating mechanism within the Chinese economy raises a methodological 
concern about the validity of theoretical constructs underlying exceptionalist research. 
 
The transitionalist perspective 
Transitionalist interpretations of China’s economic system are rooted within the broader 
paradigm of transition economics, occupied with the analysis of post-communist 
institutional developments. For transition economists, the shift from socialism to 
capitalism appears as a historical fact and economic necessity borne out of the inherent 
constraints of the socialist system.
7
 With regards to the Chinese context, Naughton (1996) 
asserted a self-perpetuating capitalist dynamic, following the establishment of a market 
component. Scarcity of consumption goods impelled rapid entry and market expansion. 
The development of non-public producers in turn exerted competitive pressures on 
state-owned enterprises, promoting corporatization and price rationalization. Meanwhile, 
increases in household savings provided additional investment for the market economy, 
allowing for its continuous expansion. In a similar vein, Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 
(2004), echoing Kornai’s assertion that economic systems comprise inextricable 
institutional arrangements (1980), argue that the introduction of market institutions, 
initiated by the state under the header of ‘market-socialism’8 impelled a trajectory of 
institutional change reflecting the inherent logic of capitalism, prompting changes within 
contiguous institutions.  
Other transitionalist research has eschewed emphasis on self-reinforcing dynamics in 
favor of a Polanyian interpretation of capitalist development.
9
 Chu and So (2010) use the 
concept of ’state neo-liberalism’ to characterize China’s current political economy. The 
neo-liberal state comprises “a[n] apparatus whose fundamental mission was to facilitate 
condition for profitable capital accumulation on the part of both domestic and foreign 
                                                     
7  According to Kornai (1980) these constraints derive predominantly from the preoccupation of central 
planning with accelerated growth and the pervasiveness of soft-budget constraints, resulting in a persistent 
condition of resource shortage. 
8 See Lange, 1937. 
9 Polanyi argued that the liberal market economy, far from being the result of a spontaneous reorganization of 
production and exchange was the result of a massive socio-political project of institutional transformation, 
central elements of which were the commodification of labor and land, see Polanyi, 1957. 
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capital” (ibid, p. 49). This mission commenced with the initial market reforms of 1978, 
initiated by Deng Xiaoping, and intensified under the Jiang-Zhu administration in the 
1990s. Its general features, it is argued, have been the ongoing privatization of industry, 
the progressive corporatization of public enterprise and the increasing commodification 
of labor and welfare.  
Szelényi in a manner reconciles the above perspective by arguing for transition within 
transition, a trajectory away from initial entrepreneurial, decentralized and peripheral 
capitalism towards a centralized state-corporatist form. Nevertheless, he posits, in spite of 
the continued economic influence of the single-Party state and the ambivalence of 
property rights “the historical trend [towards market transition] is undisputable” (2010, 
p.207). 
 In comparison to the exceptionalist perspective, transitionalist arguments present a 
more coherent whole, their differences originating in diverging understandings of the 
process of transition. However, tracing institutional developments to a pre-determined 
end point likely promotes neglect of phenomena incongruent with, or countervailing the 
purported convergence towards capitalism. As concerns the dynamics of this convergence, 
a similar problem presents itself. Explanations premised on the endogenous 
transformative qualities of capitalism may prove insensitive to the political drivers of 
change and vice-versa. 
 
The universalist perspective 
The universalist line of research, promoting a general conceptual and methodological 
approach, has only recently come to extend its scope of enquiry to the Chinese economy. 
Among the various literatures that have emerged in this area, the ‘varieties of capitalism’ 
(VoC) which emerged during the mid-1990s (Hall & Soskice 2001; Dore et al. 1999; 
Lazonick & O’Sullivan 1995) has had particular traction in recent years. Focusing in 
particular on four advanced economies (that of the United States, United Kingdom, 
Germany and Japan), these studies sought to provide an institutionally-based explanation 
for patterns of national industrial specialization. According to VoC, the nature of 
economic activity that comes to predominate within a nation is conditional on the affinity 
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between a constellation of interrelated institutions. 
  
 
Figure 3: Enterprise and institutional interdependencies in Varieties of Capitalism 
Source: (Hall & Soskice 2001) 
 
Within each of these institutional domains, a distinction can be made between a 
‘coordinated’ and ‘liberal’ variety. Institutions for corporate governance coordinate 
interaction between financiers and enterprise management. VoC recognizes two 
archetypal forms, bank- (credit) and investor- (equity) based. Banks alleviate agency 
problems by acting as a proxy for a host of owners, thereby mitigating the individual 
costs of close supervision. Investment funds do not monitor the actions of enterprise 
management with like rigor, depending instead on a set of universal metrics of enterprise 
efficiency. However, because investment funds typically face low exit costs due to the 
extensive market for securities (allowing funds to both divest of extant equity and acquire 
stakes in alternative enterprise), management has an incentive to ensure firm performance 
does not significantly or consistently fall below market returns. 
Institutions for training and education envelop academic and vocational institutes, 
responsible for the cultivation of a skilled workforce and the development of scientific 
knowledge. Here as well, VoC distinguishes between a variety characterized by strong 
science/education-enterprise coordination and one wherein constituents are more loosely 
affiliated. In the former, education and research focus on the development of specialized 
and applied knowledge and skills that are intimately related to the productive processes 
within enterprise. By contrast, in the liberal variety, education focuses on the 
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development of generic knowledge and skill and basic scientific research is more 
prominent. Industry and enterprise generally refrain from large investments in specialized 
education, emphasizing general skills and competences that are more fungible.  
Industrial relations concern the coordination of the distribution of costs and proceeds 
of production over labor, management and financiers. Coordinated institutional relations 
are characterized by long-term employment, considerable worker benefits, and 
standardized, negotiated wages. The commitment of enterprise to employees seeks to 
ensure stability in worker-management relations, by ensuring consistent and egalitarian 
outcomes. Thus, wage differentials tend to be relatively low in bargaining-oriented 
systems and volatility is mitigated by corporate efforts to retain workers. Liberal 
industrial relations are characterized by an unmediated relationship between employee 
productivity and wages. Extensive arrangements intended to shield employees from 
conjunctural movements within the economy are absent, and enterprises are 
comparatively free to attract or divest of labor as they see fit. Conversely, employees face 
relatively few constraints in pursuing more lucrative opportunities at competing 
enterprises. 
Finally, inter-firm relations ascribe to the prevailing character of association between 
economic actors. Coordinated institutions prompt enterprise to build extensive relational 
networks with suppliers, clients and other producers, in order to capitalize on economies 
of scale and scope and knowledge exchange. Moreover, enterprises may benefit from 
reduction of environmental turbulence, since partners may be willing to support 
temporarily underperforming enterprise. Within the market-based variety, the extent of 
inter-firm cooperation does not generally extend beyond the terms stipulated by contract, 
and thus competition tends to be more intensive. Although firms forego the potential 
benefits of close inter-firm coordination, they are not encumbered by reciprocal 
obligations and are able to predicate exchange relations purely on concerns of need and 
profitability. Consideration of these four institutional domains led to an archetypal 
empirical distinction between liberal market economies (LMEs), exemplified by the U.S. 
(and to a lesser extent, the U.K.) and coordinated market economies (CMEs), most 
adequately represented by Germany (and to a lesser extent Japan). 
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Arguably to pre-empt allegations of analytic bias induced by the distinctively 
Western origins of VoC, Witt (2010) points to China’s idiosyncratic forms of state and 
enterprise. Establishing the decentralized character of state-market relations and the 
multi-faceted nature of public and private ownership, Witt continues to evaluate the 
institutions for finance, industrial relations, education, intra-firm control and inter-firm 
associations.  
China’s financial institutions, states Witt, are most profoundly influenced by China’s 
political-economic particularities. While corporate financing is bank –rather than equity- 
based, a clear divide runs between the state-owned economy, which is the recipient of the 
overwhelming majority of loans, and the private economy, which has had to resort to 
financing mechanisms other than credit or equity. Furthermore, while VoC postulates that 
the bank-enterprise nexus will motivate close monitoring of the latter by the former, 
enabling long-term, growth-oriented corporate strategies, this is not the case in China. 
Rather, the main coordinative impetus derives from central and local government, which 
allocates loans on basis of its broader economic interests, but does not habitually engage 
in corporate governance. The directive influence of the state thus results in a financial 
system that is neither coordinated nor liberal. 
For the remaining institutions, VoC appears to provide a better fit. While Chinese 
industrial relations are characterized by comprehensive formal institutions for worker 
representation and protection, in fact employee autonomy is found to be marginal, as 
China’s labor union functions as an extension of the state and contracts generally provide 
little rights to redress. Thus, in absence of a functional bargaining mechanism, industrial 
relations are considered most akin to the liberal variety. Within the context of limited 
provisions for long-term financial and corporate strategies and unstable employment 
relations, it is unsurprising that few corporations invest heavily in vocational training, and 
education is overwhelmingly of the generic variety. While within China, enterprises 
habitually engage in a range of forms of longer-term association, such networks are 
generally not conducive to the development and diffusion of knowledge, which can be 
easily appropriated due to the deficiencies of the intellectual property regime. Rather, 
actors convene to exploit economies of scope and scale. The lack of long-term vehicles 
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for joint development and exploitation of knowledge causes Witt to once again opt for the 
liberal predicate. Finally, intra-firm relations are also considered to be of the liberal 
variety, with operational authority generally concentrated at the very apex of the 
enterprise. On basis of this analysis, Witt proposes to classify China as a liberal market 
economy.  
Fligstein and Zhang (2011), repeating the comparative exercise, come to the opposite 
conclusion. The suggestion that China’s economic system might be approximating 
something like a liberal market economy is immediately dismissed due to the undeniable 
persistence of state influence. The analysis thus proceeds as an attempt to define an 
organized [i.e. coordinated] capitalism that according to the authors is a function of the 
institutionalized relationships among state, enterprise and workers. Characterizing the 
Chinese system as one “where government control is high, state ownership of firms 
remains central to the economy, workers are less organized, and a private sector has 
emerged but in the shadow of the state” (2011, p.51), Fligstein and Zhang conclude that it 
bears salient resemblance to the French coordinated market system. However, the authors 
admonish that such a comparison ought to serve as a benchmark for further analysis 
rather than a definitive classification. A great strength of the varieties of capitalism 
literature is that it specifies not only the institutional components of economic systems, 
but also their interdependencies, preventing the kind of indeterminacy regarding 
theoretical constructs with characterizes exceptionalist and transitionalist accounts. 
However, due to its binary taxonomy, it shares with the latter the fact that it only allows 
for a limited set of outcomes. The need to achieve a close fit between the orientation of 
the overall system and the character of the individual institutional spheres prompts 
caricaturization of the ‘liberal-coordinated’ concepts, which in consequence lose much of 
their explanatory power.  
 
Theoretical concerns 
‘Theoretical degrees of freedom’ and ‘conceptual stretching’: Under- and 
over-specification of economic systems 
All of the above literature has made important contributions to knowledge about the 
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Chinese economy. Exceptionalist studies have served as a potent exhibit of the 
consequentiality of indigenous cultural and political phenomena. Transitionalist research 
has explicated the discontinuous nature of China’s economic institutions. Universalist 
literature provides a comprehensive and generic representation of the institutions that 
jointly comprise economic systems, adding to the completeness and comparability of 
analysis. All three paradigms, however, are prone to certain defects. These can be aptly 
framed within the terminology of ‘theoretical degrees of freedom and ‘conceptual 
stretching’’. Campbell expounds how, given the plethora of terms which could be 
introduced to substantiate the relationship between an outcome or state –in this particular 
case, that of the Chinese economy- and a purported coordinating influence, finding ‘an 
“explanation” that seems to fit perfectly becomes inevitable, through [...] total lack of 
“degrees of freedom” ’ (1975, p.179). Explanations wherein two observations are linked 
in discretionary manner through introduction of a multitude of terms (i.e. where the 
number of ‘variables’ greatly exceeds the number of observations) are prone to 
conceptual bias, and analysis may simply serve to substantiate foregone conclusions. A 
straightforward manner in which the risk of such bias can be mitigated is by defining a 
priori the terms that together ought to account for a particular outcome. Not only does 
this impose stringent limits on the number of explanatory or mediating influences that can 
be advanced over the course of analysis, but it also ensures comprehensiveness of the 
conceptual construct. Nevertheless, stipulation of theoretical terms in advance may impel 
another problem, as empirical observations may not acquiesce with the postulated 
attributes of those constructs. In such instances, adherence to a universalist idiom is likely 
to result in ‘conceptual stretching’ (Sartori 1970), causing concepts to overflow the 
boundaries of their original meaning.  
The problems of theoretical degrees of freedom and conceptual stretching are similar, 
but clearly, the former is prone to affect exceptionalist accounts, while universalist 
analyses are likely to suffer from the latter; the transitionalist perspective occupies 
somewhat of a middle ground between the two and is to an extent vulnerable to either 
shortcoming. From a methodological viewpoint, while both impel manipulation of 
explanatory terms, lack of theoretical degrees of freedom forces unjustified selectivity, 
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whereas conceptual stretching promotes inaccurate use of pre-established constructs. 
Because it is easier to assess ex ante the incongruence between universal concepts and the 
Chinese idiosyncrasies identified by exceptionalist research than to determine the validity 
of any exceptionalist account, the approach adopted here is to adhere to an essentially 
universalist conceptualization. The following section considers in detail certain 
fundamental assumptions of varieties of capitalism that confound analysis of the Chinese 
economy. 
 
The theoretical postulations of varieties of capitalism and incongruent cases 
Exceptionalist studies are often unclear as to what constitutes an economic system, and 
without articulation and consideration of its constituent elements it is impossible to assay 
whether purported coordinating influences can truly account for distributions of capital. 
Universalist interpretations are more explicit in this regard but likewise, a great deal is 
taken for granted.  
As regards varieties of capitalism, incompatibility derives not from a flaw in the 
various institutional categories (finance, industrial relations etc.), but rather from the 
underlying assumptions regarding the two basic notions of ownership and exchange. VoC 
considers coordinating mechanisms, the main social mechanisms by which production 
and exchange are organized, only insofar as they aid in the mitigation of transaction costs. 
This bias is induced both by the conceptual indebtedness to the new institutional 
economics (NIE)
10
 and an empirical focus of VoC on national economies where the 
distribution of rights and responsibilities associated with ownership, utilization, and 
transfer of factors of production are firmly embedded within the (superordinate) 
institutions of property right and contract law (Hamilton 2006). These property rights 
specify the nature of interactions that arise over the course of use of property (Furuboth 
and Pejovitch 1972). How costs and utility derived from the transfer or use of a resource 
are deposited amongst actors becomes of primary importance, because utilization of that 
resource implies benefits or detriments beyond those incurred directly by the actor (i.e. 
                                                     
10 In the introduction to ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ (2001), Hall and Soskice draw extensively on the work of 
Williamson, citing him nine times. 
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externalities, Demsetz 1967). The whole question of coordinating mechanisms (i.e. the 
market and the hierarchy) comes forth out of the incapacity of property and contract law 
to fully encompass the range of externalities that may arise out of transaction (Williamson 
2000). Consequently, analysis focuses on processes of alleviating such transaction costs. 
This problem is ultimately reducible to two perennial problems; that of information 
asymmetry (Akerlof, 1970; Coase, 1937; Stiglitz, 2002), and that of asset specificity 
(Williamson, 1983).
11
 Accordingly, the responses within each institutional domain are 
either to 1) avoid exchanges and production prone to effect the onset of such problems 
(i.e. to align productive processes to the utilization of generic and widely available 
resources) and to rely on (relatively) unambiguous informational cues for allocative 
decisions or, 2) to rely on ex-market institutions, providing a greater degree of 
interdependence to assuage the problems of information asymmetry and asset 
specificity
12
. 
 Perspectives that treat the property rights regime as a given rather than the outcome 
of the historical development of exchange relations within a specific spatial context are 
both empirically and conceptually misguided. First, they ignore coordinating mechanisms 
other than those grounded within the principle of contractual obligation. Consideration of 
exchange relations premised on reciprocity rather than contract reveals at least two 
alternative archetypal coordinating mechanisms, those of the state and of the civil society 
(Hollingsworth & Boyer 1997). The consequences of allowing for alternative 
mechanisms of coordination are not merely taxonomical but necessitate an expansion of 
the ‘institutional motive’ beyond the mitigation of transaction costs. Both society and 
state distinguish themselves from the coordinating mechanisms typically considered by 
VoC by the relatively lesser importance of ex ante specification of rights.
13
 Rather, 
whether and how constituents can hold their counterparts accountable is dependent on the 
                                                     
11 Information asymmetry relates to the degree to which the nature of a resource or a course of action prohibits 
ex ante full conveyance of its utility. 
Asset specificity refers to limitations on the deployment of that asset within productive configurations other 
than the contractually stipulated one. 
12 Again see Williamson (1983). 
13 Even in democratic societies, citizens generally do not dictate the rationale and nature of government action 
ex ante, but rather reciprocate ex post by way of the voting mechanism. 
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distribution of political influence within the system. Because different constituencies will 
tend to display diverging preferences for the distribution of the factors of production and 
its output, the distribution (hierarchy) of political influence becomes a crucial determinant 
of the patterns of economic activity within national systems. Thus, if in advancing the 
logic of eliminating transaction costs, the NIE and comparative approaches it inspired 
provided the main coordinating mechanisms of market and hierarchy, the argument has to 
be extended to allow for the crucial role of institutions in shaping and perpetuating the 
distribution of political influence over constituents.
14
 
 
 VoC  
Institutional Motive Efficiency Entitlement 
Institutional 
Principles 
Ownership 
Exchange 
Property 
Contract 
Status 
Obligation 
Coordinating Mechanism Market 
(LME) 
Hierarchy 
(CME) 
State Society 
Institutional Domains Finance/ capital 
Labor 
Inter-actor alignment 
Table 1: Universalist frameworks, assumptions and extensions 
 
The centrality of the institutions of property and contract and the overriding importance 
of eliminating transaction costs within the VoC are at odds with China’s trajectory of 
institutional development. The immediate motivations for the restructuring of property 
relations and mechanisms of coordination following the establishment of the People’s 
Republic were clearly political. Property under communism, while nominally under the 
common purview of the people, was in fact internalized in an economic dictatorship 
administered by way of a central plan. Although the reforms that commenced in 1978 
allowed for the gradual development of private ownership, property rights and contract 
law have retained a tenuous quality throughout. Only in 2007 did the state officially 
endorse the right to private property. Moreover, explanations based solely on the logic of 
transaction costs ignore the patently political quality of the allocation of capital. From the 
                                                     
14 A focal concern within the sociological institutionalism (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 
1983; Barley and Tolbert 1997 etc.). 
30 
 
many accounts (both internal and external) of rampant rent-seeking that pervades all tiers 
of the economic administration to the myriad more complex inter-actor dynamics founded 
on status and reciprocity, it ought to be obvious that analysis on basis of Coasian and 
Williamsonian principles alone, disregarding political influence
15
 will fail to appreciate 
many fundamental aspects of the Chinese ‘variety of capitalism’. 
A second problem within the VoC is the assumption that the systemic proclivity is 
towards the steady state. Considering the juxtaposition between the two proposed 
alternatives (i.e. market-based or organized coordination), it is perhaps not surprising that 
institutional systems are expected to exhibit a systemic propensity towards either close 
coordination or market exchange. This intuition is formalized through the concept of 
institutional complementarity. According to Hall and Soskice, ”institutions can be said to 
be complementary if the presence (or efficiency) of one increases the returns from (or 
efficiency of) the other” (2001, p.17). The influence of such complementarity is held to 
be self-asserting, because “the constraints and possibilities defined by a given institution 
favor other institutions’ functioning” (Amable 2000, p.656). 16  On account of the 
purported increasing returns obtained through the reciprocal alignment of the overall 
institutional system, tendencies towards deviation within individual institutional domains 
are constrained, promoting the onset of a relatively immutable ‘institutional equilibrium’. 
                                                     
15 We can further explicate the necessity to distinguish between transaction-cost and politically impelled 
mechanisms of coordination. While rent-seeking and opportunism clearly has a central place in the NIE 
discourse, the fundamental distinction is between the factors prompting such behavior. For transaction-cost 
economics, the scope for opportunism derives from the inability of contracts to account for the contingencies 
which arise as a result of the attributes of assets. By contrast, within politically driven processes of allocation/ 
appropriation, actors’ capacity for expropriation is a result of the coercive influence derived from their status 
within the socio-political hierarchy. 
16
 Examples of such institutional complementarity abound. Equity (i.e. investment)-based finance is 
complemented by an extensive market for managerial labor. The threat of replacement acts as an additional 
incentive for corporate management to act in accordance with the interests of enterprise owners. Another 
example of such institutional complementarity occurs at the intersection of the institutions for education and 
industrial relations. Long-term employment provides incentives for workers to acquire skills and knowledge 
particular to one industry or enterprise, while industry-wide wage standardization mitigates the risk of skilled 
staff ‘defecting’ to rival enterprises, promoting corporate investment in vocational training. However, the 
trajectory of institutional change has been markedly erratic and has been characterized by continuously 
alternating relationships between the institutions for labor, finance and governance. 
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This assumption too is problematic within the Chinese context. Transitionalist accounts 
aptly describe continuous processes of institutional change and a constantly evolving 
structure of production of the Chinese economic system. The logic of VoC might apply if 
the patterns of change would point consistently towards a definite institutional 
configuration or convergence on a set of technologically and organizationally compatible 
productive processes. However, transformation across the various institutional domains 
has been uneven, unfolding at different speeds and, in certain instances, occurring in 
opposite directions.  
 
Reconciling economics and politics: regulation theory 
Regulation theory
17
 (Aglietta 1998; Aglietta 2000 [1979]; Boyer 1990) has likewise 
sought to elucidate the manner in which institutional arrangements promote a coherent 
productive logic, and shares many of the assumptions of VoC. Yet, owing to its Marxian 
origins, RT has been more sensitive to the political qualities of economic activity, and 
subsumes both institutional motives of efficiency and entitlement. Within the varieties of 
capitalism, the composition of institutional architectures, and therefore the institutional 
motives that they espouse follow from the technical and organizational qualities of the 
productive process (fungible/ transient, specialized/ persistent). By contrast, regulation 
theory considers the cognitive and normative postulations providing the fundamental 
premises for the social organization within economic systems to result from the purposive 
discursive projects of political-economic elites. Underlying each economic system is a 
paradigm for economic development, a concept of control which forms the basis for 
deliberate efforts to construct, develop and perpetuate a particular mode of production 
(Lipietz 1988; Van der Pijl 2012). Such concepts do not indiscriminately represent society 
at large, but promote the interests of a dominant class.
18
 At the same time, in order to be 
                                                     
17  Subsequently, regulation theory is at times referred to as RT. ‘Regulation’ is to be understood as 
‘normalization’ (of social relations), rather than government supervision of industrial activity (Aglietta 1998).  
18 Van Der Pijl follows Marx in defining the interest groups within the capitalist system by the functional forms 
of capital, that is the mode by which returns are extracted. Commodity capital is used exclusively as a medium 
for the exchange of goods (e.g. commercial credit). If commodity capital allows for the exchange of extant 
commodities, money-capital (e.g. corporate loans and equity) enables the exchange of current for future capital. 
Investors and creditors (individual or represented in the aggregate by banks and other financial institutions) 
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broadly perceived as legitimate, these concepts need to account for the interests of other 
constituents. As such, they encompass both notions of efficiency and entitlement.
19
 
It would, however, be erroneous to hold the distribution of capital within any 
economic system to be a direct expression of the concept of control. After all, the myriad 
variations and divergences that naturally accrue during the continuous reproduction of 
relationships of production and exchange - factors simply unaccounted for within a given 
conception and deliberate strategies of defection - all cause modes of accumulation to 
differ from the comprehensive strategies of reproduction within concepts of control 
(Jessop 1990). Rather than determining economic activity in direct fashion, such concepts 
provide actors with a conceptual and discursive point of reference, creating expectations 
as regards behavior of other parties
20
 and delineating a space in which legitimate 
processes of institutional formation and contestation unfold. In order to appreciate the 
nature and degree of pressure to which a concept of control is subjected (and thus the 
degree to which the economic-political compromise propagated by that concept is 
validated or contested), the overall quality of the distribution of capital has to be 
considered separately. Regularities in the allocative process are expressed in a mode of 
accumulation, a systemic relationship between production and consumption, in turn 
intimately associated with the overall characteristic of economic growth. Within the 
extensive mode of accumulation, increases in productivity result from the exploitation of 
                                                                                                                                                 
allocate capital on the basis of the prospect of future returns. Commodity and money capital, representing the 
interests of traders and rentiers, espouses a logic of international economic liberalism, in which the circulation 
of capital is unimpeded and frictionless. In contrast to these concepts, in which rents are extracted through 
arbitration between the myriad potential allocations of capital, the industrial capitalist considers rents to be the 
exclusive outcome of the productive process. Industrial capital (e.g. retained earnings), commanded by the 
captains of large enterprise seeks to perpetuate and expand production. Ensuring the continuity of full-scale 
production at times of economic downturn causes the industrialist conception to advocate the intermediation of 
the state within the circulation of capital. 
19 The notion of ‘concepts of control’ invokes comparison to the notion of ‘institutional logics’, “the socially 
constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which 
individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to 
their social reality” (Thornton & Ocasio 2008, p.101). 
20 Compare Hall and Soskice (2001, p.13): “[W]hat leads the actors to a specific equilibrium is a set of shared 
understandings about what other actors are likely to do, often rooting in a sense of what it is appropriate to do in 
such circumstances”. 
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heretofore unutilized resources and labor (Aglietta 2000; Andreff 1978). Expansion of 
economic activity unfolds without comprehensive technological change. Under intensive 
accumulation, growth occurs primarily because of reconfiguration of productive 
processes where surplus value is created by the substitution of capital for labor, and thus 
the relative share of labor within the productive process decreases (Lipietz 1988). Limits 
exist to the capacity for expansion and thus, sustainability of extensive accumulation. One 
the one hand, these reflect physical constraints on the exertion of the worker (Brenner & 
Glick 1991). On the other, the direct trade-off between working wages and actualized 
surplus value within extensive accumulation prevents the formation of sufficient 
consumption power (and demand) to enable capitalization on scale economies.  
Economic considerations aside, the direct (negative) correlation between the 
expansion of capital and consumption expenditure exerts strain on social stability. When 
the creation of surplus value depends on the direct exploitation of labor, the social strain 
exerted by the expansion of production is exacerbated (Aglietta 2000). These qualities of 
extensive growth precipitate crisis, necessitating an eventual transition towards a 
(predominantly) intensive pattern of accumulation. Indeed, regulation theory holds the 
succession of extensive by intensive growth the primary characteristic of the trajectory of 
capitalist development (ibid). However, to the extent that increasing returns of capital 
impels reinvestment in fixed capital, and in consequence, the progressive substitution of 
labor (see De Schweinitz, 1957), intensive accumulation too will exhibit an endogenous, 
socially destabilizing dynamic. 
Ensuring the continuity of processes of accumulation is the mode of regulation, the 
set of institutions that mitigates destabilizing tendencies by validating certain social 
relationships and behavioral norms. Such a mode of regulation needs to address the wage 
relation (i.e. principles for the disbursement of surplus value to workers), the 
compartmentalization of production (and in particular the nature of competition), and the 
nature of money (and in particular the conditions upon which money is made available) 
(Jessop 1992). 
Notwithstanding its inherent finiteness, extensive accumulation can be sustained for 
a considerable period provided labor and material is available in ample supply and unmet 
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demand exists (Brenner & Glick 1991). Under such conditions, accumulation is expedited 
by constraints on wage growth, and commodity money. The first condition ensures that 
the cycle of production and investment can proceed in an unfettered manner. Moreover, 
imposition of longer work days and more strenuous demands allows for extraction of 
absolute value from labor which in turn may be used for the further expansion of 
production.
21
 Likewise, with access to capital directly contingent on supply of 
commodities, actors will seek to maximize output, which in turn promotes continuous 
addition of fixed capital and labor. Finally, production is organized in accordance with 
economies of scale and scope furnished by extant demand. The distinct impetuses and 
antagonisms of intensive accumulation demand an altogether different mode of regulation. 
Growth occurs predominantly through increases of per worker output, attenuating 
tendencies towards the direct expropriation of workers. Yet, wages ought to allow for 
redistribution of attained surplus value to counteract the marginalization of labor 
occurring through its progressive substitution by capital, and to create the capacity for 
consumption required to absorb the increase of output. The financial regime needs to 
accommodate for technological reconfiguration, and capital is supplied on the basis of 
future expectations rather than current output. Technological development also requires 
enterprise to have considerable discretion in determining the scale and scope of 
production. 
 Together, concept of control, mode of regulation and accumulation regime comprise 
a coherent construct for the analysis of economic systems, better suited to deal with the 
idiosyncrasies of the Chinese case which confound research within the vein of varieties of 
capitalism. Through introduction of the concept of control, regulation theory departs from 
the type of technological determinism
22
that characterizes explanations of institutional 
configurations within the VoC, and explicates the distinctly political influences within the 
process of institutional formation. The establishment of concepts of control is a 
‘hegemonic project’ (Jessop 1990, p.6), which advances the interests of a dominant class, 
                                                     
21 Marxian economics distinguishes between absolute and relative surplus value, the former referring to fact 
that increases in value correspond directly to increases in labor and capital, while the latter signifies that value is 
realized through an increase of labor productivity. 
22 On technological determinism, see Skinner, 1976. 
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but in order to become feasible nevertheless needs to garner the support of other 
economic constituents by explicating the general advantages of the proposed strategy for 
production. In this manner, regulation theory subsumes both issues of efficiency and 
entitlement. Concepts of control are a crucial formative influence on modes of regulation 
since they provide the communal logics and norms for deliberate attempts at institution 
building.
23
 However, the mode of regulation is not fully encapsulated by such 
coordinated, purposive action, but also subject to reflexive and peripheral deviations from 
normalized practice. Nevertheless, by promoting the continuous reproduction of 
particular sets of social behavior, regulation is instrumental in attenuating –although not 
altogether eliminating- the inherent destabilizing tendencies of the process of 
accumulation. Chief amongst these are the inherent limitations of extensive accumulation 
that necessitate, at some point, a transition towards intensive growth. Prima facie, 
regulationist insistence on the disruptive dynamics of accumulation seems to accord 
better with the observed impermanence of Chinese patterns of production and 
institutional configuration than the equilibrium orientation of VoC. Of like importance, 
the regulationist concepts introduced above are predominantly focused on describing the 
dynamics of accumulation and institutional formation, but refrain from stipulating the 
impetus behind these dynamics. Whereas within the VoC, the ‘coordinated’ and ‘liberal’ 
institutional forms are directly retraceable to the archetypal forms of the hierarchy and 
market, regulation acknowledges that the incentive structures and organizing principles 
underlying patterns of accumulation may likewise be instilled by way of society or state. 
 
The dynamic aspects of system performance: the issue of innovation 
Notwithstanding the utility of regulationist concepts one question persists. Transition 
from extensive to intensive accumulation cannot simply be accounted for by a shift in 
regulation. Certainly, such a transition requires technological conditions that allow for the 
development and introduction of more efficient methods of production. Earlier 
                                                     
23 For similar arguments within the space of organizational institutionalism, see for example Dorado, 2005; 
Fligstein, 1996. 
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regulationist accounts availed themselves of the concept of techno-economic paradigms
24
 
(Dosi 1982; Perez 1983; Breschi et al. 2000) to explicate patterns of innovation and the 
institutional influence of technology (Roobeek 1987; Lipietz 1988; Boyer 1988). 
However, referral to an external and universal technological logic can hardly explain the 
persistent differences in the rate or substantive distribution of technological advances 
between economic systems. Reasons for such diverging patterns must lie in the manner in 
which extant institutions facilitate or constrain the development and diffusion of new 
technology. Here, another body of work within the general space of comparative political 
economy (Amable 2000) is of avail. 
The institutional foundations of innovation within economic systems are the main 
focus of work within the area of national innovation systems (NIS, Freeman, 1987; 
Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993). The emphasis of this body of work has been on analysis 
of the necessary institutional conditions for the invention, development, diffusion and 
commercialization of technology. According to the NIS, the general requirements are 
essentially twofold. First, institutions need to mitigate uncertainties inherent in innovation. 
Uncertainty obtains at each stage of the innovative process; whether scientific 
understanding is, or will come to be, capable of inducing a certain function, whether such 
functions can be adequately harnessed and scaled within an industrial configuration 
(Nelson & Rosenberg, 1999), whether actual demand, sufficient to offset the costs of 
technological development exists, and whether innovators will be duly compensated for 
their efforts (Teece 1996). Second, institutions need to facilitate complex coordination 
between a variety of actors. Innovation involves the transfer of knowledge and skills 
which are often tacit and originate within distinct ‘epistemological communities’ 
(Lundvall 1992; Asheim & Gertler 2005). NIS holds that the overall scope and rate of 
technological development hinges on the capacity within national systems to deal with 
the twin problems of uncertainty and coordination. However, this systemic capacity 
extends well beyond the general purview of the aforementioned institutions for labor, 
                                                     
24 Techno-economic paradigms focus on explicating long-wave patterns of productivity (e.g. Kondratiev waves) 
as a result of the interaction of the technological scope resultant from advances in science and the constraints 
further exerted on technological development and implementation by price and demand characteristics. 
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finance and the organization of production and calls for coordination across enterprise, 
market, state and society (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff 2000).  
A related concern is the substantive distribution of technological development. 
Within economic systems, the pace and magnitude of innovation is not uniform across 
industries, but rather tends to be concentrated within particular productive processes. 
Thus, different economic systems tend to display diverging comparative advantages (or 
weaknesses). An explanation for such technological specialization is found in the manner 
in which the technical and organizational demands of distinct production processes 
intersperse with institutionalized patterns of economic behavior (Boyer 2005). Processes 
of production follow dissimilar trajectories of technological development, some unfolding 
in cumulative manner, while others display considerable discontinuity (Dewar & Dutton 
1986; Soete 1985). Additionally, within certain industries, innovation requires adjustment 
of a multitude of interdependent processes, while in others it unfolds in autonomous 
fashion. This implies differences in the commensurate permanence of social ties and 
complexity of interaction between and within the spheres of science and industry and the 
demands imposed on finance, labor and inter-actor alignment. In this manner, the matter 
of national technological specialization bridges the concepts of regulation and innovation 
system.  
 
A framework for analysis of the Chinese economic system 
A main coordinating mechanism 
In the preceding sections, a variety of interpretations of the fundamental characteristics of 
and dynamics within the Chinese economy was presented. Exceptionalist studies 
emphasized how, in spite of the introduction of market exchange and a private component 
of the economy, indigenous political and cultural institutions continue to exert great 
influence over the economy. Transitionalist perspectives have captured the transient 
character of Chinese institutional arrangements. Universalist literature has added to 
analytic rigor by providing comprehensive and coherent conceptual frameworks. Two 
problems were postulated with regards to extant research. First, lack of ex ante theoretical 
specification allows for indiscriminate introduction of explanatory terms, so that any 
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salient observation may appear a plausible cause for the state of the current economy. 
Second, most universalist theory is prone to over-specification, having been built on 
assumptions that originated within capitalist-centric thinking. Two assumptions of the 
varieties of capitalism which are particularly problematic within the Chinese context are 
the purported significance of property rights and market coordination, and the 
institutional proclivity towards a steady state. In order to address these problems while 
avoiding the risk of theoretical under-specification another universalist perspective, 
regulation theory, was introduced. Concerned with explicating the political foundations, 
dynamics of capital-distribution and institutional interdependencies of economic systems, 
regulation theory does not assume the dominance of market-coordination. Moreover, the 
inherent dynamism within and across processes of accumulation seems to better agree 
with the continual change within the Chinese system. 
 The concepts of regulation theory will form the basis for the first empirical section of 
this thesis which is concerned with uncovering a main coordinating mechanism. Four 
such mechanisms have been introduced. The market and hierarchy operate on 
institutional principles of property right and contract, their chief difference existing in the 
interdependency between actors, where the immediateness and explicit delineation of 
actors’ rights and responsibilities within markets impels high sensitivity to supply and 
demand conditions, while the more diffuse quality of intra-organizational contract implies 
greater forbearance (Williamson 1991). Organization in state and society rather adheres to 
principles of status and obligation. In contrast to market and hierarchy, the social contract 
is implicit and communal, and cannot be entered or abrogated at the discretion of any one 
individual. The difference between state and society consists of the mode of compliance, 
the former being de jure and the other de facto. 
 Universalist analysis does not directly address the issue of the coordinating 
mechanism, but rather infers it from the observed characteristics and dynamics of 
production and exchange. The concept of control, providing the cognitive and normative 
underpinnings for a communal template for production, subsumes both motives of 
efficacy and entitlement. In specifying the purported roles of economic actors 
–bureaucrats, labor, financiers, managers etc.-, and coordinating mechanisms, the concept 
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of control not only describes a functional alignment, but also a socio-economic hierarchy, 
prioritizing the interests and prerogatives of certain constituents over those of others. 
Because the mechanisms of state, society, market and hierarchy imply different 
distributions of authority across these actors, their respective status within the concept of 
control provides important clues as to the general orientation of the economic system. 
 Further corroboration of the insights derived from analysis of the concept of control 
can be derived from the distribution of capital over constituents. Examination of the 
accumulation regime allows for further specification of control over capital, by 
considering whether capital displays systemic tendencies to agglomerate within industry, 
finance, bureaucracy or labor. Moreover, diverging motives associated with each of these 
spheres will impel different dynamics within the allocation of capital. At least with 
regards to industry, finance and labor, such relations have been postulated. Thus, the chief 
concern of industry is held to be the incessant operation and expansion of the productive 
cycle, ensuring the continuation of the process of valorization (i.e. creation of surplus 
value) and the “autonomy of the capitalist center” (Aglietta 1979, p.216). For finance, the 
purported motive is the maximization of returns, and therefore the magnitude of 
dividends is prioritized over the stability or expansion of production (Van der Pijl 2012). 
Pursuit of highest returns demands nimble capital, prompting the concentration of capital 
in debt and equity markets. Labor seeks conditions of full employment and rising wages, 
which ought to result in a comparative expansion of wages and consumption expenditure. 
The motives of the bureaucracy are less determinate. Unchecked, government may pursue 
either expansion of the bureaucracy or the maximization of economic output, since both 
bestow upon bureaucrats financial benefits (Przeworski & Limongi 1993). However, to 
the extent that state legitimacy depends on the support of other constituents (i.e. absent 
direct oppression) their interests will also impinge on the bureaucratic remit. Nevertheless, 
the prominence of state coordination may be imputed from such indicators as the size of 
the public sector and volume of fiscal revenue.  
 A second pertinent characteristic refers to the predominant character of accumulation. 
Since extensive and intensive accumulation is subject to distinctive dynamics and 
constraints, they exert different demands on the mode of regulation. Additionally, the 
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quality of accumulation is of great importance to the long term viability of the overall 
system, and analysis thereof serves as a necessary prelude to the more intensive 
discussion of systemic sustainability presented in the second empirical section. 
The mode of regulation is not only relevant in explicating the hierarchy of 
coordinating mechanisms within the spheres of labor, capital and inter-actor alignment, 
but also in explicating their operative logic. Two aspects are of particular interest. 
Analysis of the mode of regulation demonstrates how the institutions of the economic 
system promote establishment of a stable production regime through the continuous 
replication of distinct patterns of social behavior. Of like importance is the manner in 
which coordination across institutional spheres allows for a particular distribution of 
capital over actors and industries. 
  
Concept of control Institutional Motive 
Accumulation regime Institutional 
Principles 
Ownership 
Exchange 
 Coordinating Mechanism 
Mode of regulation Institutional Domains 
Table 2: The universalist framework contextualized in the regulationist idiom 
 
Jointly, the concepts of the regulationist framework allow for inference of the universalist 
principles discussed above. The concept of control, espousing a communal representation 
of the roles allotted to particular actors and the principal mechanisms of organization, and 
dictates the import of technical and normative concerns. The accumulation regime 
describes regularities in the flow of capital, both across investment and consumption and 
across disparate actors. Such flows are expected to correlate to the manner in which rights 
to ownership and principles of exchange are deposited, and thus suggest the 
predominance of either principles of property and contract or status and obligation, and 
more specifically, the operation of these principles in the coordinating forms of market, 
hierarchy, state and society. The mode of regulation encompasses the institutional 
architecture which coordinate labor, capital and the organization of production but 
moreover emphasizes the interdependence between these institutions. The concept of 
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institutional complementarity suggests that the functioning of these institutions tends to 
converge on a single logic, which in turn can be attributed to the specific hierarchy of the 
mechanisms of market, hierarchy, state and society, thus bolstering insights obtained from 
study of the accumulation regime (see table 2). 
 
Gauging sustainability and competitiveness 
Notwithstanding the merits of the regulationist framework, it is unable to provide a 
satisfactory means of examining the two remaining questions posed in the introduction. 
The first of these regards the sustainability of accumulation and thus by extension, of the 
economic system at large. This depends ultimately on the capacity of the system to 
engender the continual reconfiguration of capital, labor and knowledge into constellations 
that yield value over and beyond extant configurations. The incentives and coordinating 
influences exerted by the institutions that govern the processes of technological creation, 
development, diffusion and implementation are the focus of the second empirical section. 
By explicating the quality of relationships required for innovation, NIS allows for the 
characteristics and outcomes of technological change to be contextualized within the 
overall orientation and coordinating influences of the national economic system. 
Nevertheless, it is understood that the ‘national innovation system’ is embedded within 
the economic system at large. Hegemonic concepts of control expound elite views on the 
utility of technology as a productive resource as well as the outcome of a production 
process, and are instrumental in the development of policy. The structure of production 
and distribution of capital and interdependencies between the institutions for finance, 
labor and inter-firm coordination will constrain both the identity of actors within, and the 
scope and orientation of the innovation process. 
A final question regards the qualitative aspects of innovation. Dissimilar productive 
technologies display diverging degrees of homogeneity and interdependency, and 
therefore development demands dissimilar organizational demands. The capacity within 
the various institutional domains to sustain technological development is dependent on 
the capacity to reduce uncertainty and effectuate coordination across the spheres of state, 
science, and furthermore to do so in a manner commensurate with the organization and 
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economic characteristics of particular processes of production. The identification and 
explanation of such instances of institution-industry reciprocity guide the final part of 
empirical analysis, and provide the basis for a discussion of a potential enduring 
comparative institutional advantage and its potential implications for the long-term 
viability of continued accumulation and the tenability of the current mode of regulation. 
 
Prospective contributions 
This study draws on, and seeks to integrate a variety of institutional literatures. Departure 
from pre-established frameworks ought to be validated by provision of insights otherwise 
unobtainable. A central ambition of this research is to allow for due examination of 
China’s idiosyncratic institutions – a focal point among sinologists – by considering their 
consistency and degree of influence across units and levels of analysis. In this manner, a 
priori assumptions of exceptionality, resulting from a lack of theoretical degrees of 
freedom, are avoided. In similar vein, the a priori interdependencies of institutional 
elements assumed within universalist approaches are eschewed in favor of an approach 
which allows for these interrelations to emerge from empirical observation. 
Second, this research seeks to extend insights derived from institutional analysis of 
the economic system to the crucial area of innovation and technological change. 
Regulationist approaches have traditionally treated the innovation as an exogenous factor, 
while the national innovation systems framework focuses narrowly on the subset of 
institutions and relationships directly relating to innovation, without considering their 
embeddedness in the economic system proper. Drawing on theoretical propositions from 
all aforementioned literatures, this research considers the issue of innovation both in 
terms of scale and scope. Further understanding of the relationship between national 
institutional architectures and the systemic propensity for engendering technological 
change is expected to follow from consideration of the aggregate effect of the various 
institutional domains on the capacity of economic actors to deal with uncertainty and 
coordination of development, diffusion and implementation. Moreover, by relating 
institutional orientations to attributes of specific types of technology, -rather than treating 
technological development as a process exerting homogeneous demands across 
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industries- this research aims to demonstrate the interdependency between technological 
development and broader institutional change. 
 
A note on methodology 
Generally, the approach adopted here is that of a historical, contextual analysis. The 
orientation of analysis is both structural and longitudinal. The research considers a 
comparatively long period, commencing with the establishment of the People’s Republic 
of China and extending into the present. The reasons for doing so are twofold. First, 
processes of institutional formation, diffusion and adjustment unfold incrementally and 
generally span decades if not centuries (Williamson 2000; North and Weingast 1989). 
Adequate description and analysis of institutional structures -that is, if postulated 
institutional forms are not to appear like deus ex machina- requires an understanding of 
their antecedents and formative factors, and thus adoption of a long-term view. These 
evolutionary processes are particularly relevant within the context of China where, as 
mentioned previously, institutional arrangements display a peculiar transience. 
Disentangling enduring dynamics of coordination from ephemeral interspersion requires 
repeated observation over time, and thus trajectories of institutional development need to 
be considered in their entirety. However, frequency is no proxy for centrality, and as such 
repeated observation of one or the other dynamic within the process of capital allocation 
alone cannot demonstrate its overriding importance. 
Postulation of one or the other coordinating mechanism however prompts 
expectations of consistency among institutional principles and motives, and 
correspondingly, among the interdependency of accumulation regime, mode of regulation 
and concept of control. Thus if one or the other regularity in the distribution of capital 
over productive processes and constituents is to be considered the coordinating 
mechanism, its influence ought to be expressed across the constituent parts of the 
institutional architecture as well as across the analytic units of concept, mode and regime. 
For example, Aglietta (2000 [1979]) described a ‘Fordist’ mode of production predicated 
on a tripartite covenant between enterprise, society (labor) and government, propagated 
and sustained through the ‘corporate-liberal’ discourse of the New Deal (Van der Pijl 
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2012). Under Fordism, long-term finance and extensive corporate control over the 
organization of labor allowed for bureaucratic planning, promoting the perpetual and 
incremental reorganization of standardized productive processes to achieve economies of 
scale and quality improvements. Simultaneously, strong unions and institutional wage 
increases not only alleviated antagonism between capital owners and workers, but also 
provided the latter with the requisite disposable income to sustain mass production. 
Although it is not necessarily so that, at any particular point in time, institutional motive, 
principle and coordinating mechanism are aligned, such alignment is a prerequisite for 
systemic stability and therefore, ought to be inferable in the aggregate. For this reason too, 
it is important that analysis takes on a longitudinal character. 
The second section of this thesis, examining the capacity of the Chinese economic 
system to promote and sustain continuous innovation reconciles the conceptual 
framework of innovation systems with the regulationist theory by analyzing discourse, 
institutions and patterns of technological development and embedding it within the 
broader structural analysis. 
Because the thesis encompasses a multitude of aspects of the economic systems, it 
draws on an extensive array of data. Since the development, contestation and propagation 
of concepts of control is a process unfolding predominantly within the political sphere
25
 
(Van der Pijl 2012; see also Schmidt 2007), focus is on political discourse. Government’s 
five-year plans (wu nian jihua) are of particular use since they are the product of a 
compromise between various relevant actors. Examination of the mode of accumulation 
is based chiefly on statistical material, and three datasets in particular. The ‘historical 
national accounts of the People’s Republic of China’ (1997, State Statistical Bureau of the 
P.R.C.-Hitotsubashi University) comprises a wide array of macro-economic indicators for 
the period 1952 to 1978. Until 1978, Chinese national accounting followed the socialist 
material planning system (MPS), which divided flows of capital on basis of sectoral 
allocation and output in terms of the output of industrial and consumption goods. Within 
the ‘historical accounts’, MPS-data has been converted to estimates of indices of the 
standard system of national accounts in accordance with the computational practices 
                                                     
25 ‘Political’ here is meant to refer to the political apparatus (i.e. the state and Party). 
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maintained by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). As such, the data for the 
period 1952 to from the ‘historical accounts’ is directly comparable with post-reform data 
from the China Statistical Yearbooks (NBS). The macro-economic data of the ‘historical 
accounts’ is complemented by the ‘China compendium of statistics 1949-2004’ [xin 
zhongguo wushiwu nian tongji ziliao huibian] (NBS, 2005), which provides a large array 
of relevant socio-economic indicators and information on state allocations. Finally, 
analysis of the features of the institutional architecture depends on relevant policy 
documents and secondary studies. 
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PART I  
 
IN SEARCH OF A MAIN COORDINATING 
MECHANISM 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
CHINA’S CONCEPT OF CONTROL: FROM MAOIST-LENINIST 
INDUSTRIALIZATION TO THE SOCIALIST MARKET ECONOMY 
 
Introduction 
The theoretical section presented two complementary perspectives on economic systems. 
Approaches in the vein of comparative capitalism, such as the varieties of capitalism and 
regulation theory consider the interrelation between dominant interests and principles, 
structures of governance and patterns of distribution of capital over actors and productive 
processes. The national innovation systems literature examines how institutionalized 
incentives and coordination determine the system’s capacity to engender technological 
development, a prerequisite for the sustainability of the social organization of production. 
This first part of the thesis, follows the comparative capitalism and focuses  on the 
cognitive and normative foundations, instruments and distributive implications of 
economic governance. The theoretical section demonstrated how national economic 
systems can be conceived of as composed of three elements; a concept of control, a mode 
of accumulation and a mode of regulation. This chapter, the first of five empirical 
chapters, focuses on the concept of control. The concept of control constitutes an elite 
representation of the social organization of production and distribution of capital. 
Although clearly, this concept can hardly be held wholly responsible for the actual 
distribution of capital within national economies, it delineates the discursive space in 
which the policy programs unfolded that shape formal economic institutions (c.f. Schmidt 
2007). By propagating a selective strategy for material reproduction and concomitant 
scheme for the allocation of capital over economic processes and actors, it mediates 
between the economic and political spheres. This dual character impels both functional 
and normative questions.  
As regards the functional-economic dimension, how does a particular concept of 
control promote the consistent and continuous enactment of economic relationships, 
thereby providing the opportunity for a particular mode of production to sustain itself? 
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Additionally, since different modes of production imply divergent distributions of capital 
over actors, it is relevant to ask whose interests are championed by particular concepts of 
control (Jessop 1992). Nevertheless, the desiderata of one particular constituency must 
somehow be reconciled with the perceived general interest, if a conception is to garner 
widespread societal support (Van der Pijl 2012).  
The abovementioned functional and normative considerations will guide subsequent 
analysis of China’s concepts of control. The strategy for economic development pursued 
in the three or so decades following the initial proclamation of the ‘reforms and opening 
up’ (gaige kaifang) has often been referred to as one of “crossing the river by feeling for 
stones
26” (e.g. Dunford & Yeung, 2010; Lin, 2011; Xu, 2011). Accordingly, researchers 
have emphasized the gradual and incremental aspects of policy (e.g. Cai and Treisman 
2006; Heilmann 2008). For example, Deans asserts that “of central importance to 
understanding the post-socialist state in China is the fact that the current economic system 
is not the result of a coherent strategic plan. Instead the current economic structure in the 
PRC is the result of a series of ad hoc and occasionally contradictory reforms 
implemented over a period of 25 years which were informed by short- and medium-term 
considerations and were marked by considerable compromise and negotiation.” (2004, 
p.136). Functionalist fallacies aside, such interpretations neglect two important aspects of 
the reform-era conception of the project of economic development. 
Commencing with examination of the predominant template for material 
reproduction under the communist era, this chapter argues first, that conceptual changes 
which have since resulted in the current notion of a ‘socialist market economy’ (shehui 
zhuyi shichang jingji) cannot simply be attributed to ‘isomorphic pressures’,27 but have 
accorded with the inherent criteria for paradigmatic stability. As the post-socialist 
economic conception has sought to formulate its response to a successive set of 
developmental conundrums, it has increased in cogency, promoting the perpetuation of 
                                                     
26 The adage of crossing the river by feeling the stones (mozhe shitou guo he) has often been mistakenly 
ascribed to Deng Xiaoping, but was in fact first uttered by Chen Yun during a meeting of Government Council 
in 1950. As shall be related below, Chen Yun’s influence on Deng’s approach to economic development was 
far-reaching. 
27 See DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977. 
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the extant socio-economic hierarchy. Secondly, the concept of control which took shape 
in the subsequent period of reform in many ways represents an extension, rather than a 
break from, or contradiction of the functional and normative logic of the communist-era 
political-economic elite. Thus, the reforms of 1978 were in large part an enactment of a 
pre-existing template for economic governance which had however been suppressed by 
factional rivalry. Instead of seeking to extract the Party-state apparatus from the 
economic processes of production and allocation, along the lines of Western-style liberal 
capitalism, what was envisaged was rather a system in which production and exchange 
would be governed predominantly by the market while government and Party retained 
the broad mandate of macro-economic control, which extended to both financial and 
monetary and developmental policy as well as ownership of upstream and strategic 
industry. 
 
The communist paradigm of industrialization 
The vindication of the communist forces over the Nationalist Party in 1949 heralded a 
period of great change extending to virtually all aspects of social and economic life. 
Hitherto, China had been an agricultural empire. In the latter era of the Qing Dynasty, 
rapid expansion of the population, civil unrest and foreign incursion had resulted in 
economic stagnation and political impotence. While the establishment of the Republic of 
China in 1912 spelled the official end of two millennia of imperial rule, warlords 
continued to administer regions under their purview as local fiefdoms (Schoppa 2000). 
Constant turmoil and the perpetuation of pre-modern institutions obstructed the process of 
industrialization which had radically transformed relationships of ownership and 
production in most of the Western world. China’s economic backwardness, framed within 
the ideological backdrop of an inevitable clash between capitalist and socialist societies, 
led the Chinese Communist Party, seizing power in 1949, to regard rapid industrialization 
as the major imperative. Accordingly, the first of China’s five-year plans (wu nian jihua) 
stated: 
 
The adoption of a strategy of active socialist industrialization and the prioritization of 
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heavy industry is necessary for the establishment of a strong army, satisfaction of the 
people’s needs and the creation of a material foundation for a socialist transformation. 
Therefore, we must make the establishment of a basis for heavy industry the focus of the 
draft of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy[…] 
Agriculture furnishes the conditions for the development of industry. Just like comrade 
Mao Zedong has said in his “On coalition government:”The peasants…are the main 
actors within the Chinese industrial market. Only they can provide abundant grain and 
raw materials, and absorb the major part of industrial products.
28
 
 
The CCP’s template for economic development reiterated the basic tenets of the theories 
of Fel’dman and Preobrazhensky, who propagated that in the division between 
Department I and II,
29
 development of the former ought to predominate. Department II 
would provide the required investment for the expansion of Department I by way of the 
‘price-scissors’ mechanism, wherein prices for agricultural produce were depressed 
(Knight 1995). In turn, industry would manufacture producer goods for agriculture, which 
increased the efficiency of agricultural production and thus yield greater surplus value, 
which would subsequently be reinvested in the development of Department I. The 
ensuing pattern of mutually complementary growth of both Departments would effectuate 
a trajectory of accelerated growth.
30
  
In the context of this particular paradigm for the eventual realization of the socialist 
stage of development, the uprooting of traditional ownership relations was as much an 
economic necessity as a restoration of the natural integrity of the nexus of labor and 
production (and abrogation of the predatory features of landlordism), which had been 
crucial in the CCP’s securing support of the peasant class (Selden 1995). 
  
                                                     
28 SPC 1952, zhonghua renmin gongheguo fazhan guomin jingji de di yi ge wu nian jihua [First five-year plan 
for the development of the national economy of the P.R.C.], Chapter 1. 
29 Within Marxian economics, heavy industry (producing producer foods for its own expansion), and industry 
providing producer goods for the development of agriculture are jointly referred to as Department I, while 
agriculture, producing goods for consumption, is referred to as Department II. 
30  This expansionary strategy was vehemently opposed by Bukharin who insisted on the simultaneous 
development of light industry to ensure a steady flow of capital. 
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The establishment of the People’s Republic of China, led by the working classes, and the 
nationalization of the economic lifelines provide us with the opportunity to develop and 
transform the Socialist economy in accordance with the plan, and to gradually let 
China’s backward agricultural economy become an advanced socialist industrial 
nation.
31
 
 
Although consensus existed within the Party-state on the broad principles of socialist 
industrialization and public administration of heavy industry, there existed considerable 
divergence in opinion regarding the overall scope of state control and central planning. 
Contention centered on three interrelated issues: the appropriate ratios of investment and 
growth ratios of the two Departments; distribution of fiscal influence over the center, local 
government and the collective and respective roles of economic planning and market 
exchange within the allocation of resources and goods; and the adequate roles of the social 
and technical imperatives within the economic production. The immediate occasion for 
the debate which continued through most of the communist period was the lag in growth 
of agricultural output under the first five-year plan.
32
 Moderates such as Chen Yun, who 
headed the State Capital Construction Commission, attributed this shortcoming to the 
excessive burden imposed on the agricultural sector, and therefore proposed a more 
balanced trajectory of development for the agricultural and industrial sectors.. 
 
Experience proves that industrialization with heavy industry at its core cannot and ought 
not to be undertaken in isolation; it must accord with all other elements, especially 
agriculture. Agriculture is an indispensible requirement for the development of industry 
and even the entire economy. Retarding the development of agriculture will not only 
affect light industry and the improvement of people’s livelihood, but will also greatly 
affect the development of heavy industry and indeed the economy proper, and influence 
the consolidation of industrial and agricultural unity. Therefore, we must continue to 
expediently develop agriculture and realize the mutual coordination of the development 
                                                     
31 SPC 1952, Chapter 1. 
32 1953-1957 
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of agriculture and industry.
33
 
 
Notably, this assessment was shared by Mao. In a seminal speech given that same year 
the Chairman, while insisting on the essential correctness of the preceding pattern of 
development, acknowledged that subsequently, accumulation would require 
reconsideration of the relationships between the economic departments:”Our current 
predicament is that we must appropriately adjust the investment ratios between heavy and 
light industry and agriculture and increase the development of agriculture and light 
industry.” However, Mao reiterated the principle of prioritizing heavy industry.34 
The consensus of Party and state leaders concerning sectoral adjustment however came to 
serve as an entry point for a more comprehensive discussion regarding the mechanisms of 
coordination and distribution of control (Brødsgaard 1983). Bo Yibo, chair of the State 
Economic Commission was convinced that economic success was strongly dependent on 
full exploitation of the ‘socialist advantage’ of centralized planning. 
 
No matter whether it concerns the deployment of construction or the allocation of 
investment, or the confirmation and planning of production indicators, whether it involves 
the adjustment and allocation of raw material and products, all of these must proceed from 
a holistic perspective, so as to guarantee the focal points and consider the general; our 
nation’s limited labor, material and fiscal resources must be rationally utilized where the 
need is most pressing, their effect most prompt, and their use the greatest. To do this, we 
must most certainly consolidate command and unify planning.
35
 
 
Within the State Planning Commission, by contrast, a concern that centralized planning 
was unfit to effectively deal with the diverse industrial conditions and demands of the 
localities, and therefore advocated decentralization of control to sub-national levels 
government (Donnithorne 1964). Chen Yun went yet one step further, arguing for a role 
                                                     
33 Zhou 1956, guanyu fazhan guomin jingji de di er ge wu nian jihua de jianyi de baogao [Report on 
suggestions concerning the second plan for the development of the national economy]. 
34 Mao 1956, lun shi da guanxi [On the ten major relationships]. 
35 Bo, February 24, 1959 People’s Daily [renmin ribao]. 
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for both state planning and market allocation. According to Chen, within light industry 
and agriculture, material allocation, stipulated production quota and undifferentiated 
prices had limited diversity in material supplies, reduced the output of secondary products 
(i.e. auxiliary sources of revenue) and introduced quality problems. Consequently, Chen 
proposed the partial reinstatement of market relations in light industry: 
 
As for basic commodities related to the national economy and peoples’ subsistence, such 
as cotton, cloth, coal and sugar, we must continue to implement overall national 
procurement so as to ensure supply and a stable market. For the highly diverse 
commodities for daily use, we must gradually retract overall procurement and revert to a 
method of selective buying…for common products for selective purchase, the 
commercial departments have priority; and products not subject to selective purchase or 
those that remain can be sold by the manufacturing units themselves or by entrusted 
commercial departments
36
 
 
Moreover, Chen extended his suggestion on allowing production and exchange outside the 
plan to the agricultural sector (Chen, 1956). This deviation from the Marxist-Leninist 
precepts of economic organization proved unacceptable to Mao. In a critique to the State 
Capital Construction Commission’s proposed adjustments to economic coordination, Mao 
insisted that: “basic construction ought to strengthen the leadership of the Party and 
mobilize the masses”. 37  Mao’s statement reflected his strong emphasis on the 
development of the ‘socialist consciousness’ at the expense of the technical requirements 
of production.
38
 Subsequently, the ideological rift between proponents of a strategy 
                                                     
36 Chen 1956, shehui zhuyi gaizao jiben wanchengyihou de xin wenti [New problems in the wake of the 
essential completion of the socialist transformation ]. 
37 Mao 1958, dui jianwei dangzu guanyu dangqian jiben jianshe gongzuo ji ge wenti de baogao de piyu 
[Critique addressed to the Party organ of the Basic Construction Commission regarding the report of several 
problems within the work of basic construction]. 
38 Marxist-Leninist economic theory holds that attainment of the socialist ideal critically depends on four 
conditions: completion of the socialization of capital and the reproduction of productive forces; and the 
pervasion of socialist consciousness and understanding of material and technical conditions. Whereas the 
understanding of material conditions and the internalization of the technology of material reproduction 
develops by an incremental process of learning and instruction, the transformation of social relations is a 
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chiefly informed by the technological qualities of economic production and coordination 
those supporting political mass mobilization came to delineate a division between the 
economic bureaucracy, headed by leaders such as Chen Yun, Bo Yibo and Zhou Enlai 
(who would become the driving force behind the economic reforms of 1978) and the 
conservative Party-faction headed by chairman Mao (Lieberthal 1997). The discord 
amongst China’s leadership prompted Mao to overturn his support for a more balanced 
trajectory of development. Under the banner of anti-revisionism, the chairman ushered 
China’s economy into the Great Leap Forward (da yuejin).39 During the Great Leap, the 
relationship between agriculture and industry was greatly altered so as to prioritize the 
latter (see table 3). 
 
 Grain Steel 
September 1956 500 m. tonne 10-12 m. tonne  
August 1958 1.5 bn. tonne 80 m. tonne 
June 1961* 310-320 m. tonne 10 m. tonne 
Realized in 1962 160 m. tonne 6.7 m. tonne 
* Quota for 1963 
Table 3: Planning the Great Leap Forward; production quota for grain and steel output for the 
year 1962 
Sources: Zhou 1956, guanyu fazhan guomin jingji de di er ge wu nian jihua de jianyi de baogao 
[Suggestions concerning the second five-year plan for the development of the national economy]; 
Party Organ of the State Planning Commission 1958, guanyu di er ge wu nian jihua de yijian 
[Opinions on the second five-year plan]; Party Organ of the State Planning Commission 1961, 
guanyu di er ge wu nian jihua hou liang nian buchong jihua de baogao [Report on the 
supplementary plan for the two years subsequent to the second five-year plan] 
 
The uprooting of economic organization proved catastrophic,
40
 yet voices calling for 
economic development through balanced restructuring and expansion failed to make a 
                                                                                                                                                 
revolutionary process (Schran 1962). 
39 1958-1961. 
40 The primary cause of the widespread famine precipitated by the Great Leap Forward was the major 
increase in agricultural output expropriated by government (Bernstein 1984; Li & Yang 2014). The 
agglomeration of agricultural production into giant communes was believed to bring about a commensurate 
upturn in output, yet failed to do so as collectivization attenuated peasants’ incentives and extensive welfare 
arrangements induced wasteful consumption. 
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lasting impression. Adjustments introduced to balance investment ratios between 
agriculture and heavy industry were by and large reversed during the third five-year plan 
period (1966-1970).
41
 Moreover, political antagonizing against ‘revisionist’ tendencies 
posed stringent constraints on the scope for expansion of light industry. More than that, 
Mao’s economics ensured that on the whole, the rate of investment allocated to the 
construction and development of industry far surpassed those implied by the original 
thesis of Fel’dman and Preobrazhensky. 
 
The conceptual legacy of the socialist paradigm of industrialization 
The paradigm for economic development which characterized the period from 1949 until 
the reforms which commenced in the 1970s acquiesced with the Marxist-Leninist model. 
The centrally administered transfer of agricultural surplus to industry was to ensure the 
accelerated insertion of the Chinese economy into the global frontier and provided the 
general outlines for the nature and social organization of production. However, beyond 
this broad imperative, conceptions amongst China’s political-economic elite regarding the 
appropriate methods and trajectory of economic development were marked more by a set 
of consistent debates then by consensus.  
                                                     
41
 Within the period directly following the Great Leap, central government’s concern was to “vigorously 
develop agriculture so as to essentially solve the people’s problems with nutrition and clothing[…].]In 
accordance with these basic tasks, the method of planning has changed considerably, that is to say, that 
planning will comply also with the precept that agriculture constitutes the basis.” SPC 1964, di san ge wu nian 
jihua de chubu shexiang [Preliminary thoughts on the third five-year plan]. 
However, deteriorating international relations resulted in a shift of emphasis to the construction of an 
inland industrial basis (the so-called “Third Front”), which was to preclude the disruption of the national 
economy in the case of a foreign incursion. “Expediting the construction of the Third Front is a major 
strategic decision of tremendous historical significance made by the Chairman in 1964. We must heed the 
instructions of the Chairman and swiftly construct the Third Front, and gather the nation’s labor, material, 
finances so as to gradually build up the defence industry, natural resource, materials, fuel, power, machine 
and chemical industries and the transportation and logistics system, and let the Third Front become a 
large-scale strategic rearguard. This relates to the overall deployment of the third five-year plan.”(SPC 1965, 
guanyu di san ge wu nian jihua anpai qingkuang de huibao tina [Outline of the report on the preparation of 
the third five-year plan] ). Ironically, the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations was precipitated in part by the 
disagreement between Mao and Khrushchev regarding the appropriate means by which economic 
development was to be brought about. 
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The first of these concerned the respective roles of the technical and social aspects of 
economic production. While Soviet leadership embraced Taylorian concepts of work 
organization and Fordist standardized manufacturing techniques, deeming it a natural 
complement to, and logical extension of central planning (Hughes 2004). No such 
overtures to the prowess of American industrial organization were made by Mao and his 
confidants. While leadership within the economic bureaucracy was concerned with the 
‘technical aspects’ of economic development, the CCP, with Mao at the helm emphasized 
the development of socialist consciousness amongst the working masses, combining a 
system of incessant and ubiquitous propaganda with periodic mass movements such as 
the Great Leap Forward (Shambaugh 2007). 
 Nested within this larger debate was a set of issues related to the appropriate 
distribution of resources and productive activity within the Chinese economy, as well as 
its concomitant coordinating mechanisms. Throughout the communist era, leaders of the 
State Economic Commission and State Capital Construction Commission repeatedly 
argued for a more moderate ratio of investment in industry, allowing agriculture and light 
industry to develop on a more even footing and preventing excessive accumulation of 
capital within Department I from creating shortages in Department II. Moreover, 
disagreement existed on the appropriate roles of allocation by market and plan. As 
attested to by Chen’s statement, some of China’s economic leadership was convinced that 
the engrossing quality of the economic plan placed undue constraints on the development 
of Department II and thus exacerbated imbalances introduced by the price-scissors 
mechanism. Allowing for the development of a contained market for consumables was 
believed to mitigate many of the quality and supply problems. Secondly, throughout the 
communist era, there existed an ongoing discussion regarding the appropriate balance of 
influence between central and sub-central government, as well as between that of the state 
and the Party. While some were ardent proponents of the virtues of central planning, 
others espoused concerns regarding responsiveness to varying local conditions. The 
discussion regarding the appropriate distribution of bureaucratic control led to periodic 
bouts of decentralization, followed by countervailing centripetal dynamics (Lieberthal & 
Oksenberg 1988; Lyons 1990).  
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As a result of the contention between ideological and technocratic influences within 
Party and bureaucracy, the strategy for economic development under communism 
exhibited marked volatility. Compounding this instability was the insistence on an 
excessively high rate of inter-sectoral transfer. While the template for ‘socialist 
industrialization’ clearly marked a finite stage within the broader trajectory towards 
communism, the neglect of agriculture precipitated structural macro-economic imbalance. 
When ideological concerns attenuated following Mao’s death and the subsequent ousting 
of the ‘Gang of Four’42 in 1976, the urgent need to tend to the functional shortcomings of 
the Maoist-Leninist concept of control ensured the aforementioned issues regarding the 
appropriate relations between economic sectors, center, locality and enterprise, planning 
and market came to define to a large extent the political-economic discourse of the 
subsequent era. 
 
The strategy for economic development in the reform period: “crossing the 
river by feeling the stones” 
1978-1993 Reform and opening up 
The death of Mao and removal of the radical ‘gang of four’ in 1976 put a decisive end to 
the Cultural Revolution and allowed leadership to once more take economic development 
as its main priority. Mao’s persistent emphasis on the expedited development of industry 
had resulted in acute shortages in agriculture, not only rendering the ‘price-scissors’ an 
utterly infeasible instrument for further industrial development but also constraining 
supply of basic commodities. Problems were compounded by the neglect of light industry. 
With Mao’s influence waning, economic policy came to “regard agriculture as the 
foundation and industry as the guide… and to prepare the plan for the national economy 
in agreement with the order of agriculture, light industry and heavy industry”.43 Mao’s 
                                                     
42 The Gang of Four (si ren bang), a clique comprised of Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang 
Hongwen rose to prominence during the Cultural Revolution. 
43
 Zhou 1975, zai zhonghua renmin gongheguo di si jei quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di yi ci huiyishang de 
baogao [Report delivered at the first meeting of the fourth plenum of the National People’s Congress].  
Note: Zhou Enlai had already expounded the necessity of developing agriculture in order to develop industry 
as early as 1949. Likewise, his ideas about decentralization of government authority and the coexistence of 
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immediate successor, Hua Guofeng however maintained the  precept of coordination by 
plan and the strategy of accelerated accumulation.
44
 It was not until Hua was superseded 
by Deng Xiaoping that the state began to chart the course for a novel trajectory of 
development. Unfettered by the ideological constraints faced by Zhou and his peers, 
Deng expounded the strategy of ‘internal reform and (duinei gaige, duiwai kaifang) at the 
third interim meeting of the eleventh National People’s Congress in December 1978. In 
line with Chun Yen’s propositions, the agricultural sector became the focal point of initial 
reforms. 
 
The nation issues purchase quota, appoints responsibilities and acquisition volumes for 
complementary rural output. For surplus, a portion is purchased at increased price, a 
portion is bought at lowered prices, and a portion is not procured and can be sold by the 
farmers themselves.
45 
 
The attenuation of administrative control over the agricultural sector did not only promote 
agricultural production, but also drove the expansion of light industry, which absorbed 
excess rural labor. Because of this rapid growth, the sectoral imbalance which had 
impeded development in the period preceding reforms quickly diminished. As reforms 
progressed, the contract responsibility system (jiating lianchan chengbao zerenzhi), 
which allowed farmers to retain and sell for a profit any output above state-contracted 
quota, was extended to the public industrial sector. In tandem with marketization, greater 
fiscal autonomy was granted to local government. Fiscal decentralization provided a 
further incentive to market development as taxes levied on enterprise became a main 
source of revenue for local authorities.  
Although it is questionable to what extent the reforms comprised a truly coherent 
                                                                                                                                                 
public and private ownership predated the reforms by some two decades (Hu 2008). 
44 Hua famously declared his support for Mao’s policies in an article in the People’s Daily  (February 1977), 
stating:”Whatever Chairman Mao’s policies, we must persist in upholding them; whatever Chairman Mao’s 
instructions we must faithfully heed them from strart to finish” 
45 State Council 1982, zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan de liu ge wu nian jihua 
(tina) [Summary of the sixth five-year plan for economic and social development], Chapter 9. 
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conception of control,
46
 at least two of its key aspects, decentralization and marketization, 
had already been forcefully advocated by central figures within the economic bureaucracy 
in the communist period. Thus, while Deng Xiaoping’s strategy of ‘reform and opening 
up’ (gaige kaifang) has often been touted as a visionary break from the ‘socialist’ mold, 
its main tenets were neither new nor in contradiction to extant indigenous interpretations 
of China’s economic system. 
 
1993-2003: Stabilization and consolidation 
The diminishing relevance of central material allocation and production quota impelled a 
discussion amongst China’s economic leadership regarding the appropriate relationship 
between market allocation and planning. The need to articulate the role of the market and 
non-public economy within the Chinese economic system gained additional urgency due 
to popular pressure for political liberalization. This debate pitted Deng, who 
unambiguously supported the continuation of economic reforms against more 
conservative leaders such as Li Peng,
47
 who insisted on the need for strong central 
economic control. The resultant comprise was the promulgation of the ‘socialist market 
economy’ (shehui zhuyi shichang jingji) in 1992.  
 
The economic system of market socialism that is to be established is one wherein, under 
the macro-control of the socialist state, the market fulfills its basic function in the 
allocation of resources, where economic activity accords with the demands of the law of 
value
48
 and changes in supply-demand relationships…At the same time the inherent 
                                                     
46 In a speech given during his influential Southern tour (nanxun) of 1992, Deng himself admitted that he had 
not fully contemplated the roles of capitalist organization and operation, and that its limits could only be 
appreciated by way of experimentation. Deng 1992, zai wuchang,shenzhou, zhuhai, shanghai deng de tanhua 
yaodian [Main points of the Wuchang, Shenzhou, Zhuhai and Shanghai speeches]. 
47 However, as evidenced by the decision to violently quell the Tiananmen protests of 1989, Deng did not 
tolerate the notion of political reforms. 
48 Discussions surrounding the Marxian concept of ‘law of value’ (Chinese: jiazhi falü) would occupy the 
political economic establishment throughout the communist era (see Brødsgaard 1983). According to Marx, 
capitalism distorts the relationship between labor and value by way of interjection of the wage-labor nexus on 
the supply side and commodification (operating under the principles of exchange value rather than labor value) 
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weaknesses and inertia of the market must be recognized, and the state’s 
macro-economic control must be bolstered and improved.
49
 
 
Expounding the subsequent foci of efforts to develop the socialist market economy, 
Jiang Zemin (then General Secretary of the Central committee of the CCP) 
emphasized four issues: 
 
1) Increasing fiscal and operational autonomy of state-owned enterprise (large SOEs in 
particular) so as to let them take on the responsibility of maintaining the value of 
state-owned assets. Improving the structure of public economy through reorganization 
and market competition. 
2) Accelerating market coordination of resources, capital and labor and eradicating 
administrative and regional divisions. 
3) Redistributing revenues and expenses amongst state and enterprise and center and 
locality through the introduction of a standardized taxation system and reforming wage 
and social benefit systems 
4) Ensuring government focuses on overall planning, economic restructuring and 
supervision, and separating government and enterprise.
50
 
 
Although at the time, many regarded policy under Jiang to be an extension of Deng’s 
market reforms, emphasis on public sector restructuring and the separation of economic 
administration and production were a direct reaction to the volatility which had 
characterized the economic development during the first period of reforms.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
on the demand side. While socialist organization was to forestall the onset of such a discrepancy, others argued 
that central administration on basis of central plan could not adequately account for heterogeneity (in quality) 
amongst commodities and actual demand schedules. The concept of the socialist market economy prioritized 
resolution of the latter problem.  
49 Jiang 1992, jia kuai gaige kaifang he xiandaihua jianshe bufa,duoqu you zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi de 
gengda shengli [Accelerate the pace of reform, opening up and modernization, and strive to achieve an even 
greater victory for the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics]. 
50 Jiang 1992. 
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The overall balance of the economy is faced with certain problems. Ensuring a basic 
balance between the overall needs of and provisions for society, preventing excessive 
allocation of national revenue and inflation are major issues. Gleaned from a historical 
perspective, when economic development proceeds by leaps and bounds, this brings 
about a superficial pursuit for rapid growth; the scale of investment becomes excessive 
and consumption funds inflated, which brings on macro-economic imbalance and major 
distortions, which are incorrigible afterwards.
51
 
 
In conjunction with efforts to curb the overall scale of industrial investments, 
macro-economic control was to focus on the structural aspects of development by 
delineating sectoral foci of economic development. The policy of ‘retaining the large and 
releasing the small’ allowed the state to consolidate its control over, and responsibility for 
enterprise, focusing on large firms in profitable industry. Simultaneously, the state had 
commenced with the selection of a select group of ‘backbone enterprises’ (gugan qiye) 
which were to ensure China’s international economic competitiveness. 52  These 
enterprises, concentrated in pillar industries (zhizhu chanye) providing producer goods 
and industrial infrastructure, operated directly under the purview of the center.
53
 
 
Public capital must be prioritized within overall societal capital; and the state-owned 
economy must control the national economic lifelines, and exert a leading function in 
economic development.
54
 
 
When reforms commenced in 1978, the proposals of Chen Yun and other economic 
                                                     
51 Li 1991, guanyu guomin jingji he shehui fazhan shi nian guihua he di ba ge wu nian jihua de gangyao de 
baogao [Report on the outlines for the ten-year program for national social and economic development and the 
eight five-year plan], Chapter 3. 
52 Li 1991, Chapter 3. 
53 State Council 1996, zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan “jiu wu” jihua he 2010 
nian yuanjing mubiao gangyao [Outline of the long-term objectives for 2010 and the ninth five-year plan for 
national social and economic development], Chapter 3. 
54 Jiang 1997, jiang zemin zai zhongguo gongchandang shiwu da shang de baogao [Jiang Zemin’s address to 
the fifteenth conference of the CCP]. 
62 
 
progressives had been initiated without definitive endpoints. With the transition of 
leadership from Deng to Jiang, the conceptual delineations between plan and market, 
state and enterprise became clearer. Faced with an impoverished rural economy and 
virtually non-existent light industry and service sector, Deng’s main concern had been to 
provide incentives to increase agricultural production and invest in local economies. By 
contrast, Jiang’s policies had been motivated by a desire to break the patterns of 
overinvestment and overcapacity by limiting the influence of local and industrial 
bureaucracy over public and collective enterprise (Li & Ma 2004); devolving many of the 
former responsibilities of the public sector –notably the provision of public services and 
the employment guarantee- unto the market (Ngok 2008); and the privatization or 
bankruptcy of poorly performing public enterprise (Liew 2005). Market forces were to 
play an ever greater role in the allocation of labor and capital and coordination between 
supply and demand. Increasing reliance on market allocation was however not 
tantamount to the dilution of state influence. Reserving for itself the prerogative of 
macro-economic adjustment, the central state intensified its fiscal and monetary control 
(Ma 2000). However, within the socialist market economy, the state’s mandate extended 
beyond cyclical adjustments to include the structural organization of industry. Under 
Jiang, a novel economic paradigm emerged in which a select group of centrally controlled 
business conglomerates were to at once become the fulcrum of the domestic economy and 
the vanguard of economic modernization and international competitiveness.  
 
2003-present: Towards sustainability and sovereignty 
In spite of the success of macro-economic reforms in curbing inflation and reorganization 
of public industry, a plethora of ongoing problems, left unattended under the Jiang 
administration, had gained in urgency. After twenty-five-years of rapid growth the 
inherent limitations of capital-intensive development had become increasingly salient. 
Labor had remained largely of the unskilled variety. Urban-rural imbalances continued to 
exacerbate and were compounded by social aggravations resultant from the abolishment 
of the employment guarantee and retrenchment of the public sector.  
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Amidst rapid development during the 10
th
 FYP period, certain prominent issues 
appeared: the relationship between investment and consumption was unbalanced, part of 
industry blindly expanded, production capacity was excessive, transformation of the 
mode of economic development slowed down, energy resources are strained, 
environmental pollution has exacerbated, the regional development gap and the income 
gap between certain groups in society has continued to increase, the development of 
public services is still lagging behind, and the elements inciting social instability are 
manifold.
55
 
 
Hu Jintao, who succeeded Jiang as China’s paramount leader in 2003, responded to the 
above challenges by promulgating the ‘scientific development concept’ (kexue 
fazhanguan).
56
 With regards to the mode of development, the concept presented two 
significant departures from the extant trajectory. The notion of ‘taking people as the basis’ 
(yi ren wei ben) implied an emphasis on the qualitative as well as quantitative dimensions 
of economic growth. More egalitarian development would not only alleviate mounting 
social tension but also facilitate the transition towards a pattern of growth driven by 
domestic consumption. Secondly, the scientific development concept underlined that 
further development ought to be contingent on the creation of a capacity for ‘indigenous 
innovation’ (zizhu chuangxin) and strong high-technology industry (Fewsmith 2004). The 
                                                     
55 State Council 2006, zhonghua gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan de shiyi wunian jihua gangyao 
[Outline of the eleventh five-year plan for social and economic development] 
56 “First we must correctly and comprehensively grasp the profound significance of basic demands of the 
scientific development concept. To persist in ‘taking people as the basis’, thus is to take the comprehensive 
development of man as the objective, and to plan and promote development on basis of the fundamental needs 
of the people and continuously fulfil the peoples’ need for material and cultural growth, to conscientiously 
guarantee the peoples’ economic, political and cultural rights and to ensure the results of development benefit 
all. Comprehensive development is to promote economic, political and cultural development with economic 
development at the core, so as to realize economic development and overall social progress. Adjusted 
development means to plan the development of cities and countryside, regions, economy and society, people 
and nature, domestic development and international openness; to advance the productive forces and relations, 
to balance the construction of the economic foundations and upper layers, and promote the balanced 
development of the economy, politics and culture. Sustainable development means to promote the harmony of 
man and nature, and realize a balance between economic development and population, resources and ecology[.]” 
(Hu 2004, zai zhongyang renkou ziyuan huanjing gongzuo huyi shang de jianghua [Address given at the central 
working meeting for population, resources and environment] ) 
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gradual move towards knowledge and technology-intensive economic activity would 
adjust investments in favor of labor, ultimately resulting in higher wages. From a strategic 
perspective, domestic innovation was believed to increase efficiency of 
resource-intensive industry and reduce reliance on foreign technology and 
resource-markets, thus sustaining the perennial goal of sovereignty.
57
 Accordingly, the 
following objectives were stipulated under the eleventh five-year plan:
58
 
 
1) Retain stable and relatively rapid economic growth and balance investment and consumption. 
2) Transit from resource-intensive and environmentally harmful to ecologically sustainable 
development. 
3) Enhance the indigenous capacity for innovation and render domestic science and technology 
the primary driver of economic growth. 
4) Balance rural and urban development and regional development. 
5) Establish a harmonious society and ensure development progresses under conditions of social 
stability. 
6) Perfect property relations and the pricing system and the state’s capacity for macro-economic 
governance.
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Seeking to adjust the dynamics of growth as well as the distribution of its benefits, policy 
under Hu gained a more interventionist character. Large-scale government investment and 
fiscal stimuli were introduced to promote the development of the service section and 
indigenous development of ‘leading industries’ (zhidao chanye) in which technological 
advances would effectuate large downstream externalities (Gu et al. 2009).
 60
 
                                                     
57 State Council 2006, guojia zhongchangqi kexue he jishu fazhan guihua gangyao (2006-2020 nian) [Outline 
of the national medium and long-term plan for the development of science and technology 2006-2020], Chapter 
1. 
58 2006-2010. 
59 CC 2005, zhonggong zhonyang guanyu zhiding guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shiyi ge wu nian guihua de 
jianyi [Opinions concerning the drafting of the eleventh five-year plan for the national economic and social 
development], Chapter 2. 
60  The 2006-2010 five-year plan explicitly refers to four industries: Information and communication 
technology, biotechnology, aeronautics and aviation and new materials. 
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Government investment in infrastructure became a key feature of regional development 
policy. To bolster the directive capacity of the center, the organs responsible for national 
economic planning (The State Commission for Economic Reform and the State Planning 
Commission) were merged into the National Development and Reform Commission in 
2003. In a subsequent round of bureaucratic reforms, the number of industrial ministries 
was reduced so as to bolster NDRC’s control over the industrial allocation of capital (Yeo 
2009).
61
  
 Intensification of state influence in capital allocation under Hu reflects an 
interpretation of economic development more concerned with the issue of long-term 
sustainability. Thus, through a combination of fiscal reallocation and emphasis on 
development of human and intellectual-capital intensive industries, government has 
sought to mitigate socio-economic inequality, which undermines stability and obstructs 
the transition towards a mode of growth predicated on domestic demand.
62
 Likewise it 
has sought to redirect investment from additions to the stock of fixed capital within 
traditional industry towards the development of a set of strategic emerging industries and 
domestic technology. Although large conglomerates still occupy a pivotal role within the 
overall project of development, the prior emphasis on creating economies of scale is 
complemented by insistence on developing an ecosystem of related small and 
medium-sized science and technology-based enterprise able of producing breakthroughs 
in crucial general purpose technologies.
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Touching the stones: Productivity, stability and sustainability 
Undeniably, Chinese conceptualizations of the project of economic development have 
undergone comprehensive changes since reforms actualized the vision of Chen Yun and 
his associates, and it is questionable to what extent they, or even Deng would recognize 
the present template. However, these changes cannot be simply dismissed as reflexive 
                                                     
61Reforms were however heavily contested by the industrial ministries, so that the original program of 
comprehensive restructuring had to be abandoned (Brødsgaard 2010). 
62 Due to diminishing marginal utility, highly skewed income distributions are expected to result in lower 
aggregate consumption than more egalitarian distribution. 
63 State Council 2006, Chapter 27. 
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short-term adjustments, but demonstrate a coherent and progressive logic. In order for a 
particular paradigm to sustain itself, it must be widely perceived as both ontologically 
apposite and legitimate (see Hinings and Tolbert 2008; Meyer and Rowan 1977).  
The post-socialist developments within the economic concept of control have been 
impelled by three interrelated problems. As a most fundamental prerequisite, economic 
paradigms must identify and articulate a set of conditions that motivate and direct 
systemic productivity. This was the overriding concern in the first stage of reform. By 
way of the introduction of a market component within Department II (agriculture, light 
industry) and eventually, Department I, Deng provided both the incentive for more 
efficient production and the allocative autonomy to redeploy redundant agricultural labor. 
By decreasing centralized expropriation and diversification of agricultural production 
towards cash crops, sectoral imbalances were attenuated. Having addressed the essential 
problem of productivity, the paradigm tended to the issue of short- and medium-term 
stability.  
Thus, changes in fiscal relations and economic restructuring under Jiang sought to 
placate conjunctural tendencies towards the overexpansion of industry (which in turn, 
impels underinvestment within the overall economy), allowing the cycle of investment 
and production to continue in stable manner. Finally, short-term stability must be 
complemented with long-term viability. This requires articulation of conditions which 
promote the continuous reorganization of capital into processes which create value over 
and above extant methods of production, ensuring sustainable economic growth (see 
figure 2).  
Under Hu, changes within the strategy for economic development sought to promote 
a departure from an overwhelmingly extensive pattern of accumulation (i.e. growth 
driven by novel additions of capital towards extant modes of production) towards an 
intensive one, wherein technological progress would allow for a more egalitarian 
distribution of economic gains, and investment would be driven predominantly by 
domestic demand. The common thread within the three stages has been an incessant 
emphasis on the primacy of industrial investment and the expansion of production. 
Despite concerns regarding the appropriate staging and allocation of industrial investment, 
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the overriding importance of industry has relegated concerns regarding the efficient 
functioning of capital markets to secondary stature. Herein as well, the Chinese template 
differs fundamentally from the Western concept of liberal capitalism. 
 
 
Figure 4: Development of China's post-socialist economic paradigm 
 
Constituents and control over capital: aligning functional and normative 
aspects 
Along with the conceptual progression from the basic requirement of productivity 
towards the promotion of stability and ultimately sustainability, the respective rights and 
responsibilities assigned to various economic constituents have been articulated with 
greater clarity. Although firmly entrenched within the echelons of the Party-state, the 
process of paradigmatic formation, adaptation and contestation has not been insensitive or 
inconsequential to the interests of different constituencies. Deng’s reforms have been 
widely perceived as spelling the irrevocable attenuation of the economic control of the 
state, and many regarded policy under Jiang to be a continuation of a progressive 
programme of economic liberalization (Chu 2010). Such interpretations are at odds with 
the political-economic discourse of the Party-state itself, which has insisted that crucial 
industries remain firmly embedded within the public economy.
64
 While efforts to engage 
                                                     
64 With reference to the restructuring of the public sector by ‘retaining the large and releasing the small’, Jiang 
stated that “the leading function of the public economy is reflected in its capacity for control…If public 
ownership continues to be the main system of property relations and the state controls the national economic 
lifelines, and the capacity for control and competitiveness of the state-owned economy are strengthened, under 
these conditions, a marginal reduction of the overall proportion of the state-owned sector [within the overall 
economy] will not influence the essence of China’s socialism.” (Jiang 1997, zai zhongguo gongchandang di 
shiwu ci quanguo daibiao dahuishang de baogao, [Report of Jiang Zemin’s address to the fifteenth meeting of 
the National People’s Congress] ). This statement was reiterated some decade later by Li Rongrong, Chair of 
the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission: “[In] armaments, power generation and 
distribution, oil and petrochemicals, telecommunications, coal, aviation and shipping industries [...] the State 
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in the separation of enterprise and government (zhengqi fenkai) were considered 
representative of a process of convergence towards global capitalism (Pearson 2007), 
such apparent ‘normalization’ disagrees with the expansive and expanding Chinese 
definition of macro-economic control.
65
 The countervailing tendency towards the 
intensification of state control and re-centralization has led to a widespread perception 
that “the state advances and the private sector retreats” (guo jin min tui).  
Moreover, rather than contradicting the centrally espoused logic of reform, changes in the 
sphere of control of the Party-state have been framed as impelled by the requirements of 
economic development. In the first phase of reforms, the onus of increasing productivity 
fell on local government and a nascent non-public sector. The remit of the central state 
was defined mostly in negative terms, and characterized by devolution and mitigation of 
bureaucratic constraints. In the subsequent period, the influence of the center waxed even 
as the overall size of the public sector decreased. Under Jiang, the state attributed itself a 
pivotal role in maintaining fiscal balance and promoting growth and national 
competitiveness through the creation of scale-efficient state-owned conglomerates. In 
recent times, the mandate of the state has yet expanded as it has taken on a more 
Keynesian guise, and industrial investments are guided by the goals of macro-economic 
stability and in the long run, the realization of a virtuous cycle of domestic consumption 
and technology-driven growth. Although the role assigned to the central state sets China’s 
concept of control apart from both liberal and coordinated varieties of capitalism, it 
differs in equal measure from the pre-reform concept of socialism. Within the Chinese 
ideal-type of the ‘socialist market economy', the market is assigned the primary 
responsibility of resource allocation while the state reserves for itself the prerogative of 
                                                                                                                                                 
must have "absolute control" ” (China Daily 2006). 
65 “In accordance with the principle of separating government and enterprise, we must transform the function 
of government. Government’s functions in economic management must truly change to the promulgation and 
implementation of policies of macro-level adjustment and control, managing the construction of basic 
infrastructure and creating a benevolent environment for economic development, and functions which ought 
not to be implemented by government must gradually be transferred to enterprise, the market and social 
intermediary organizations.” State Council 1996, zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan 
“jiu wu” jihua he 2010 nian yuanjing mubiao gangyao [Outline of the ninth five-year plan for the economic 
and social development of the P.R.C. and the long-term objectives for 2010], Chapter 7. 
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macro-control.
66
 The latter’s definition is expansive and envelops both fiscal and 
monetary control as well as ownership of key industries in Department I and the capacity 
to allocate resources to perceived priority areas within the overall project of economic 
and social development. Thus, notwithstanding the transformative impact of economic 
reforms, the centrality of the Party-state apparatus within the Chinese economy has 
remained unquestioned.  
The main political implication of changes to the concept of control has been a 
re-evaluation of the hierarchy of the various economic constituents (i.e. local government 
and public and private enterprise). The broad remit of sub-central government during the 
initial period of reforms was retracted when the perceived need for fiscal discipline 
prompted the recentralization of the banking system and dilution of the ties between 
ministries and SOEs. During this same period, the emphasis within central discourse on 
the efficiency and competitiveness of public enterprise, part of an ostensible 
internalization of western precepts of corporate governance, legitimized the policy of 
‘releasing the small’ and the dismantling of the iron rice bowl. In consequence, the 
entitlements and autonomy of local government and much of public industry has been 
severely curtailed. The state’s attitude towards the development of the private component 
of the economy has been predominantly non-interventionist, although the resolve to 
effectuate an upturn in domestic consumption by (amongst others) promoting the 
development of the service sector and engaging in a more egalitarian redistribution of 
capital through expansion of the social welfare program under the twelfth five-year plan 
may be indicative of greater engagement. Although the focal loci of industrial investment 
have shifted (from the local state-enterprise to a central government- enterprise nexus) it 
ought to be noted that the concept of control has continued to advance the interests of the 
industrialist class (as opposed to that of say creditors or shareholders).  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter expounded the evolution of the Chinese ‘concept of control’. Just as the 
                                                     
66 State Council 2006, guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shiyi ge wu nian guihua gangyao [Outline of the 
eleventh five-year plan for National Economic and Social Development], Chapter 2. 
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emergence of the liberal economies of the United States and United Kingdom was 
inextricably related to (yet not teleologically determined by) the neo-liberalism of the 
Reagan and Thatcher administrations and the development of German industry was 
embedded within the Bismarckian welfare programme, the evolution of China’s economic 
institutions has to be understood with reference to its overarching economic paradigm. 
Describing the development from a Leninist program of agricultural-industrial transfers 
intended to promote the expedited construction of an industrial economy to the current 
socialist market economy, it was argued that transformations within the concept of control, 
rather than being reflexive, have been impelled by the interrelated and progressive 
problems of ensuring productivity, medium-term stability and long-term sustainability. 
Notwithstanding the irrefutable changes in understanding of the demands of economic 
development, the commensurate organization of production, and the entitlements and 
responsibilities of constituents, the political-economic elite, led by the central Party-state 
apparatus has sought to ensure its continued centrality within the economic system as 
well as the intimate connection between administrative and industrial actors. Thus the 
introduction of market production and exchange and the devolution of fiscal and 
functional authority to the provinces could be more appropriately interpreted within the 
context of a long-standing discussion regarding the efficacy and appropriate scope of 
influence of different instruments of coordination within a Leninist-Marxist mode of 
economic administration than within the dichotomous discourse of socialism-capitalism. 
Similarly, such an interpretation implies that the underlying conceptual drivers of 
centrally instigated institutional change were to do with effective economic 
administration and the perpetuation of the extensive economic mandate of the Party-state, 
rather one of fundamental socio-political transformation.  
This ought to discredit any characterizations of the Chinese system as neo-liberal, be 
it ‘state-neoliberalism’ (Chu 2010) or otherwise. After all, the neo-liberal concept of 
control which developed in the Anglo-Saxon economies sought to advance the interests of 
the money-capitalists (e.g. creditors and investors) (Van der Pijl 2012). Yet within the 
Chinese concept of control, the overriding concern has been to perpetuate industrial 
investment and maintain high rates of economic growth on which the state has staked 
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much of its legitimacy (Jefferson 2010) rather than to ensure the highest possible rates of 
return to capital. 
However, even if consideration of the Chinese concept of control allows us to 
confine definitions of the economic system to some type of state industrialism, many 
questions remain. First, as to how can changes in the allocation and accumulation of 
capital account for the tremendous increase of economic activity within the 
post-communist era, and did these changes indeed follow the precepts propagated by the 
elite? After all, the argument here is neither that the assumptions and logic of the Chinese 
concept of control are infallible, nor that its tenets are internalized and implemented by 
economic constituents without exception. Therefore, within the next chapter, emphasis 
will be on the Chinese mode of accumulation, which recounts the actual development of 
capital distribution over actors and processes. Secondly, how have the various 
constituents been compelled to act in accordance with the prescriptions of the socialist 
market economy?
67
 This question will be addressed in the fourth chapter which deals 
with the economic institutional architecture. A final and fundamental question regards to 
whether the envisioned strategy to ensure the sustainability of China’s economic 
development programme is feasible. Thus, in chapter five, the emphasis is on the 
institutional factors which influence the likelihood that China can adopt a 
technology-intensive and more egalitarian mode of development. 
  
                                                     
67
 'The compromises underlying the feasibility of [the] various strategies [i.e. concepts of control] are 
reached by concrete compensations for the special interests involved through the profit-distribution process[.]' 
(Van der Pijl 2012, 7,8). 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
ACCUMULATION UNDER COMMUNISM AND MARKET SOCIALISM: 
FROM INDUSTRIALIST CONCENTRATION TO DIFFUSION AND 
BACK AGAIN 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter considered the evolution of China’s concept of control, from one 
firmly rooted in the Marxist-Leninist economic paradigm to the indigenous vision of a 
Chinese socialist market economy. As elite conceptualizations of the project of economic 
development changed in response to the severe shortcomings of the communist strategy 
of industrialization and the subsequent challenges of ensuring stability and sustainability, 
regulatory and government reallocation effectuated a comprehensive redistribution of 
capital over sectors and constituents. This chapter will expound changes in the patterns of 
capital distribution since the establishment of the P.R.C. In line with the questions raised 
in the previous segment, this analysis will consider how the reorganization of capital 
impelled the tremendous upturn in economic activity and output following the end of the 
plan economy. A second point of interest relates to transformations within patterns of 
distribution of capital over the various economic constituents. The latter has both 
functional and normative implications for the elite concept of control. After all, the 
distribution of capital will consolidate the dominance of one among the various groups of 
constituents within the economic system (e.g. industrialists, investors, workers, central 
and local administrators etc.). Since their capacities and interests differ, so will the 
paradigms and modes of production they are able to and willing to sustain.  
 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The subsequent section 
provides a brief overview of the pre-reform patterns of capital allocation. This section 
confirms that the prioritization of industry and excessive rate of transfer of agricultural 
output severely impeded economic growth. The section thereafter focuses on 
developments in the post-communist era. It is argued that Deng’s policy effectively 
removed regulatory constraints on the development of agriculture and light industry, 
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allowing for alleviation of sectoral imbalances through the development of a market 
system. This period was followed by a countervailing trend towards the reconsolidation 
of central control over capital allocation, and comprehensive restructuring of state-owned 
enterprise. Concentration of investment into a public economy relieved of the burden of a 
plethora of non-performing SOEs, along with a burgeoning private sector ensured that the 
pattern of growth, characterized by high investment in fixed capital, to continue unabated. 
Notwithstanding the continuation of an essentially industrialist mode of accumulation, 
regulatory changes under Jiang prompted a comprehensive redistribution of capital. The 
bureaucratic recentralization of fiscal and regulatory authority has prompted a 
commensurate increase of the prowess of central state-owned enterprise. Emphasis on 
expansion of production and consolidation of capital within the echelons of public 
industry in lieu of a more balanced trajectory of growth has resulted in the exacerbation 
of entrenched socio-economic disparities. Recent intensification of centrally administered, 
direct fiscal transfers has as of yet failed to substantially moderate patterns of 
accumulation. This discrepancy between the promulgated intent to transit to a 
consumption-driven mode of development through the invigoration of (primarily 
non-public) labor and knowledge-intensive sectors and actual patterns of capital 
allocation calls into question the likelihood of fulfilling the current administration’s vision 
of a sustainable mode of accumulation within the system of a socialist market economy. 
 
Accumulation in the communist era (1949-1978): Accelerated 
industrialization and its outcomes  
As related in the preceding chapter, the principles of the mode of production within the 
communist era originated from within the theories of Fel’dman and Preobrazhensky. Thus, 
Department II, of which agriculture constituted the major part, was to furnish the capital 
required to engage in the construction and expansion of an industrial basis. In turn, 
industry would manufacture producer goods which would allow for an upturn of 
agricultural productivity beyond the initial gains resultant from the collectivization of the 
means of production. Despite admonitions of key figures within the economic 
administration, Mao insisted on a divergence from the initial trajectory of development in 
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favor of a great increase of the ratio of transfer of surplus from agriculture towards 
industry. 
Despite Herculean effort and great expense, attempts to match the accomplishments 
of the modern industrialized economies within a generation by way of the ‘productive 
advantage’ of socialist economic organization fell decisively short of the mark. While 
throughout the era of the plan economy, China maintained a high ratio of fixed gross 
capital formation to gross domestic product,
68
 the average growth rate of the economy 
during the period 1952-1978 was 6.7%. While certainly robust, economic development 
was nowhere near quick enough to realize the objective of matching the productivity of 
the industrialized capitalist economies within a generation. Not only did the mode of 
accumulation under communism fail to engender the envisioned quantitative upturn, but 
the strategy of concentrating capital within the industrial sector, had caused the growth of 
agriculture to lag considerably behind (see figure 3). 
 
 
Note: 1952 = 100 
Figure 5: Growth indices of output of primary and secondary industry, 1952-1978 
Source: China Statistical Press, 2005, table 6.  
 
Investment ratios between the first and second economic departments (agriculture and 
industry respectively) throughout the communist era exhibited a much stronger bias 
                                                     
68 Ranging from 0.25 in the first five-year plan period (1953-1957)  to 0.34 during the period of the fourth 
five-year plan (1971-1975), SSBC-Hitotsubashi University Historical National Accounts of the P.R.C. 1997. 
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towards the development of industry than proposed in the original 
Fel’dman-Preobrazhensky paradigm. High investment in industry had been supported by 
the appropriation of agricultural revenues (by way of depressed prices for produce, the 
so-called price-scissors mechanism). However, sustainability of the strategy of the 
accelerated development of capital towards the industrial sector was contingent on 
increases in the efficiency of agricultural production. Such improvements failed to 
materialize. Because of government’s preoccupation with industrial development, central 
capital allocation had predominantly targeted heavy industry and the production of 
producer goods for the agricultural sector had been neglected. By contrast, government 
investment in the development of basic conditions for agricultural production (irrigation, 
electrification etc) remained marginal (see figure 4). 
  
   
Note: Industrial construction expenditure is total basic construction expenditure minus agricultural 
expenditure 
Figure 6: Ratio of agricultural to industrial basic construction expenditure and sectoral output, 
1953-1978 
Source: China Statistical Press, 2005, tables 6, 18  
 
Rather, the state had continued to rely on reorganization (i.e. the establishment of 
large-scale farming collectives) and autonomous investment by the rural community. 
Additionally, although the reorganization of plots into large-scale collectives resulted in 
labor-saving economies of scale, they had but a marginal effect on overall productivity 
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because rural labor participation had from the outset been comparatively low, and there 
were few alternative uses for idle rural workers.
69
 While China’s labor force grew by 
some 191 million in the period 1952-1978, industry only absorbed about 37 per cent of 
this addition (Naughton 2007, p.81). On the one hand, there was an inherent limit to the 
extent to which capital-intensive industry could absorb the rural labor surplus. On the 
other, the covenant between the Party-state and the industrial worker was predicated on 
the latter’s subjugation to the Party-state apparatus in exchange for a comparatively high 
wage and entitlement to a wide array of welfare benefits. Rapid expansion of the 
industrial workforce would have depressed wages and attenuated the capacity for 
monitoring and control of the bureaucratic apparatus. Thus, the state relied on the 
household registration system to enforce a stringent constraint on the mobility of rural 
inhabitants. 
The limited capacity of industry to absorb excess agricultural labor was reciprocated 
by the lack of rural purchasing power, which further prevented the diffusion of industrial 
products to the agricultural sector. What growth the sector experienced did not result in a 
commensurate increase of rural affluence; whereas total agricultural output had grown 
roughly five times between 1952 and 1977 (the year preceding agricultural reform) per 
capita consumption expenditure had only doubled.
70
 Moreover, while production was 
subject to quota and appropriated by the state at depressed prices, peasants had arguably 
but little incentive to autonomously increase production.
71
 Due to the lack of investment 
in agricultural modernization and limits to the rationalization of the structure of rural 
labor, production of grain per peasant remained virtually stagnant throughout the plan era, 
reaching 0.90 cubic meters in 1952 and 0.93 in 1977
72
.  
In spite of the failure to vitalize agriculture, industry expanded rapidly, growing from 
some 18 to just under 45 per cent of GDP from 1952 to 1978. Econometric analysis 
confirms the overwhelmingly extensive character of accumulation during this period, 
                                                     
69 The average rate of rural labor participation between 1952 and 1978 was 38.8%, and displayed only marginal 
variation (China Statistical Press 1998). 
70 (China Statistical Press 2005). 
71 Essentially, the problem was one of rent-seeking, see (Murphy et al. 1993). 
72 Calculated from (China Statistical Press 2005, tables 4, 39) 
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with growth almost in its entirety being accounted for by additions to fixed capital in 
novel areas of industry (see table 4). The predominantly extensive character of 
accumulation under communism is further suggested by the volatile pattern of growth of 
the industrial sector since “[a]s long as capitalism transforms the labor process by the 
creation of collective means of production, but without reshaping the mode of 
consumption, accumulation still progresses only in fits and starts” (Brenner & Glick 1991, 
p.52).
73
 
 
 Shares of output growth (%) 
Period Output 
growth 
TFP growth Capital Labor 
(educated)* 
TFP 
1952-1957 6.5 4.7 12.7 14.9 72.4 
1957-1965 3.9 -1.0 93.1 49.5 -42.6 
1965-1978 4.9 -0.2 67.7 36.7 -4.4 
1952-1978 4.4 0.5 56.3 32.7 11.0 
* Workers who enjoyed education at primary level or above 
Table 4: Estimated growth of GDP and its composition, 1952-1978 
Source: Brandt & Rawski, 2008, p. 839 
 
All in all, after nearly three decades of continuous struggle, the Chinese state had failed to 
achieve the national economic prowess envisioned at the incipience of communist rule. 
First, an excessive bias in central coordination towards heavy industry had resulted in 
neglect of agriculture. Problems within the pattern of production were mirrored by the 
lack of rural purchasing power, an outcome of the rents levied on agricultural surplus and 
the persistently unequal income and social welfare conditions within agriculture and 
industry.
74
 Although the extraordinary feats of economic growth in other communist 
economies which astounded Western observers (Krugman 1994) had not come about in 
China, socialist economic development had nevertheless yielded the industrial foundation 
for the subsequent strategy of ‘reform and opening up’ (gaige kaifang). 
                                                     
73 This is because first, sufficient rents have to be appropriated from Department II to fund expansion of 
Department I, and Department II, given its lack of expendable capital, cannot assimilate the additional output of 
Department I. 
74 Which will be expounded in the next chapter. 
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Accumulation under market socialism 
Extensive accumulation through sectoral readjustment (1978-1993) 
As related in the discussion of the Chinese concept of control, leading economic 
administrators such as Chen Yun and Zhou Enlai had long advocated a comprehensive 
revisal of the mechanisms and guidelines of capital allocation, arguing for a trajectory of 
more balanced sectoral development and the introduction of a market component within 
Department II. With the demise of Mao and removal of other Maoist hardliners, Deng 
was finally able to implement the much anticipated reforms. Agriculture became to focal 
point of early adjustments. The initial focus on agriculture had essentially two reasons. 
First was the lack of increases of rural productivity.
75
 Secondly, emphasis on heavy 
industry had rendered bureaucratic interests in the agricultural sector marginal, and 
therefore agricultural reforms met with little resistance (Shirk 1993). Three major 
changes were introduced. First, farming collectives were disbanded. Secondly, prices for 
government procurement were increased by an average 22.1 per cent in 1979 (Lin 1992). 
Finally, farmers were allowed to sell a proportion of produced crops on the market. The 
household responsibility system (jiating lianchan chengbao zerenzhi), introduced on a 
trial basis in 1979, allowed farmers to retain and sell for a profit any output above 
state-contracted quota. As a result, the household responsibility system had become 
ubiquitous by the early 1980s (Qian 1999). Subsequent to these regulatory changes, 
agricultural output rapidly increased. Moreover, the introduction of a market for produce 
prompted farmers to shift production towards cash crops and livestock which fetched 
higher prices (see table 5). 
 Introduction of the household responsibility system also allowed peasants to engage 
in non-agricultural production, providing a means to alleviate the problem of idle rural 
labor. By way of the 1979 Decision on Certain Issues regarding Accelerated Agricultural 
Development,
76
 central government explicitly endorsed and promoted the development 
                                                     
75 Under central planning, the ratio of per household rural production to consumption had consistently dropped, 
from its initial high of 2.88 under the first five year plan to 2.48 after the period of adjustment (e.g. 1966-1977). 
(Calculated from CENET 2005, tables 4, 6, and 11. 
76 CC 1979, guanyu jia kuai nongye fazhan ruogan wenti de jueding. 
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of so-called Township and Village Enterprises (TVE, xiangzhen qiye).
77
 These TVEs, 
concentrated within labor-intensive light industry, quickly emerged as a crucial factor of 
economic development in the first decades of reform. 
 
Subsector 1952-1978 1978-1984 
Crops 2.5 5.9 
Grain 2.4 4.8 
Cotton 2.0 17.7 
Animal husbandry 4.0 10.0 
Fishery 19.9 12.7 
Forestry 9.4 14.9 
Agriculture (total) 2.9 7.7 
Table 5: Average annual growth rates of agriculture, 1952-1984 
Source: Lin 1992, p.35 
 
Although central government condoned and encouraged the development of TVEs, it did 
not provide the main impetus to their development. Rather, the expansion of TVEs was 
driven by peasants and local government. Localities had been given authority to tax TVE 
sales and retain fiscal revenue beyond a negotiated proportion remitted to the center. As a 
result, local government gained a strong interest in promoting the development of TVEs 
(Chang & Wang 1994; Kung & Lin 2007). Fiscal and operational decentralization was 
crucial to reform because it provided stronger incentives for local government to promote 
the development of regional economies (Young 2000). Under the central plan, provincial 
governments had been invested with control over local enterprise but enterprise revenues 
had to be remitted to central government. Throughout the pre-reform era, local 
administrators had strong incentives to (nominally) meet production quota. However, 
managers had but little interest in ensuring that production was efficient, since costs (or 
gains) would ultimately accrue to the center. Seeking to improve the productivity of 
state-owned enterprise, the center introduced the state enterprise law of 1988, which 
transferred the operational mandate from local government to enterprise management. 
                                                     
77 Within the early stages of reform, TVEs adopted a collective ownership structure, wherein local government 
would own a majority share (Sun 2002). 
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Now nominally free to attract capital and offer its goods and services outside centrally 
stipulated quota (Chen 2008), SOEs had a clear incentive to promote the expansion of 
production. Nevertheless, in order to compensate local government for its loss of 
influence over enterprise, the center decided to decentralize fiscal control (Shirk 1990a). 
This allowed local government to retain the larger share of fiscal revenues extracted from 
public industry and created yet greater impetus for expansion of industrial production.  
Under the planning system, the Chinese economy had been enfeebled by years of 
centrally enforced capital transfers and restrictions, distorting the balance between 
economic sectors and the ratio between investment and consumption. During the period 
of ‘reform and opening up’, many of these constraints and restrictions were removed. The 
introduction of a market component and corporatization, first within agriculture and 
subsequently in selected areas of industry prompted an organic process of amelioration of 
sectoral imbalances. At the outset, increased productivity owed much to the proliferation 
of agriculture as attested by its growing share of GDP. However, it was the transition 
from agriculture towards higher value-added production, promoted by the introduction of 
the collective township and village enterprises, which gave the greatest impetus to growth 
in the early period of reform. 
  
 
Figure 7: Shares of GDP by sector and ownership status, 1978-1993 
Source: Calculated from (China Statistical Press 2005), tables 6, 41 
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The rural economy was also bolstered by the pervasive establishment of collective 
enterprises, which allowed for the absorption of excess rural labor and expanded the 
heretofore severely restricted supply of industrial consumer goods. Finally, rapid market 
growth impelled the development of services such as retail, trade, transportation and 
communication (OECD 2006, see figure 5). 
The increase of products and services sold through the market in turn promoted the 
rapid increase of wages, and expendable income. Between 1978 and 1993, per capita 
rural consumption spending rose, from 183 to 855 yuan.
78
 In the same period, urban 
income increased by a similar magnitude, from 405 to 3027 yuan. Thus, although gradual 
marketization benefited both rural and urban citizens, it also exacerbated the disparity 
between them (see figure 6). Jointly, the implicit transfers of capital caused by the 
abrogation of regulatory constraints and introduction of a market mechanism pushed 
capital intro new forays of productive activity. Lack of supply in many consumer markets 
prompted incessant investment in production capacity (Wedeman 2003). Increased 
production of consumption goods in turn promoted demand within heavy industry (Pei 
2005). 
 
Figure 8: Rural and urban growth of per capita consumption expenditure, absolute and YoY 
growth , 1978-1993 
Note: Absolute growth in price-adjusted yuan. left axis; year-on-year, right axis 
Source: Calculated from (China Statistical Press 2005, tables 11 and 28) 
                                                     
78 (China Statistical Press 2005, table 11). 
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Functional implications aside, shifts in the distribution of capital also had political 
consequences. As a result of fiscal decentralization, local governments’ financial prowess 
greatly increased. This enhanced financial stature implied that, as reforms progressed, 
local government became a chief influence in the coordination of capital. The influence of 
direct central allocation waned in tandem with the proliferation of the market and the 
progress of decentralization so that by the mid-1990s, the practice of central material 
allocation had all but disappeared (Naughton 1996). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stabilization and the reemergence of the central state (1994-2002) 
Between 1978 and 1995, China’s economy had grown at an average 9.7%, and per capita 
GNP had risen from 379 to 4754 yuan (NBS 1996; 2010). The burgeoning market also 
contributed greatly to the fiscal prowess of the state. Between 1978 and 1995, revenue 
from taxes rose from 51.9 to 603.8 billion yuan (NBS 1996). Rapid increase of revenue in 
turn, fuelled local investment in industry. However, corporatization and marketization 
within the state-owned sector had failed to replicate the splendid successes of the market 
economy. Fiscal decentralization had prompted local government to engage in endemic 
overinvestment, contributing to mounting inflation (Wu 2005; Shirk 1993, see figure 7).
79
 
Moreover, due to vested bureaucratic interests, investments continued to favor industry, 
resulting in overcapacity in many sectors (Auty 1992).
80
 While decentralization thus 
introduced perverse incentives for local governments, the ability of the center to deal with 
these issues through monetary and fiscal policy had weakened due to its diminished share 
of revenues. 
 With the passing of power from the first generation of reformers to the new 
leadership, market-reforms were accompanied by a stringent focus on macro-economic 
stabilization and institutionalization of administrative relations. Deng’s policies had 
sought to address the constrained development of agriculture and light industry brought 
about by the practice of central planning. 
                                                     
79 The inflationary crisis, and pervasive discontent regarding bureaucratic corruption were among the chief 
reasons for the civil unrest of 1989, precipitating into the Tian’anmen incident. 
80 This is reflected in the generally positive terms of trade of agriculture vis-à-vis industry, suggesting an 
overabundance of industrial output (see figure). 
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Figure 9: Inflation and sectoral parity, 1978-1995 
Source: NBS, 1996 
 
Policies under Jiang Zemin were of a similar reactionary nature, being much concerned 
with the structural imbalances brought on by unchecked market growth and the 
discretionary influence of local government. Thus, rather than seeking to fundamentally 
alter the pattern of capital-driven economic development, institutional changes were 
geared towards consolidation and adjustment. Nevertheless, regulatory interventions had 
profound implications for the distribution of capital over constituents and sectors. 
Commencing in 1994, central government introduced various macro-level policies 
which sought to discipline public industry by curbing local government’s capacity for 
discretionary industrial investment while attenuating soft-budget constraints.
81
 The tax 
reforms of 1994, which supplanted negotiation-based sharing arrangements between 
provincial and central government which had existed under Deng with a unified tax 
scheme, were the first major initiative to curb discretionary investment of local 
government (Loo & Chow 2006; Ma 2000). Concurrent efforts were made to curtail the 
availability of credit by consolidating fiscal authority within the People’s Bank of China, 
which gained central bank status. Subsidiaries operating at the local level, which had been 
susceptible to the influence of local government, were closed (Wong & Lu 2002). 
                                                     
81 CC 1994, guanyu wanshan shehui zhuyi shichang jingji tizhi ruogan wenti de jueding [Decision on Certain 
Issues regarding the Completion of a Socialist Market Economy]. 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
110 
120 
130 
1
9
7
8
 
1
9
7
9
 
1
9
8
0
 
1
9
8
1
 
1
9
8
2
 
1
9
8
3
 
1
9
8
4
 
1
9
8
5
 
1
9
8
6
 
1
9
8
7
 
1
9
8
8
 
1
9
8
9
 
1
9
9
0
 
1
9
9
1
 
1
9
9
2
 
1
9
9
3
 
1
9
9
4
 
1
9
9
5
 
Retail price index 
Industry-agriculture price 
parity index 
84 
 
Following this recentralization of the banking sector, the state introduced a decisively 
more conservative monetary policy (see table 6). 
  
 
Money 
(M1) 
Currency in 
Circulation 
(M0) 
1991 24.21 20.17 
1992 35.89 36.45 
1993 n/a n/a 
1994 26.17 24.28 
1995 16.78 8.19 
1996 18.88 11.63 
1997 16.54 15.63 
1998 11.85 10.09 
Table 6: Growth rate of money supply, 1991-1998 
Source: NBS, 2012, table 19-4 
 
Simultaneously, bankruptcy legislation and labor force reductions put an end to the 
unconditional state support given for public enterprise.
82
 Under the slogan of ‘retaining 
the large and releasing the small’ (zhua da fang xiao), central government disbanded or 
privatized the largest share of state-owned enterprises, leaving the state in control of only 
the largest corporations (Naughton 2007).These measures proved successful in curbing 
the runaway inflation which had accompanied economic development under Deng. 
Within the period between 1995 (the year following the introduction of tax reforms) and 
2000, inflation decreased by an average 3.4%, lowering the retail price index from 114.8 
to 98.5 (NBS 2004). Reforms also had profound effects on the structure of the economy. 
Public sector retrenchment added significantly to the expansion of the market component 
of the Chinese economy, so that from 2002, non-public industry accounted for the greater 
share of industrial output.
83
 
                                                     
82 State Council 1997, guowuyuan pizhuan guojia jingmaowei guanyu 1997 nian guoyou qiye gaige yu fazhan 
gongzuo yijian de tongzhi [Notification on State Council’s Endorsement of the 1997 Opinions of the State 
Economic and Trade Commission on the Reform and Development of Public Enterprise]. 
83 Calculated from (China Statistical Press 2005, table 41). Note that after 1996, the introduction of the 
shareholding form within state-owned industry renders differentiation between state and market-based 
enterprise problematic, and thus actual state-ownership is understated. On the other hand, from 1998 onwards, 
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However, contraction of the scale of state-owned industry did not imply its decline. 
Although the number of SOEs was reduced to less than half between 1995 and 2000, 
overall output of state-owned industry continued to rise steadily. At the same time, 
expenses associated with loss-making enterprise were reduced by a great margin, leaving 
the state in command of a more consolidated and more robust public sector. Fiscal and 
monetary policies were successful in mitigating local tendencies towards overinvestment 
and improving the efficiency of the public economy by abolishing loss-making enterprise 
and excess labor. As in the initial period of reform, these structural adjustments were not 
without political consequence. First, because monetary and fiscal stabilization had been 
effectuated through the consolidation of control of the financial sector within the central 
state, thedecentralization of budgetary revenues was reversed. However, because this 
decrease in local government revenues was not accompanied by a commensurate 
redistribution of expenses, local governments increasingly relied on extra-budgetary 
sources of income. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second, rapid expansion of the market economy and the diversification of legal 
ownership structures had resulted in the emergence of a growing constituency of private 
entrepreneurs. 
                                                                                                                                                
statistics include only non-SOEs with annual revenues of over 5 million yuan., which results in a downward 
bias in the estimate of total non-public enterprise. 
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Figure 10: Central and local government revenue, 1990-2000 (billion yuan.) 
Source: Calculated from (CENET, 2005, tables 23, 24) 
 
From centrifugal to centripetal capital (2003-present) 
In spite of the success of macro-economic reforms and reorganization of public industry, 
a plethora of ongoing problems, left unattended under the Jiang administration, had 
gained in urgency. The detrimental consequences of resource-dependent growth had 
become increasingly salient. Productivity gains had been realized predominantly through 
addition of capital, while labor remained largely of the unskilled variety. Moreover, 
abrogation of the employment guarantee had led to the layoff of some forty per cent of 
workers in public industry. In addition to the growing divide between public and private 
sector, urban-rural imbalances continued to exacerbate. Although Deng’s agricultural 
reforms had greatly contributed to the wellbeing of the rural population, investment in the 
reform era had been concentrated within industry, and the household registration system 
had continued to stymie rural-urban migration.  
Moreover, in an ironic reiteration of the past, the market mechanism had promoted 
novel forms of expropriation of rural capital. While Jiang’s fiscal reforms had aided in the 
consolidation of budgetary revenues, it had also eliminated a main source of income. To 
compensate, local governments proceeded with the large scale transfer of farm-land to 
industry and the property sector. Although peasants had been given the right to long-term 
use of plots, they had no legal recourse to address appropriation and sale of farm-land 
(Peck & Zhang 2013). All in all, the pattern of economic growth pursued under Jiang had 
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not only constrained the growth of wages, and thus the potential to transfer to a 
consumption-driven model of development, but also aggravated social tensions. Secondly, 
emphasis on the expansion of industrial capacity resulted in high consumption of energy 
and raw material. Heavy reliance on coal energy
85
 and accumulating industrial waste 
induced significant strain on the environment. Concerns over social and environmental 
externalities coincided with apprehensions about the tenability of economic sovereignty 
given China’s increasing reliance on foreign factor markets and technology. 
In tandem with the reconsolidation of control within the central Party-state apparatus, 
direct appropriations re-emerged as a key instrument of capital allocation. Under Hu, 
programmes –typically administered by local government- directed at the resolution of 
perceived bottlenecks in economic development have combined lump-sum allocations 
with a host of subsidies and other indirect fiscal stimuli. Development of rural and 
peripheral economies and promotion of human and intellectual capital have been key foci 
of these policies. Accordingly, policies such as the ‘western development programme’ 
(xibu da kaifa), have been appended with a range of incentives targeting the rural 
economy.
86
 From 2003 to 2010, investment in agricultural development grew from 4.6 to 
9.1% of total state expenditures (NBS 2004, 2011). Moreover, government rapidly 
increased outlays for science, technology and education and introduced a host of 
industrial policies extending favorable conditions to domestic enterprise operating within 
technology-intensive industries (McGregor 2011). 
 Counteracting the abovementioned redistribution of capital was the incessant growth 
of the centrally-controlled public economy. Bolstered by its resolve to retain control over 
the overall structure of the economy, central government designated several upstream 
sectors as ‘pillar industries’ during the fourteenth Party congress and again in the tenth 
five-year plan (Liu 2005). These subsequently became the focus of government’s efforts 
of reorganize public industry. The state effectuated the consolidation of central SOEs 
through a series of mandatory mergers and acquisitions, resulting in the formation of a 
                                                     
85 In 2004, coal-based energy accounted for 74.5 per cent of total energy production (NBS, 2005). 
86  Note that many of these programs were instigated under Jiang, rather than under Hu. The western 
development program for example, commenced in 1996. 
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select group of large business conglomerates. The amalgamation of public assets was 
complemented with ownership diversification by way of stock-listing, resulting in a rapid 
influx of capital. As a result, the overall stature of these central SOEs (zhongyang qiye) 
rapidly increased, so that by 2008, they accounted for more than 40 per cent of 
state-owned assets (SASAC Yearbook, 2009). 
 
 Figure 11: Output, profit and taxes of state-owned and state-controlled enterprises, 2003-2010 
Source: NBS 2011, 14-8 
 
Under Hu, China’s economy continued to experience steady growth, with GDP 
increasing by an average 10.9 per cent between 2003 and 2012 (NBS 2012). However, 
progress along the qualitative dimensions of economic development was less obvious. 
Lump sum allocations for the alleviation of sectoral and regional disparity have not been 
able to moderate socio-economic inequalities which emerged as a consequence of 
decades of industry-oriented, investment-driven growth. The prioritization of industry, 
impelling the neglect of agricultural development throughout most of the post-communist 
era, has also been largely responsible for the structural disparity of the coastal and inland 
region. Focusing on those areas where ‘reform and opening up’ were to reap the most 
immediate benefits, early efforts at marketization, corporatization and integration with the 
global economy were concentrated in the relatively affluent and developed coastal 
provinces. Subsequent investment and development increased the productivity of coastal 
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industry vis-à-vis that of the inland regions, in turn reinforcing the tendency for 
investment to flow to the coastal provinces (Fujita & Hu 2001)The rapid deterioration of 
the ratio of rural to urban incomes, which only moderately improved under the Hu-Wen 
administration demonstrates a patent misalignment between the humanist discourse of yi 
ren wei ben and actual patterns of development (figure 10). 
 
 
Figure 12: Rural income as share of urban income, 1998-2011 
Source: Calculated from NBS, 2012, table 10-2  
 
After three decades of reform, China’s trajectory of economic development departed 
significantly from the communist-era model. No longer does capital extracted from 
agriculture form the main source of investment for industry. Relationships between 
bureaucracy and enterprise have been refashioned so that now the market component 
comprises the larger part of the economy. Within the public economy as well, the practice 
of material planning which once constituted the fulcrum of state-enterprise coordination 
has disappeared in tandem with corporatization. Contrasting these profound changes are 
certain persistent characteristics of the distribution of capital. The subsequent section 
which considers the overall mode of accumulation in the post-command-era economy 
demonstrates that, notwithstanding profound institutional change, development is still 
driven by high investment in fixed capital, and the persistent prioritization of the public 
component of the economy. Yet, these engrained features of Chinese economic 
development threaten long-term sustainability and undermine social stability.  
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The mode of accumulation within the socialist market economy  
Structural features of accumulation 
Under socialism, the distinguishing pattern of accumulation was one of expropriation of 
capital from the rural economy into heavy industry. Removal of these coercive 
regulations in the first stages of reform introduced both incentives and opportunities for 
the diversification and expansion of production in both agriculture and light industry, and 
accounts in large part for the rapid upturn of economic activity in post-communist China. 
Although the forced transfer of agricultural surplus into industry has ceased to be the core 
of China’s economic strategy, investment in the reform era consistently prioritized the 
development of industry over that of agriculture. Thus, while output of the primary sector 
grew by 4.37 times between 1978 and 2011, industry expanded by more than 35 times in 
the same period (see figure 11). 
 
Figure 13: GDP and component growth, 1979-2011, (1978=100) 
Source: NBS 2012, table 2-1 
 
Moreover, while the price-scissors mechanism has been abandoned, and in recent years 
incremental steps have been taken to alleviate other institutional constraints (such as the 
household registration system), expropriation had persisted in other guises, such as the 
acquisition and sale of farm-land by local government. As a result (with the exception of 
the initial stage of liberalization), growth within agriculture has continued to trail 
significantly behind that of the secondary and tertiary sectors. 
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Similarities with the pre-reform pattern of accumulation do not only exist within the 
sectoral distribution of capital, but also in the relationship between investment and 
consumption. As can be gleaned from figure 12, household consumption expenditure rose 
rapidly in tandem with the market-driven expansion of the economy during the first two 
decades. However, during the tenure of Jiang (1993-2003) growth of household 
consumption expenditure slowed down markedly. 
Although in the wake of Hu’s promulgation of yi ren wei ben (to take the people as 
the basis), the divergence in growth rates of consumption expenditure and productive 
capital decreased, government’s reaction to the global financial crisis offset this 
development.
87
 All in all, the reform-era economy has relied on high investment and high 
additions to the fixed capital stock in even greater degree than its communist counterpart. 
Moreover, the expansion of fixed capital has consistently outpaced growth of both GDP 
and wages, suggesting the persistence of a predominantly extensive mode of 
accumulation. 
 
Figure 14: Growth of real GDP, household consumption expenditure and gross fixed capital, 
1978-2011 
Source: Calculated from NBS, 2012, tables 2-17, 2-18 
                                                     
87 In reaction to the 2008 financial crisis, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
implemented a comprehensive stimulus plan (totaling roughly 4 trillion yuan). The major part of these funds 
(1.5 trillion and 1 trillion yuan. respectively) were invested in national infrastructure and various large 
technological projects stipulated in the Medium and Long-term Plan for Scientific and Technological 
Development (Anonymous 2009b). Keynesian investment (predominantly in state-controlled industries) 
adding to the growth of fixed capital thus was prioritized over fiscal measures which could have stimulated 
consumption through increases of expendable income.  
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Capital concentration and distributive consequences 
While the broad characteristics of accumulation during and after the command economy 
display certain salient similarities, the reform-era distribution of capital has been more 
divergent. For one, processes of marketization, corporatization and de-recentralization 
introduced novel constituents while moderating relationships of authority between extant 
ones. Amongst these changes, the emergence of a private sector has been of greatest 
consequence. The establishment of an economy outside the confines of the public sector 
provided tremendous scope and drive for the utilization of latent capital. Indeed, the 
market now comprises the greater part of the Chinese economy, a fact central to 
transitionist arguments. 
Yet the significance of the development of the market component is subject to 
qualifications. First, the introduction of new sources of financing has not challenged the 
primacy of industrial capital. In fact, Chinese reliance on loans and FDI as sources of 
investment in fixed assets has consistently decreased. Thus, the emergence of investors 
and creditors (domestic and foreign) did not result in a comprehensive shift in the 
hierarchy of economic constituents (see table 7). 
 
 State Budget Domestic Loans Foreign Investment Enterprise, others* 
1981 28.1 12.7 3.8 55.4 
1985 16.0 20.1 3.6 60.3 
1990 8.7 19.6 6.3 65.4 
1995 3.0 20.5 11.2 65.3 
2000 6.4 20.3 5.1 68.2 
2005 4.4 17.3 4.2 74.1 
2010 4.7 15.2 1.6 78.5 
*Includes investment from retained revenues and funds obtained from sources other than financial 
institutions 
Table 7: Sources of investment in fixed assets by percentage of total, 1981-2010 
Source: NBS, 2012 
 
Second, the reduction of the share of overall production of the public economy has been 
countervailed by the increasing concentration of capital. Due to local government’s 
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proclivity to invest in the local public economy during the initial period of reform, the 
productive capacity of local SOEs grew at a much faster rate than that owned by 
collective and private enterprise. To wit, in the period 1978-1996, the number of 
state-owned and market-based enterprises rose by an annual average of 1.02 and 2.78 % 
respectively, while gross output of the two sectors grew by a yearly average of 23.1 and 
18.0 per cent.
88
 Restructuring in the mid-1990s transferred much of the state’s 
non-productive assets to the private sector. Yet the volume of assets under purview of 
remaining SOEs - particularly those in strategic upstream industry controlled by central 
government- rapidly increased. In the same period, the size of private enterprise grew at a 
much more moderate rate.
89
 Thus, patterns of accumulation within the private and public 
segments sector have been largely contrasting, with rapid but diffuse growth
90
 prevailing 
in the private economy and more moderate expansion coinciding with increasing 
concentration in the (centrally controlled) public sector. Since these enterprises have been 
the focus of government’s corporate development strategy (Nolan 2001; Keister 1998) 
and are increasingly clustered in major upstream industries, their diminished share of 
gross industrial output is a poor reflection of their actual significance within the economic 
system (see tables 8 and 9). Notwithstanding the pervasive influence of the state, the 
processes of marketization and corporatization, along with the tremendous accumulation 
of assets within central SOEs have given rise to a potent managerial constituency within 
the public sector (Walder 2011). 
 The devolution of operational authority to corporate leadership has created new 
potential for the development of agency problems and emphasized the need to adjust 
coordinating mechanisms to ensure alignment of state-managerial interests (Brødsgaard 
2012). 
 Concentration of industrial assets is representative of a more general trend towards 
the recentralization of capital in the public sector. However, this transfer of revenues 
wasn’t accompanied by a commensurate redistribution of expenses.91 Thus, although  
                                                     
88 Calculated from (China Statistical Press 2005). 
89 Below data refers to domestic private enterprise only. 
90 I.e. growth by means of the establishment of new enterprise. 
91 In 1993, the central-local distribution of fiscal revenues was 0.22 and 0.78, while the distribution of expenses 
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State-owned/ controlled as % of total industry      
 Enterprises Employees Assets Liabilities Equity Fixed assets GVIO Industrial profits 
1998 39.22  60.49  68.84  44.15  67.84  79.46  49.63  36.01  
2003 17.47  37.62  55.99  56.26  55.38  64.00  37.54  46.01  
2011 5.24  19.77  41.68  43.88  38.73  48.91  26.18  26.81  
         
State-owned/ controlled average (monetary values in million yuan.)    
  Employees Assets Liabilities Equity Fixed capital GVIO Industrial profits 
1998  579  115.72  47.31  41.34  55.14  51.93  0.81  
2003  631  275.73  163.33  111.67  127.38  155.80  11.19  
2011  1063  1651.85  1010.38  640.59  656.13  1296.25  96.51  
         
Private (above scale) as % of total industry     
 Enterprises Employees Assets Liabilities Equity Fixed capital GVIO Industrial profits 
1998 6.46  2.60  1.37  1.31  1.46  1.21  3.07  4.62  
2003 34.45  17.88  8.60  8.82  8.31  6.88  14.75  10.31  
2011 55.47  32.25  18.90  15.03  20.38  17.55  29.89  29.57  
         
Private (above scale) average (monetary values in million yuan.)    
  Employees Assets Liabilities Equity Fixed capital GVIO Industrial profits 
1998  151  13.94  8.53  5.41  5.11  19.53  0.63  
2003  152  21.48  12.99  8.50  6.95  31.03  1.27  
2011  164  70.73  32.66  31.82  22.23  139.71  10.05  
Table 8: Concentration of capital and distribution over state-owned and private enterprise, 
1998-2011 
Source: Calculated from NBS, 2012, tables 14-6, 14-10; 2004, tables 14-5, 14-9 
 
 
Total  
SOEs 
Central 
SOEs 
Central /Total 
SOEs 
Number 113,731 148 0.13% 
Employees (1, 000) 36,723 11,368 30.96% 
Assets (billion yuan) 13,182.87 5,557.4 42.16% 
Table 9: Distribution of capital within the public economy, 2008 
Source: SASAC Yearbook, 2009 
 
local government emerged as the main coordinating actor within the initial period of 
reform, subsequent development saw a countervailing tendency bolstering the 
                                                                                                                                                 
was 0.28 and 0.72 respectively. By 2011 these ratios had changed to 0.49 to 0.51 and 0.15 to 0.85 (NBS, 2012). 
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hierarchical relationship between central and local government. A consequence of fiscal 
redistribution has been local government’s increasing reliance on the collection of 
extra-budgetary revenues (Mertha 2005), of which the aforementioned appropriation and 
sale of land is an example. Thus, the fiscal reconsolidation of the central state has 
proceeded in part by the devolvement of costs unto local government, which in turn has 
partly passed these on to society.  
Finally, prioritization of industry has had profound implications for the distribution of 
capital over the urban and rural economy. While the rural economy was invigorated by 
the abolishment of systemic resource transfers, until recently, no deliberate efforts were 
made to significantly adjust the systemic bias of capital allocation towards industry. 
Moreover, due to interregional differences in productivity, capital has continued to flow 
predominantly to the developed coastal regions. The dual divergence between eastern and 
inland regions and cities and countryside has caused socio-economic disparities to 
exacerbate during the reform era. 
 
Conclusion 
In the communist era, industrial development was driven by the expropriation of 
agricultural surplus value. Constraints on rural purchasing power and the overwhelmingly 
extensive quality of accumulation within industry resulted in a lack of transfer of 
productivity-enhancing capital from department I to department II and precluded 
realization of the strategy of accelerated industrial development. In the initial period of 
reform, extensive and diffuse growth of the market sector consistently outpaced more 
consolidated accumulation within the public sector, allowing for attenuation of the 
imbalances between the economic departments. With the passing of power from Deng to 
Jiang, tendencies towards liberalization and decentralization were reversed, even as the 
administration proceeded with reforms reminiscent of western economic liberalization. In 
an ironic reiteration of pre-reform patterns of capital distribution, capitalist institutional 
reforms have led once again to the expansion and invigoration of the commanding heights 
of the state-controlled economy.  
Thus, capital accumulation in the post-communist era has not unequivocally adhered 
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to a single pattern. Roughly, accumulation within the non-state component of the 
economy has been diffuse, with additions to capital stock being relatively dependent on 
the influx of new enterprises. By contrast, the public economy has developed 
predominantly by expansion of capital under control of extant firms, and the select group 
of centrally controlled national champions in particular. Regardless of these differences, 
the overall mode of accumulation has remained predominantly extensive, with rates of 
gross fixed capital even far surpassing those under communism. The emphasis on the 
continuous expansion of productive capacity is reflected in the continued dominance of 
the industrialist class within the coordination of capital. Although the significance of 
central planning was diminished with the development of debt and equity markets, the 
financial sector appears to have bolstered rather than challenged the extant 
socio-economic hierarchy.  
Nevertheless, corporatization and marketization resulted in the emergence of novel 
constituents, whom the state has had to contend with. The influence of Chinese 
entrepreneurs grew in tandem with the development of the market economy. Within the 
public sector, devolution of operational control resulted in the formation of a managerial 
class. This alteration of distribution of capital necessitated changes to the institutional 
architecture which coordinated the interrelations between state and market and central 
state and sub-central public actors. However, the discrepancy between current discourse – 
to the effect of promoting more egalitarian growth – and the actual distribution of capital 
points also to the path-dependent constraints imposed by institutions that have entrenched 
the imperative for continuous expansion of productive capacity. The subsequent chapter 
examines how the institutions which regulate finance, labor and competition have 
continued to accommodate the state-industrialist nexus in the face of the changing 
distribution of capital, as well as why institutionalized inter-constituent relationships may 
impede the transition towards a more egalitarian mode of development. 
Finally, the persistence of an extensive mode of accumulation calls into question the 
general sustainability of current economic development. Consistently high margins of 
addition to industrial capital imply a risk of production in excess of consumption or a 
systemic problem of idle capacity. China’s ‘opening up’ and emphasis on exports has 
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been instrumental in staving off the destabilizing influences of over-accumulation (Boyer 
2012). Recently, the global financial crisis suppressed foreign demand, while the state’s 
financial stimuli, targeted mainly at the expansion of fixed capital, have ironically 
compounded the problem of over-accumulation exacerbating the risk of stagflation. The 
limits of the Chinese pattern of extensive accumulation are also obvious from increasing 
socio-economic divergence, prompted by the uneven development of city and countryside 
and the predominance of capital investment over the expansion of expandable income. 
The systemic crisis the Chinese economy is facing now is thus one which is 
fundamentally different from that impeding growth in the communist era. The latter was 
brought on by the structural imbalance of agriculture and industry. Although growth of 
the agricultural sector has continued to trail behind that of service and industry, China’s 
current economic predicament arises out of the inherent limitations of an extensive mode 
of growth. The manifest economic and social imbalances prompted by China’s 
accumulation regime stress the imminent need for a capacity to consistently increase 
relative surplus value by way of the introduction of productivity-enhancing technologies. 
Absent increases in labor productivity, transition towards a more egalitarian, domestic 
consumption-based model of development appears infeasible. Chapter five asks whether 
the current institutional architecture can provide the requisite impetus and coordination to 
transition towards a predominantly intensive mode of accumulation. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
REGULATION UNDER COMMUNISM AND MARKET SOCIALISM: 
SUSTAINING THE STATE-INDUSTRIALIST NEXUS 
 
Introduction 
Notwithstanding profound changes within the distribution of capital over productive 
processes and constituents since the transition from the communist central planning 
system to the current constellation of market socialism, patterns of capital accumulation 
have displayed certain salient continuities. As related in the previous chapter, one of these 
commonalties is the heavy reliance of economic growth on the expansion of industrial 
capital. Additionally, although the public economy has inarguably become less 
encompassing, the state has continued to play a role of central (and in recent years, 
increasing) importance. Jointly, the predominance of industrial capital and consolidation 
of control over key industrial sectors by the central Party-state apparatus –a dominant 
form of capital and main coordinating mechanism- give rise to China’s state-industrial 
nexus. To venture beyond this general characterization of the main dynamic of the 
Chinese economic system, this chapter considers the mode of regulation, that is, the 
aggregate of institutional arrangements which determine the systematic relationships 
between productive capital and labor and finance and capital, as well as the ways in 
which enterprises interact over the course of production. Analysis is concerned with how 
China’s mode of regulation sustained the communist and post-communist 
state-industrialist nexus. An additional question of interest is how this relationship 
between state and industry was affected by the transition towards market socialism.  
 This chapter commences with an overview of the institutional framework which took 
shape under communism. Transfer of agricultural surplus to industry hinged on a 
centrally administered system of capital allocation. However, the distributive process 
necessitated establishment of a great number of regional and functional bureaux. 
Informational and coordinative constraints subsequently resulted in sub-central 
bureaucracy’s emergence as separate constituents within the system of economic planning. 
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Notwithstanding the pervasive nature of the state, the center’s coordinative capacity was 
thus curtailed by considerable bureaucratic fragmentation, which ought to be considered 
when making longitudinal comparisons of the magnitude of economic control. The 
systemic bias towards heavy industry was reinforced by the development of an 
indigenous system of industrial relations. The household registration system segregated 
the rural and urban workforce. The state cultivated its relationship with the industrial 
workforce through the institution of the danwei, or work unit, which effectively eroded 
the autonomy of industrial labor. Administrative staff was managed by way of the 
nomenklatura system of personnel control. Jointly, these institutions, constituting the crux 
of the communist mode of regulation, ensured the dependency of labor and management 
on the Chinese Communist Party. In reviewing the institutions which took shape under 
communism, this section not only provides an anchor point for discussion of subsequent 
institutional changes, but it likewise yields important insights into the nature of the 
Leninist system of bureaucratic administration which continues to constitute the primary 
means by which the central state coordinates with China’s main economic constituents. 
With the introduction of reforms in 1978, the monopolistic mode of regulation, 
which had promoted the concentration of capital into heavy industry, was supplanted by a 
more extensive one. Nevertheless, state monopolization of upstream industry and credit 
and equity markets introduced novel mechanisms of expropriation, resulting in a 
countervailing trend of consolidation. As capital flowed towards public industry, much of 
the costs of loss-making enterprise –of which the ‘iron rice-bowl’ system of urban social 
welfare, which constituted the crux of the state-industrial worker nexus, comprised no 
small part- were devolved unto the private sector. In its stead, the state sought to solidify 
its ties with the emergent managerial class. Through its Leninist bureaucratic apparatus, 
the center perpetuated relationships of hierarchical dependency with leaders of public 
industry and regional government, while simultaneously seeking to co-opt private-sector 
entrepreneurs. The aligning principle between these constituents and the center is the joint 
interest in the continuous development of industrial production. As such, in spite of 
alteration of primary constituents and the mechanisms coordinating their interaction, the 
state-industrialist nexus has abided. 
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The communist mode of regulation 
As regulation theory would predict, reorganization of relationships of production in 
communist China was accompanied by a commensurate reordering of the mode of 
regulation. Although predominantly monopolistic in character, the communist industrial 
paradigm and the distinctly political context of economic activity lent an idiosyncratic 
character to regulation. 
 
Coordination of capital and inter-enterprise relationships 
Fiscal and material planning 
Upon the establishment of the People’s Republic, the CCP rapidly commenced the project 
of economic nationalization. Initially, the scope of public ownership was limited to heavy 
industry, while private enterprises were allowed to continue operation within consumer 
goods and commerce.
92
 However, in tandem with the development of the economic 
administration, the scope of state control expanded, and by 1956, virtually all industry 
had been subsumed either within state-owned enterprise or collectives. Ultimate control 
over the allocation of capital rested with three central organs: the State Planning 
Commission, State Economic Commission and the Basic Construction Commission.
93
 
Although the distribution of responsibilities over the various administrative organs varied 
periodically, the relationship between the three was broadly as follows. The State 
Planning Commission was responsible for setting out the long- and medium-term course 
of economic development. To this effect, it drafted various national plans (such as the 
five-year plans) in which it stipulated overall outlays for each of the economic 
departments, promulgated production quota and set out major objectives for the 
                                                     
92 Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 1949, gongtong gangling [Common program]. 
93 CC 1958, guanyu chengli zhongyang jiben jianshe weiyuanhui, jihua weiyuanhui, jingji weiyuanhui de 
jueding [Decision regarding the establishment of the Basic Construction, State Planning, and State Economic 
Commissions]. Throughout the history of the P.R.C. bureaucratic organization has been subject to a great 
number of reforms. As such the SEC and SPC have at times been merged into a single entity or operated 
separately, while the BCC was disbanded or re-established at various intervals. The latest incarnation of the 
SEC and SPC is the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), established in 2003. For an 
extensive overview of bureaucratic reforms see for example Brødsgaard, 2002; Burns, 1993. 
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development of the industrial and public infrastructure. The State Economic Commission 
was responsible for short term macro-economic adjustments. It produced detailed annual 
budgets for the industrial and regional bureaucratic organs and set yearly production 
targets. Finally, the Basic Construction Commission was mandated with management of 
investment in fixed industrial assets (jiben jianshe), so as to increase productive capacity. 
Its concrete tasks consisted of the articulation and prioritization (pai dui) of objectives for 
plant construction and expansion and industrial infrastructure (Dong 2007b). 
 
 
Figure 15: Organization of economic administration under the central plan 
Source: Adapted from www.czbb.changzhigov.cn 
 
Although the formal structure of China’s communist economic bureaucracy provides an 
impression of a highly centralized and hierarchical system of allocation (see figure 13), 
there were actually considerable limits to the extent of control central organs could exert 
over the process of economic development. The formulation and implementation of the 
national plans was a highly complex process, fraught with extensive informational and 
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managerial constraints. Thus, upon establishment of the planning system, a great number 
of functional and regional organs emerged to support the central state. The State Planning 
Commission would initiate the planning process by promulgating a series of ‘control 
figures’ (kongzhi shuzi), broad targets and quota for production and economic growth. 
After approval from the National People’s Congress, functional ministries would draft 
tentative economic plans for the economic departments under their purview.
94
 These then 
produced detailed schemas for allocation of capital to the manufacturing plants under 
their purview. Central planning thus depended heavily on information and assertions 
provided by these subordinate elements. Moreover, leading cadres within industrial 
bureaux were often promoted to positions of eminence within the government and Party, 
which resulted in a permeation of industrial interests into the highest echelons of political 
hierarchy (Brødsgaard 2002).  
Second, throughout the communist era, there existed an ongoing discussion 
regarding the appropriate balance of influence between central and sub-central 
government, as well as between that of the state and the Party. Leaders directly 
responsible for economic administration were in favor of strong central control. However, 
Chairman Mao had great reservations about the proliferation of central bureaucracy.
95
 
Political arguments were appended by a concern regarding sensitivity to varying local 
conditions (Lieberthal & Oksenberg 1988; Lyons 1990). This resulted in the rather unique 
administrative system of tiaokuai (lit. ‘lines and blocks’). Under this arrangement, which 
persists until present day, bureaucratic organizations either fall within the functional (tiao) 
or regional (kuai) category. The former are to ensure that central policies are devolved to, 
and implemented by lower levels of the administration, while the latter allows for 
adjustments, if warranted by local conditions.  
Political and economic forces coalesced to ensure that, throughout most of the 
command era, the propensity towards decentralization prevailed.
96
 Administrative 
                                                     
94 Financial and Economic Committee of the State Council 1952, guanyu guomin jingji jihua bianzhi zanxing 
banfa [Temporary measures for the drafting of the national economic plan]. 
95 This rift between proponents of balanced growth and mass mobilization coincided largely with the division 
between bureaucracy and Party (Lieberthal 1997). 
96 Schurmann (1968) notes that decentralization reinforced Party control because local governments would be 
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reforms were introduced in 1957, which brought less crucial elements of the economy 
such as light industry under the direct auspices of local government. Enterprises in heavy 
industry remained for the most part under central control, but material allocation to those 
enterprises became a local affair (Donnithorne 1964). Capital under direct control of the 
center subsequently greatly decreased due to popular mobilization during the Great Leap 
Forward and Cultural Revolution, and the strategy of regional autarky pursued under the 
Third Front. However, as Lardy (1975) points out, the center still exerted considerable 
influence over allocation, as demonstrated by the construction of an industrial basis in 
inland regions (since richer provinces would have surely opposed inter-regional fiscal 
transfers if so able).  
Although the center continued to stipulate the broad direction of national economic 
development,
97
 central government’s capacity to specify conditions upon which capital 
would be made available to enterprise or critically survey productive conditions was 
limited. Information asymmetry implied that central government could only rely on crude 
production quota in deliberating the allocation of capital and could exert but little direct 
control over productive agents. The communist institutions for the allocation of capital 
thus had their peculiarities; although capital was made available a priori on basis of 
future projections,
98
 it lacked the capacity for monitoring and control characteristic of 
bureaucratic systems. In the face of the center’s limited capacity to directly coordinate 
allocation of capital and its outcomes, it relied to great degree on the intricate systems of 
personnel administration. 
Central control over capital was complemented by the bianzhi system (lit. ‘the 
establishment’), which encompassed both administrative bureaux (jiguan) and enterprise 
(qiye).
99
 The system stipulated the remit and proportionate remuneration for each 
position within the economic bureaucracy, as well as the total number of personnel 
occupied within each position (Brødsgaard 2002; Mertha 2005). Together with the 
                                                                                                                                                 
beholden to Party committees at the regional level.  
97 According to Harding (1981) proposals to give provinces greater autonomy in economic planning were 
vehemently –and successfully – opposed by the center. 
98 As is characteristic of monopolistic regimes. 
99 Responsibility for the administration of the bianzhi system lay alternatively with the Party or the state. 
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planning mechanism, the bianzhi system thus allowed the center to delineate the 
proportions of both capital and labor appropriated by industry and its supporting 
bureaucracy (see Przeworski & Limongi 1993). Clearly, central decisions regarding the 
industrial bianzhi relied in no small part on information delivered by sub-central 
bureaucratic organs, which encouraged opportunism on the part of the latter (Groves et al. 
1994). Nevertheless, the system’s relevance in curbing the expansionary tendencies 
within the economic administration can be inferred from the sharp increase in industrial 
labor during the Great Leap Forward, when the bianzhi system was temporarily 
suspended in favor of a strategy of mass mobilization (Dong 2007a). 
 
Constituent interaction 
The bianzhi system was equally important in determining intra-bureaucratic negotiations 
of the division of authority and responsibility. Through bianzhi reform, the state could 
adjust the relative influence of constituents within the bureaucracy by increasing or 
decreasing their position within the hierarchy and the number of staff allotted to them. 
Throughout the pre-reform era, the center engaged in significant periodic bureaucratic 
reforms and down-scaling, habitually abolishing, merging or (re)establishing various 
departments in accordance with prevailing opinions on the appropriate distribution of 
influence. For example, following the decision to decentralize fiscal and operational 
responsibilities for economic development in 1958, the Basic Construction Commission 
was abolished, and its responsibilities divided amongst the State Planning Commission, 
State Economic Commission and Ministry for Construction.
100
 Under conditions of 
public ownership and administration by plan, productive actors had in principle no 
control over either prices or output, and as such, competition in the capitalist sense was 
irrelevant to pre-reform China. Due to the regional and functional compartmentalization 
of industry, enterprise neither engaged in direct competition nor collaboration. Rather, 
competition took on an indirect form, were bureaucratic constituents vied for the favor of 
the center. The central state, in turn was permeable to the demands of sub-central 
                                                     
100 Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 1958, guanyu tiqing tiaozheng guowuyuan suo shu 
zuzhi jigou de yi’an [Proposal regarding the adjustment of the organs under the State Council]. 
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constituents because it of necessity relied on them for economic information
101
 and 
execution of its plans. 
 
The coordination of labor 
Unlike Soviet communism, which was predicated on the support of the proletariat, the 
peasant class provided the basis for China’s communist revolution as well as the 
economic foundation for socialist development. Although agricultural production was 
rapidly subsumed within the plan economy, the state’s initial engagement with the 
agricultural sector was by and large limited to the abrogation of exploitative arrangements, 
through the purge of landlords and rent-seeking bureaucrats
102
 and the socialization of 
farm-land. Restructuring of rural social relationships and universal work entitlement was 
to put an end to exploitation and poverty. Having removed these constraints the state 
considered it sufficient to depend on a strategy of self-reliance (zili gengsheng) within the 
countryside (Chang 2003).
103
 This changed as the strategy of industrialization intensified, 
and the state came to consider collectivization a necessary measure to ensure an upturn in 
agricultural output. Hesitation on part of the peasants who, after having wrought control 
from the landlords, now had to turn over their plots to the collective induced the state to 
introduce the ‘five guarantees’ (wu bao), which ensured provision for basic needs for 
destitute families. The fate of these guarantees was intimately associated with that of the 
rural communes. As the communes grew, so did the scale and scope of guarantees until, 
during the heyday of the collective in 1958, they came to account for approximately half 
of peasant incomes (Dixon 1982). This particular agricultural production-welfare nexus 
was however short-lived. After the catastrophic ending of the Great Leap Forward, the 
lavish welfare arrangements within the communes were scaled back and associated 
                                                     
101 The asymmetric distribution of information relating to (localized) economic activity, in favor of regional 
actors, results in the onset of possible rent-seeking of agents (i.e. local and functional bureaucracy) vis-à-vis 
principals (e.g. the center), see (Berle & Means 1965). 
102 On the social organization of pre-communist agricultural China, see Liu 2007. 
103 Additionally, regulationist theory asserts that the existence of pre-capitalist forms of communal and familial 
subsistence provision depresses wages and therefore is a crucial determinant of the potential for extraction of 
absolute surplus value (Brenner & Glick 1991). 
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expenses were largely devolved to the production teams (Dixon 1982)
104
  
In contrast to the state’s fickle engagement with China’s peasants, the urban, industrial 
workforce was a continual focus of institutional arrangements under communism. As 
harbingers of the socialist industrial economy, urban laborers were rewarded both with 
higher incomes and greater access to welfare goods.
105
 The bifurcation between 
agriculture and industry was institutionalized through the household registration system 
(hujizhi).
106
 From the mid-1950s onwards, government utilized an extensive 
administrative apparatus to monitor and control all domestic movement of labor. This 
registration system allowed government to restrict movement from countryside to city, so 
as to realize the desired distribution of labor between agriculture and industry. Curbing 
the inflow of urban migrants was required to ensure appropriate incentives for cooptation 
of the industrial workforce (Cheng & Selden 1994). Moreover, by transfixing industrial 
labor, the registration system provided a prerequisite for the project of socio-political 
transformation, which sought to supplant traditional social relations (of family, region etc.) 
with ties to the factory or commune (Walder 1988).Within industry, the lot of the laborer 
became inextricably associated with that of the production unit, or danwei. Regulation 
introduced in the first half of the 1950s rendered the danwei responsible for providing 
lifetime employment and social welfare for all factory workers.
108,109
 However, the 
influence of danwei-organization extended far beyond the work-relation as the production 
unit also constituted the locus of domestic and communal life, and as such encompassed 
virtually all aspects of social interaction (Yeh, 1997).  
Notwithstanding the centrality of the production unit, the relationship of chief 
importance was not that between labor and management, but rather that between 
                                                     
104 Agricultural production was organized in communes, comprised of brigades, which in turn were made up of 
production teams, the smallest organizational unit. 
105 To this, Chang (2003) adds that urban labor constituted a potential political threat, requiring a strategy of 
large-scale cooptation. 
106 The household registration is alternatively knowns as the “hukou” system. 
108 A system colloquially referred to as the ‘iron rice bowl’ (tie wan fan). 
109 State Council 1951, laodong baoxian tiaolie [Regulations on Labor Security]; State Council 1954, guoying 
qiye nebu laodong guize gangyao [Outline of the Internal Labor Regulations for Public Enterprise]. 
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employee and the Party-state. In 1955, national reforms standardized wages according to 
specified occupational grades. From then on both the distribution of wages and the 
number of specified positions for each unit were determined not by the production unit, 
but rather through the bianzhi system (Howe 1973). Initially, wage differentials were 
promoted as a production incentive, but these were largely reversed later due to the 
progressive politicization of economic life (especially during the period of the Cultural 
Revolution). This politicization had dual implications for industrial relations. At the level 
of enterprise, it meant a substitution of a system of communal discipline for monetary 
rewards (such as the infamous struggle meetings, ibid). This did however not mean that 
material incentives or occupational differentiation were abandoned altogether. Rather, this 
became the purview of the Party, which bestowed privileges on workers who upheld the 
virtues of communism in exemplary manner (Walder 1988). Naturally, the Party’s system 
of personnel control encompassed not only China’s industrial workers, but also those 
bureaucrats responsible for regional and industrial administration. The nomenklatura 
system, established in the mid-1950s had its origins in the Soviet system of cadre 
administration and comprised a register of key positions within the bureaucratic hierarchy 
(Burns 1987).
110
 Through the nomenklatura the Party’s Central Organization Department 
and a plethora of Party Committees controlled the appointment, promotion and removal 
of central, provincial and ministerial leadership as well as the directorate within the major 
universities and research institutes (Manion 1985). The nomenklatura not only constituted 
the sole organizing principle for all crucial positions within the bureaucratic hierarchy, 
but also provided strong incentives for bureaucrats to conform to Party directives. After 
all, decisions regarding cadre promotion were made on basis of appraisals of the 
ideological virtue and professional attainment of candidates, while promotion into the 
echelons of the Party-state bureaucracy bestowed upon individuals (without any outside 
options) the benefits of power (Burns 1989). The system thus functioned as a rank-order 
tournament (Lazear & Rosen 1981), impelling bureaucrats to frenetically strive to meet 
production quota.
111
 
                                                     
110 Cadres are Party members within public office. 
111  Kung and Sen (2011) note that incentives for professional attainment significantly contributed to 
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Within regulationist accounts, the employee relationship is treated as a time and 
context specific expression of a general compromise between workers’ right to the value 
of their labor and their demand for certainty of provision. In communist China, this 
compromise was characterized by an institutional bifurcation between productive activity 
in agriculture and industry. Although the state stipulated the organization of agricultural 
activity and lay claim to its output, it did not offer the peasants commensurate security. 
With the exception of a brief period during the Great Leap Forward, the wage-labor nexus 
(that is, the institutionalized distribution of realized surplus value) disadvantaged the rural 
population (not least by the artificial depression of rural income), in order to promote the 
expedited development of industry and the allegiance of the urban workforce. Overall, 
organization of labor expressed a peculiar paradox. Agricultural production was 
characterized by an extensive employment relationship but subject to the centralization of 
surplus value, while within industry, the wage-labor relation was decisively intensive, yet 
only partially predicated on the extraction of surplus value. Life-time employment and 
guaranteed social benefits were appended with social organization of the work 
relationship which encouraged strong identification of the worker with enterprise. 
However, the relationship between appropriation of surplus value and guaranteed 
provision of welfare was interrupted by the extensive political apparatus which sought to 
ensure the fidelity of personnel to the Party and the precepts of communism. 
 
Characterizing the communist mode of regulation 
Prima facie the communist institutions which coordinated labor, capital and inter-actor 
relations which jointly circumscribe the mode of regulation broadly resembled a 
monopolistic mode of regulation. Lifetime employment and comprehensive welfare 
benefits were extended to workers in industrial manufacturing units. Capital was 
allocated on basis of centrally promulgated production targets. Competition was 
eschewed as it was believed to result in the wasteful duplication of productive efforts. Yet, 
regulation in communist China had its idiosyncrasies. 
First, interactions between the central Party-state, local government and 
                                                                                                                                                 
administrators’ extraction of grain output to meet central quota during the Great Leap Forward. 
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manufacturing unit were guided by an admixture of economic and political objectives. 
Decisions to decentralize fiscal and operational autonomy to provincial administration, or 
at times, to the grassroots level had in part been motivated by Mao’s concerns that the 
development of a strong central bureaucracy would threaten the dominance of the Party. 
Such reservations were compounded by the inherent constraints of central planning to 
render the reality of bureaucratic economic administration less than totalitarian. Rather, 
the institutional ties which came to predominate the communist mode of regulation were 
those that tied the various constituents to the Party. The industrial danwei, intended to 
satiate workers’ economic and social needs, was an outcome of the need to co-opt the 
proletariat within a system of socio-political relations over which the Party presided. The 
desire to ensure dependency on the CCP was likewise reflected in the practice of 
nomenklatura, by which the Party was able to directly control the fate of cadres 
occupying prominent positions within all areas of economic (as well as political and 
social) life. As a result of the relentless focus on industrial expansion, realization of 
production quota became the major imperative, resulting in a state-industrialist nexus, 
premised on a covenant between the Party, sub-central bureaucracy and industrial 
workers. 
Due to this industrialist orientation (and in contradiction to the communist 
egalitarian ideal) regulation had unapologetically prioritized the urban economy. 
Although the countryside had been burdened with the provision of funds requisite for the 
project of socialist industrialization, the state by and large neglected its commitment to 
investment in agricultural production and peasant welfare. In so doing, Chinese 
communist regulation not only contravened with the principles of Fel’dman and 
Preobrazhensky, but also undermined the economic system’s social cohesiveness. 
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The mode of regulation in the reform-era Chinese economy 
Two decades of development under the central plan had given rise to palpable social and 
political antagonisms. A focus on ideology and class politics had increasingly supplanted 
economic objectives, but had been unable to insulate the Party from mounting popular 
dissatisfaction. Therefore, the changes under the mode of regulation which were 
instigated under Deng were as much a prerequisite to the remarkable transformation of 
the Chinese economy as a means of placating the disenchanted peasants and invigorating 
inefficient industrial relations. The incentivizing and coordinating mechanisms which 
came to replace the system of material planning and mandatory production quota 
provided the institutional conditions for China’s remarkable economic transformation. 
Simultaneously, institutional change effectuated a comprehensive reconfiguration of the 
state-industrialist nexus. 
 
Fiscal allocation 
Coordination of capital 
Although the dismantlement of the ‘iron rice bowl’ system perhaps constituted the most 
salient aspect of the departure from the socialist plan economy, the influence of the 
transformation of the fiscal system has been equally profound. In the three decades of 
reform the principles and mechanisms for the allocation of capital changed fundamentally. 
Moreover, the substitution of a finance-based regime for the socialist practice of planned 
production and material allocation resulted in a realignment of fiscal authority between 
the center, local government and enterprise.  
The shift away from the principles of central planning occurred naturally through the 
rapid growth of the market. Although the national credit plan (xindai jihua) continued to 
ensure that capital was directed to the objectives stipulated in central government’s 
five-year plan, routine investment in enterprise fell outside the purview of the central 
bureaucracy.
112
 Due to the introduction of the household and contract responsibility 
systems, agriculture and industry had focused increasingly on production for the market, 
rendering central production quota and material allocation of ever lesser importance 
                                                     
112 According to Ma (2000), the credit plan was officially abolished in 1997. 
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(Naughton 1996). As a consequence, reinvestment of funds autonomously raised by 
enterprise rapidly became the major driver of industrial expansion. 
Concurrently, China’s banks took on a role of increasing importance. During the plan 
economy, the People’s Bank of China had been the sole financial institution. Responsible 
for administration of deposits and remittances, its main function was to allocate funds on 
basis of central policy (Nanto & Sinha 2002). Changes to China’s banking system had 
commenced in the late 1970s. The Agricultural Bank of China was established in 1979 to 
furnish capital for township and village enterprises as well as invest in agricultural 
infrastructural projects. The China Construction Bank managed capital for the 
development of national infrastructural development and large enterprise, while the Bank 
of China was chiefly responsible for international finance. These three were appended by 
the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China in 1984, which functioned as the urban 
counterpart of the ABC and took over the commercial activities of the PBC, when it was 
given central bank status that same year (ibid). Because of the proliferation of economic 
activity outside the plan and the concomitant expansion of the banking system, loans 
rapidly came to replace centrally budgeted allocation as the primary source of external 
investment.  
The transition from material planning to fiscal allocation did not just imply the 
substitution of one coordinative mechanism to another, but had major redistributive 
consequences. First of these was a reorganization of the sources of capital. The 
introduction of the household responsibility system had portended the end of the 
price-scissors mechanism, thus allowing for the reinvigoration of an impoverished rural 
economy. Simultaneously, it created a requirement for another source of capital capable 
of funding the ongoing expansion of China’s industry. With personal incomes growing as 
a result of the upturn in market activity, private deposits rapidly developed to account for 
the major portion of credit controlled by China’s financial institutes in the initial stages of 
reform. Notwithstanding the diminished importance of central direct fiscal allocation, 
government continued to exert stringent control over interest rates. With the exception of 
intervals during which rapid growth was accompanied by low inflation, interest rates for 
personal deposits have been artificially depressed to provide cheap capital to state-owned 
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enterprise (Shih 2011).
113
 Thus, by way of the transition towards bank-based finance, 
depressed returns on savings have come to replace the system of artificially low prices for 
agricultural produce which subsidized industrial development within the plan economy. 
 In tandem with the expansion of commercial credit, China developed its securities 
market. The Shanghai Securities Exchange commenced operation in late 1990. A second 
exchange was opened in Shenzhen the following year. Both exchanges were established 
with the objective of expanding and diversifying sources of corporate investment, as well 
as to promote greater operational discipline within the public sector. Some ten years after 
the inception of the Chinese stock markets, total capitalization had reached 4.1 trillion 
yuan, or roughly 40 per cent of GDP (Li & Ma, 2004). The vast majority of traded shares 
were issued by state-owned or controlled enterprises. In 2002,
114
 the state held a 
controlling stake (averaging 49 per cent) in 1043 out of a total of 1230 enterprises.
115
 As 
in the credit market, the state has continued to exert significant influence. The China 
Securities Regulatory Commission and the bureaucratic planning agencies jointly specify 
the quantity of stock to by newly issued and its total value. Provincial offices nominate 
candidates for listing, on basis of recommendations of industrial bureaux (Ma 2000). 
Control over the overall size and features of the stock market is complemented with a 
strong degree of direct state ownership, as a high proportion of non-transferable shares 
within state-controlled shareholding companies has ensured that government’s position as 
ultimate owner has remained by and large unchallenged (Zhang 2004).  
Notwithstanding the rapid development of equity finance, its role has been to append, 
rather than to replace bank-based finance, which continued to provide the vast majority of 
externally raised funds. The adoption of capitalist fiscal institutions was accompanied by 
a gradual but fundamental redistribution of financial influence. The initial period of 
reform was characterized by a comprehensive shift of fiscal authority from the center to 
the localities and enterprise. In accordance with the fiscal responsibility systems, local 
government would remit a negotiated portion of revenues to the center. 
                                                     
113 By varying estimates, state-owned enterprise accounts for anywhere between 70 to 95 per cent of national 
bank lending (Witt 2010; Steinfeld 2002). 
114 The last year for which comprehensive data on ownership was available. 
115 Calculated from: Database of Chinese listed firm’s ownership structures (NUS, 2006). 
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With regional contributions to economic growth the predominant concern, better 
performing provinces were able to negotiate better terms, and could thus retain a larger 
share of revenue (Shirk 1990). More favorable fiscal conditions in turn drew investment 
to the more affluent provinces, creating a cyclical dynamic which resulted in a 
progressive decline of the ratio of central to provincial revenues. Because banks, despite 
their increased importance within the coordination of capital flows, had continued to 
function essentially as administrative bureaus, they had but little means to stipulate the 
conditions upon which credit would be made available. Rather, decentralization had 
allowed provincial government to utilize its increased stature to engage in discretionary 
borrowing from bank subsidiaries (Zinser 1991). Local government used its financial 
clout to support and expand local state-owned industry. Because ultimate financial 
responsibility for the public economy continued to rest with central government and 
interest rates had been kept extremely low to fuel the rapid expansion of industrial output, 
credit was extended with but marginal regard to enterprise performance (Montes-Negret 
1995). This arrangement was altered significanty due to reforms introduced from the 
mid-1990s onwards. The financial system which developed under Jiang, and was 
expanded subsequently under Hu was characterized by the progressive centralization and 
consolidation of control over capital. Reform of the fiscal system commenced with the 
replacement of the host of annually negotiable remittances to central government which 
had existed under the responsibility system with a system of standardized national taxes. 
Under the new tax assignment system, central government revenue was bolstered through 
customs duties, consumption tax and income tax on centrally owned SOEs. Furthermore, 
the center was entitled to 75 per cent of revenues from VAT. While collection of central 
taxes had initially relied on efforts of local government, from 1994 onwards, central taxes 
were collected by national tax bureaus (Ma 2000). As a result of the reforms, central 
revenues from taxes rapidly increased, resulting in a reversal of the distribution of state 
revenues between the center and localities. 
 
Corporate governance 
The transition from lump sum allocation to bank finance was accompanied by the 
114 
 
development of different monitoring and control mechanisms. The People’s Bank of 
China was elevated to status of central bank, and subsidiaries operating at the local level 
where closed (Ma 2000). Operating directly under State Council, the PBC was mandated 
with the supervision of the operation and organization of other financial institutions 
(including banks and investment funds), as well as promulgating and executing monetary 
and exchange policy. China’s Commercial Banking Law in 1995 decreed that commercial 
lending ought to be separated from non-banking investments activities.
116
 Moreover, 
commercial and policy lending were separated. Accordingly, the PBC has continued to 
supervise policy lending, which is executed through the State Development Bank, 
Import-Export Bank and Agricultural Bank. Commercial lending has become the purview 
of the Bank of China and the four specialized banks
117
 (Li & Ma, 2004). These changes 
jointly served to consolidate control over lending within the banks, mitigating the 
influence of local government. However, in stark contrast to capitalist bank-centered 
financial systems elsewhere (e.g. Dore, Lazonick, & O’Sullivan, 1999; Hall & Soskice, 
2001), strong ties with central government seem to have precluded the formation of 
strong links with enterprise, and as such China’s banks do not habitually engage in close 
scrutinizing of corporate strategy. Due to the absence of this fiduciary quality, banks 
function predominantly as extensions of the central state, allocating funds to enterprise in 
accordance with government priorities (Tian & Estrin 2007).  Rather, the task of 
enterprise governance within the public economy has increasingly fallen on a select group 
of state-controlled asset management companies, most important of which the 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). To facilitate 
the reorganization of the public economy which commenced in 1997, four asset 
management companies (AMCs) were established, each under the auspices of one of 
China’s four commercial banks.118  
                                                     
116 While commercial banks’ investment activities were allowed to continue for some time, a 1997 circular 
mandated that all banks close their shareholding accounts. 
117 the Agricultural Bank of China, Construction Bank of China, Bank of China and the Industrial and 
Commercial bank of China. 
118  These are Huarong (Industrial and Commercial Bank of China), Dongfang (Bank of China), Xinda 
(Construction bank of China) and Changcheng (Agricultural Bank of China). 
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The principal function of these AMCs was to repackage SOE debt into equity, 
thereby reducing the strain of non-performing loans (Heilmann 2008).
119
 The furious 
pace at which such restructuring unfolded suggested that the primary concern was with 
consolidating the state’s financial position, rather than improving the performance of 
loss-making enterprise. By the end of 2002, a total of 587 enterprises had undergone 
debt-equity swaps, involving assets worth yuan 334.48 billion.
120
 Subsequently, focus 
was on harnessing the center’s control over the largest and most profitable elements of 
public industry. The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(guowuyuan guoyou zichan jiandu guanli weiyuanhui, SASAC) was established in 2003 
as a special entity directly under State Council and given ownership of a select group of 
‘central enterprises’ (zhongyang qiye), large business conglomerates121 within industries 
of strategic importance. It was mandated with approval of corporate investment, 
supervision and initiation of acquisitions and mergers and management of executive 
appointment within these enterprises (Pearson 2007; Naughton 2008). In 2005, these 
central enterprises posted profits of yuan 627.7 billion, equivalent to 97,4 per cent of total 
profits achieved within the economy (Mattlin 2009). 
 Changes in the governance of public enterprise have however been more 
instrumental in allowing the center to wrest control over the commanding heights of the 
economy from the industrial ministries than fundamentally altering the authority between 
SOE and central government. SASAC has made headway in the reorganization of various 
backbone industries, gradually reducing the number of central enterprises from an initial 
200 or so to a current 113 by way of a series of mandated mergers and acquisitions.
122
 
The expansion of central control has not however been paired with greater fiscal claims 
of central SOEs. Under the tax reforms of 1994, China’s large SOEs were exempted from 
                                                     
119 Through a debt-equity swap, investors take on enterprise’s liabilities in return for an ownership stake. 
Theoretically, well-informed investors will only be willing to take on such liabilities if they possess the 
requisite expertise, while the transfer of operational authority to principals ought to alleviate potential agency 
problems, thus resulting in improved corporate performance. 
120 Research Institute of Finance and Banking of the People’s Bank of China, 2003. 
121 At present, there are 115 such central enterprises, http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2425/index.html), 
Accessed April 17, 2013. 
122 http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2425/index.html. 
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remitting profits to government. Although, after vehement contestation, State Council 
passed regulations in 2007 requiring central SOEs to pay tax on profits, the effective rate 
was limited to 5 per cent in most cases (Brødsgaard 2012). As a result, the tremendous 
growth in profits achieved by these SOEs in recent years has not resulted in a comparable 
increase in central revenues. In spite of this lack of dividends, central government still 
profits from the growth of the national champions through taxation, which accounts for 
approximately one fifth of total central revenues (see table 10). 
 
 
Corporate 
income tax 
Total revenue 
Revenue from 
corporate income/ 
total 
2005 320.4 1605.18 0.20  
2006 435.85 1957.61 0.22  
2007 564.97 2277.49 0.25  
2008 739.11 3268.06 0.23  
2009 761.91 3591.57 0.21  
2010 779.52 4248.85 0.18  
2011 1002.34 5132.73 0.20  
Table 10: Central government revenue and revenue from corporate tax, 2005-2011 
Source: Compiled from NBS 2006-2012, table 8-5  
 
Introduction of capitalist financial institutions has had profound effects on the 
mechanisms of capital allocation and the distribution of influence over capital. The 
transition from negotiated remittances to a nationally standardized taxation has greatly 
simplified the coordination between central and local government, and bolstered the 
former’s financial position vis-à-vis the latter. Recentralization of fiscal control was 
greatly aided by the reform of the banking system. Likewise, the emergence of 
shareholder ownership has been a instrumental precursor in the project of sectoral 
organization of strategic industry. Moreover, the expansion of capital markets, through 
the development of banking and the stock exchange provided the state with additional 
means to transfer private sector capital into state-controlled industry.  
Nevertheless, the emergence of credit and equity finance has had but marginal 
influence on the system of corporate governance. By far the largest portion of corporate 
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assets remains composed of industrial capital. Debt and equity financing has appended 
the industrialist focus on corporate expansion, rather than replaced it with a 
profit-orientation. The capacity for financial institutions to serve as a proxy for principals 
has also been constrained by the predominance of state-relations. Since China’s domestic 
banks continue to perform an indispensable role in central capital allocation and are 
firmly embedded within the bureaucratic system, they lack the requisite autonomy and 
incentives to engage in more independent monitoring of enterprise performance. Finally, 
the spread of western practices of corporate governance is impeded by the pivotal role of 
the bureaucratic systems of supervision and control which developed under communism. 
 
The coordination of labor 
China’s post-reform mechanisms of labor coordination show both salient continuities and 
profound changes. In spite of the dissolution of the price-scissors and the scope for 
diversification provided by the introduction of the TVE, rural-urban inequality has not 
only persisted, but consistently widened. In part, the disparity can be accounted for by 
greater labor productivity of urban industry. However, the naturally inegalitarian tendency 
of industrial development has been compounded by the institutional divide between the 
rural and urban economy. In 2005, the Ministry of Public Security announced its intent to 
eliminate the household responsibility system.
123
 Subsequently, 13 provinces, 
autonomous regions and municipalities abrogated the taxonomical distinction between 
rural and urban status (Xinhua 2005). Nevertheless, free flow of labor from the 
countryside to the city has continued to be impeded. Large cities, fearing the destabilizing 
socio-economic consequences of the abrogation of huji arrangements, have been loath to 
engage in reforms. Furthermore, in affluent regions conditions for eligibility of the 
transformation from rural to urban status have remained prohibitively high for the vast 
                                                     
123 This resolve was reiterated by the central committee of the CCP in late 2008. The ‘decision on certain major 
issues regarding the promotion of rural reforms’ of 2008 (tuijin nongcun gaige fazhan ruogan zhongda wenti de 
jueding) called for the “unification of rural and urban societal management, advancement of reform of the 
household registration system, broadening of the conditions for settlement in small and medium sized cities, 
and the orderly transformation of rural to urban registration status of persons with who have stable employment 
and residence in towns and city”, Chapter 3.  
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majority of rural residents (Kam & Buckingham 2008). Even in instances where 
rural-urban registration has been abolished, reforms have not extended to taxation, 
employment and welfare policies (administered by different bureaux), which continue to 
perpetuate rural and urban divergences (Hu 2009). In addition to the inegalitarian 
influences of capitalist industrialization and the huji system, new inequalities have arisen 
due to their interaction. Prospects of greater opportunities have motivated massive 
unsanctioned rural migration to the cities. By government’s own estimates, China’s 
‘floating population’ (liudong renkou) now totals some 211 million, or roughly 16.5% of 
the overall population (State Commission for Population Control 2009). These migrant 
workers are categorically denied access to public welfare provisions and have no recourse 
to legal protection, and are therefore exposed to the unadulterated Dickensian aspect of 
China’s economic modernization.  
  Although the practice of linking welfare to registration status has implied the 
continuation of inequality between rural and urban inhabitants, changes in labor 
institutions have also attenuated the traditional covenant between industrial workers and 
the state. Liberal policies introduced throughout the reform-era (and in the 1990s in 
particular) had gradually dismantled the danwei system, in which public enterprise served 
as the main provider of social welfare services (Gu, 2001). The 1994 Labor Law heralded 
the end of the ‘iron rice-bowl system’, which had rendered the danwei responsible for 
lifetime provision of welfare services to its workers. The lifetime employment guarantee 
had been nominally abrogated with the introduction of the enterprise contract 
responsibility system in 1986 (Wong 2001). However, changes in the volume of the 
public workforce were limited up until 1997, when the policy of releasing the small 
resulted in the closure of the majority of small and medium-sized SOEs. Introduction of 
national unemployment insurance in 1999 and a national security fund the subsequent 
year sought to bring the provision of social welfare in line with the new reality of 
commoditized labor, while the minimum life security system was introduced in 1998 to 
deal with the novel phenomenon of urban poverty (Liu & Wu 2006). Although these 
policies have effectuated the expansion of urban welfare to the private sector, the levels of 
support provided by the programs are have been marginal compared to those furnished by 
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the danwei system they have come to replace. 
Changes in the scope and scale of welfare provisions seem to accord with liberalist 
principles. The introduction of national programs has nominally eliminated the 
welfare-nexus between the industrial worker and public enterprise. However, a sole focus 
on the changing boundaries of the welfare system ignores the comprehensive 
redistribution of associated expenses amongst central and local government and 
individuals. Prior to reforms, central government shouldered ultimate fiscal 
responsibilities for the welfare services provided by the danwei. Due to corporatization of 
state-owned enterprise and fiscal decentralizations in 1980s, central governments share of 
these expenditures drastically dropped.
124
 Despite the national status of the welfare 
programs introduced in the 1990s, local government has remained primarily responsible 
for financing of welfare.
125
 Because of efforts to recentralize state revenues
126
, local 
government in turn devolved many of the expenses unto individuals. Not only did this 
imply high stipulated contribution rates for enterprise and individuals to pension and 
social insurance schemes, but also the progressive privatization of other major welfare 
services such as housing, education and healthcare (Wong 2001; Hannum & Wang 2006). 
While restructuring and corporatization within the public sector greatly alleviated costs 
associated with social welfare and contributed to the profitability of state-owned 
enterprise, this displacement has only been partially offset by recent forays into 
developing a national social security system. Moreover, due to fiscal reforms, 
responsibilities have been distributed unequally over local and central government. 
Abrogation of the ‘iron rice bowl’ and the danwei system also implied the end of the 
traditional social contract between the industrial workforce and the Party-state. Reforms 
have led to widespread discontent amongst disenfranchisement laborers, who feel the 
state reneged on its responsibilities (Hurst & O’Brien 2002).  
Leaving normative judgments aside, it is undisputable that the communist-era 
                                                     
124 Under the 1985 rearrangements of central-local fiscal relations, outlays for welfare were devolved to local 
government. 
125 In 2011, the proportions of budgeted outlays for ‘social safety and employment efforts’ for central and local 
government were 4.5 and 95.5 per cent respectively. 
126 Which will be dealt with subsequently. 
120 
 
state-labor nexus has withered due to the regulatory changes of the 1990s. While 
pre-reform institutions cultivated workers’ dependency on the Party-state, emphasis on 
the allegiance of the industrial workforce has been substituted for a preoccupation with 
growth and efficiency. In tow, the Party-state has sought to redefine and bolster its 
alliances with China’s traditional ‘managerial class’, comprised of heads of local 
government and state-owned enterprise, while reaching out to its new constituents. As a 
consequence of the development of the market component of the Chinese economy, a 
private entrepreneurial class took shape. Although Deng’s reforms had supported 
entrepreneurship as a driving force of economic modernization China’s political 
establishment, still largely composed of the old revolutionary guard, remained on the 
whole strongly adverse to notion of embracing a capitalist class. Antipathy intensified in 
the wake of the Tiananmen debacle, and that same year private entrepreneurs were 
officially banned from CCP membership (Dickson, 2007). Antagonism between the 
political elite and China’s emerging capitalists abated under Jiang. Due to comprehensive 
reform of the public economy a great portion of state-owned enterprises were converted 
to private status.
127
 In tow with this shift, many cadres who had formerly been employed 
as SOE managers became private entrepreneurs.
128
 Naturally, Party membership amongst 
the owners of newly privatized enterprise was high, resulting in a permeation of private 
interests within the Party.
129
 Further impetus to the reconciliation of the traditional 
political and new economic elite was given directly by Jiang himself, and in 2002, an 
amendment to the CCP’s Constitution lifted the moratorium for entrepreneurs on CCP 
admission.
130
 
                                                     
127 According to the 2002 Report on the national survey of private enterprise [2002 nian zhongguo saying qiye 
diaocha baogao], privatized SOEs accounted for approximately 25.7 % of the total number of enterprises 
within the private sector in 2002. 
128 A phenomenon referred to as xia hai [plunging into the sea]. 
129 The abovementioned survey estimated 50.7% of leadership of privatized SOEs to hold Party membership. 
130 Jiang’s ‘three represents’ (san ge daibiao), while often regarded as a void ideological construct, has in fact 
been accredited with providing the impetus to the inclusion of the entrepreneurial class (Lewis et al. 2003). 
Contemporary changes to regulation abound. Article 1 of the first chapter of the constitution stated that 
“Chinese laborers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals and advanced constituents belonging to other social classes, 
who acknowledge the leadership and constitution of the Party and who want to join a Party organization and 
actively contribute to it, implement the Party’s resolve and pay their contributions in a timely fashion can apply 
121 
 
 For entrepreneurs operating in China’s private economy, the utility of Party 
membership has been primarily to gain access to scarce resources.
131
 Because the private 
economy has been largely excluded from participation in China’s state-capital markets, 
entrepreneurs have had to rely overwhelmingly on self-raised funds or illicit banks (Tsai 
2009). A major advantage of active support of the CCP consists of the opportunity to 
enjoy access to funds at significantly lower interest rates from China’s state-controlled 
banks (Zhou 2009).  
The Party on the other hand, has a clear interest in co-opting private entrepreneurs, 
who have been instrumental in fulfilling the Party’s mandate of continued economic 
growth. Moreover, the development of an economically autonomous class would 
constitute a challenge to the socialist system (Dickson, 2000). The operational logic of the 
Party has been to gradually augment the institutional foundations of the private sector 
(Dickson, 2007; Tsai, 2007), while simultaneously building clientelistic ties with the 
entrepreneurial vanguard. After years of contention between the Party’s conservative and 
progressive factions, a Property Law was finally promulgated in 2004.
132
 Yet, further 
controversy delayed adoption of the law for another three years. Private property 
regulation has been enforced with varying degrees of vigor, depending on the regional 
status of private-sector and local government relationships. Overall, the introduction of 
formal market institutions has somewhat attenuated the importance of political capital in 
ensuring contract enforcement (Yano et al. 2013). Nevertheless, political connections 
continue to bestow preferential access to financial and legislative resources (Li et al. 
2008). While the Party’s patronage system has thus shifted from its pre-reform focus on 
                                                                                                                                                 
for membership of the CCP”. In a speech made at the 16th Party congress the previous year, Jiang had included 
entrepreneurs amongst the advanced constituents as ‘builders of a socialist society’. The decision was 
subsequently reiterated and articulated in the ‘Decision to convene the 17th National People’s Congress’, which 
stated that “each province, municipality and city must attract an appropriate number of representatives of new 
economic and social organizations”. 
131 A survey held amongst private entrepreneurs in eight Chinese counties in 2005 found that for 51.3 per cent 
of co-opted entrepreneurs economic benefits had been the main motivation for joining the Party (Dickson, 
2007). 
132 Tsai (2007) notes that entrepreneurs were markedly absent from the political drive for the consolidation of 
private property regulation, positing that extensive informal institutions (such as guanxi, networks predicated 
on social relationships) already provided the prerequisites for reliable exchange. 
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industrial laborers to capitalist managers, and the criterion of political zeal has been 
substituted for economic prowess, the link between socio-economic privilege and regime 
support has persisted.  
 The influence of economic reforms on the state-enterprise nexus was not limited to 
the private sector. The corporatization of state-owned enterprise resulted in a greater 
degree of operational and fiscal autonomy. Moreover, reliance of government on SOE 
revenues had bolstered the political clout of large and profitable SOEs, much like 
decentralization had improved the bargaining position of local government vis-à-vis the 
center. In the face of diluting bureaucratic ties between the state and public enterprise, 
management by nomenklatura has been of seminal importance in perpetuating central 
control. Personnel management within public industry focused on the select group of 
‘central enterprises’ (zhongyang qiye). Although SASAC nominally acts as principal, 
appointment of executive management of the 53 largest central SOEs is administered not 
by SASAC, but by the Organization Department of the CCP on basis of the nomenklatura 
(see table 11). These executives are regularly transferred to top positions in the 
government and Party and vice-versa, further enhancing the reciprocity between the 
political and economic spheres. To wit, in 2007, thirteen executives of state-owned 
enterprises within so-called strategic and pillar industries were members of the central 
committee of the CCP, and as such have direct influence in national policy formulation. 
 Nomenklatura control likewise constituted a seminal link between central and local 
government. Despite fiscal recentralization and the consolidation of public assets within 
central enterprises, economic administration has of necessity continued to rely 
extensively on the kuai component of regional bureaucracy (Xu 2011). Under conditions 
of high complexity and limited capacity to directly monitor actual behavior, the pursuit of 
(regional) economic growth provided a parsimonious means of aligning central and local 
interests. For the CCP, continued economic development has long been a pivotal premise 
for political legitimacy (Chen, 2002; Liew, 2005), while for local government, regional 
growth enhances its fiscal prowess. This has led the central Party-state to promote 
regional GDP-growth as the primary heuristic in assessing the professional attainment of 
local leaders, whose chances of promotion are tied directly to increases in gross regional  
123 
 
Industry Type of industry No. executives  
on nomenklatura 
No. CC members  
(2007)† 
Power generation Strategic 7 2 
Aeronautics Strategic 3 3* 
Steel Pillar 5 3 
Electronics/ Equipment Pillar 4  
Machinery Pillar 4  
Services (other)‡ Other 5 1 
Shipbuilding Strategic 3 1 
Automobiles Pillar 3  
Petrochemical Industry Strategic 3 2 
Telecommunications Strategic 3 1 
Food Other 2  
Services (financial) Other 5 1 
Mining (coal) Strategic 1  
Military Strategic 1 1 
Chemical Pillar 1  
Engineering/ 
Construction 
Pillar 1  
Total 13 53 13 
Strategic industries are industries in which the state considers absolute control and the increase of state assets imperative. 
Pillar industries are industries considered vital to the economy in which the state must maintain a controlling stake 
† Of which two served as full and eleven served as alternate members of the Central Committee 
‡ Other services include: logistics, aviation, retail, travel 
 * Two members were executives at the same enterprise, China Aerospace Science and Technology 
Table 11: Party-enterprise ties within the public sector, 2012 
Source: Adapted from Brødsgaard 2012; Chan 2009; Mattlin 2009; China Daily 2006  
 
product ( Li & Zhou, 2005; Meyer, 2011). Not only does this system promote vehement 
competition amongst local leaders (Xu 2011), but it is also instrumental to sustenance of 
the industrialist orientation. Investment in fixed capital, commands an immediate upturn 
in regional growth, which is important because the tenure of provincial governors is short 
(generally three to four years).
133
 In addition, because business tax, the single largest 
contributor to local revenues,
134
 is levied over the total volume of production, local 
government has a strong incentive to promote investment in fixed assets.  
                                                     
133 (Choi 2012). 
134 In 2011, business tax constituted 32.9 per cent of total local tax revenues and 25.7 per cent of total revenues 
(NBS, 2012). 
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Competition 
A final comprehensive change in the mode of regulation regards the transformation of the 
coordinating mechanisms and mechanisms governing interaction between China’s 
economic actors. As reforms progressed, the tripartite strategy of decentralization, 
marketization and corporatization gradually came to replace operational planning. In 
1992, the status of the market economy was greatly elevated when Jiang Zemin 
proclaimed the establishment of a ‘Socialist Market Economy’ the main task of economic 
reform.
135
 The distributive and organizational effects of competition did not only assert 
themselves through the expansion of a market economy, but also through deliberate 
efforts of the state to introduce incentives for efficacious use of resources within the 
public economy and bureaucracy. As a result, different economic actors have been 
exposed to different competitive dynamics, the scope of which broadly coincides with the 
boundaries of private, local and central public industry. 
 
Private industry 
Rapid market expansion paired with the slow development of formal institutions has 
profoundly influenced inter-actor relations within the private economy. Retarded 
introduction and ambiguous enforcement of private property rights and exclusion from 
participation in official markets for financial capital have motivated a strong reliance on 
intricate relational networks, or guanxi (Redding 1995; Lovett et al. 1999).
136
 First, 
guanxi have been instrumental in funneling foreign capital into China’s private economy. 
When Deng’s reforms reinstated China’s gradual engagement with the international 
economy, Chinese diaspora (based predominantly in the independent territories of Hong 
Kong, Macau and Taiwan) were quick to capitalize on the burgeoning economic activity. 
Personal ties within the mainland allowed outside investors of Chinese origin to 
circumvent FDI regulation (strongly biased towards investment in state-controlled 
industry) and rapidly expand their presence in China’s Special Economic Zones (SEZs), 
                                                     
135 http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/20/content_697129.htm. 
136 Guanxi has its origins in the Confucian model of social organization, wherein individual identity is 
predicated on one’s status within the social hierarchy and one’s relations to others. 
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which formed the beachheads of the state’s early experiments in international market 
activity (Hsing 1998). 
Foreign investment has focused predominantly on the manufacturing sector.
137
 
Reflecting the dependence of the Hong-Kong and Taiwan economies on international 
trade, enterprises established in China emerged predominantly in export-oriented 
industries (Lin & Kwan, 2011). For these enterprises transnational relational networks 
were instrumental in linking foreign capital and technology with the low-cost labor stock 
freed up by the introduction of the market system (Zhang, 2005). 
Besides alleviating constraints on access to financial capital by promoting the influx 
of foreign investment, guanxi have been an indispensible in furnishing conditions for 
market exchange. Conventionally, property rights and contract law have been regarded as 
the sine qua non of market exchange and production (e.g. Coase, 1937; Williamson, 
1985). In light of the underdeveloped stature of these formal institutions and lack of an 
independent judiciary, contractual protection was substituted by relationship-based trust. 
Through intricate systems of referral and cultivation of reciprocal relationships, private 
enterprises coalesce in informal conglomerates which function as internal markets for 
capital and information, and allowed entrepreneurs to band together to gain economies of 
scale (Peng & Heath 1996).
138
 
 Finally, relational ties cultivated through guanxi also link China’s entrepreneurs to 
the economic bureaucracy. More so than centrally orchestrated attempts to co-opt China’s 
emergent capitalists, reciprocal relationships between local government and private 
entrepreneurs have been instrumental in solidifying the incongruous nexus between the 
socialist bureaucracy and the private economy. For local government, various 
extra-budgetary fees and taxed levied on private enterprise in return for preferential 
treatment have constituted an increasingly important source of revenues (McNally 2007). 
For enterprise, investment in the development of ties with bureaucratic actors, rather than 
comprising a one-off transaction, comprise a sustainable advantage over competitors who 
                                                     
137 Up until 2008, FDI in manufacturing accounted for 60.84 % of the cumulative total. Real estate was another 
major recipient of FDI, absorbing 16.18 % of total foreign capital (China commerce yearbook, 2009). 
138 The notion that business groups may constitute a viable substitute for formal market institutions has been 
posited more generally by for example (Khanna & Yafeh 2007). 
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lack political capital (Wank 1999). Gleaned from this perspective, the ambiguous stature 
of formal institutions and resulting bureaucratic discretion in regulatory enforcement 
comprises a prerequisite for the perpetuation of the interdependent relationship between 
capitalists and the state, wherein political influence and economic performance are 
intimately associated (McNally 2012). 
 
Sub-central public industry 
Under the plan economy, competition for capital between the constituents of the 
sub-central bureaucracy was largely subsumed within the planning mechanism. While 
local government had considerable autonomy in distributing budgetary funds to 
manufacturing units under its purview, the center retained considerable control over the 
magnitude of sums allocated to provinces and ministries and desired levels of output. In 
the initial period of reforms, intra-bureaucratic contestation over resources became 
characterized by ‘bargaining politics’, where ministries and provinces vied for 
representation of their particular interests (Shirk 1993). Devolution of fiscal authority to 
the provinces in the initial stages of reform had weakened central control. At the same 
time, the tiaokuai system prohibited the articulation of spheres of responsibility and 
authority. The indeterminateness of influence was exacerbated by the erratic quality of 
alternating bouts bureaucratic reform.
139
 This led to a situation of ‘fragmented 
authoritarianism’ (Lieberthal & Lampton 1992), wherein state influence was 
paradoxically both expansive and piecemeal. Under Jiang, a series of comprehensive 
adjustments to intra-bureaucratic relations was introduced. In addition to fiscal 
recentralization, bureaucratic reorganization sought to consolidate regulatory control 
within the central organs while severing the links between SOEs and industrial ministries 
through bianzhi reforms, reducing the number of industrial organs, and corporatization of 
the operational arms of ministries (Pearson 2007b). Due to the standardization of local 
remittances to the center, the extensive bargaining over fiscal revenues abated. However, 
                                                     
139 Administrative reforms often proceeded in haphazard fashion, with reorganization progressing without due 
consideration of requisite human capital and competences. Furthermore, central attempts at streamlining 
China’s bureaucracy were often subverted by bureaucratic constituents at lower levels, whom engaged in the 
attraction of staff and establishment of organs outside the bianzhi system (Brødsgaard, 2002). 
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in the face of the continued emphasis on regional economic development, the center was 
loath to wrest control over local public enterprise from provincial government. 
Jointly, increased financial prowess of local government during the first stage of reform, 
provincial ownership of state-owned enterprise and the imperative of economic growth 
resulted in intense inter-regional competition, but also motivated erection of provincial 
trade barriers to protect local industry, and exacerbated the cellular structure of industry 
which had developed due to efforts to ensure regional industrial autarky during the Third 
Front (Young 2000).Simultaneously, many industries witnessed a rapid expansion of 
existing production capacity and an influx of new manufacturers. Local bureaucracies, 
receiving rents through the provision of licenses and the collection of industrial levies and 
taxes had little incentive to curb industry entry. Because the central state bore ultimate 
fiscal responsibility for the local public economy, local states were rather insensitive to 
the detrimental effects of the influx of competitors and accruing overcapacity on the 
financial performance of local SOEs (Wang 1991). The combination of rapid entry and 
regional protectionism led many Chinese industries to suffer concurrently from structural 
overcapacity and a lack of enterprises operating at efficient scale (Huang, 2002: Pei, 
2007). Furthermore, incentives to promote the development of local industry led to 
extended price-wars, particularly in such industries as aviation in which high demand and 
decentralization compelled local government to fervently compete for market-share 
(Chung 2003). Despite central attempts to maintain a state of ‘orderly competition’ 
(youxu jingzheng), industries predominantly under control of local government continued 
to be characterized by intense struggle for market share and protectionism.
140, 141
 Central 
                                                     
140 Examples include both traditional foci of state-owned industry such as mining and steel production (Wu 
2000), as well as novel ones which developed in tow with reforms, such as automobile manufacturing (Noble et 
al. 2005)and civil aviation (Chung 2003). 
141 Central government has recently sought to address the problem by way of an anti-monopoly law , which 
paradoxically prohibited enterprises from marketing goods at below-market rates (zhonghua renmin gongheguo 
fan longduanfa [Anti-monopoly law of the P.R.C.], Chapter 3, Article 17). The motivation for such a decree 
was derived from the concept of ‘excessive competition’ (guodu jingzheng), where low industrial barriers to 
entry and high barriers to exit induced enterprises to market goods below cost-price. The prevalence of this 
phenomenon reflects the extent of the abovementioned problems of overbearing control of local government 
over industry organization. However, Yu & Wu (2008).mention that a provision limiting the administrative 
influence of local government over industry entry and exit was omitted from the final version of the law. 
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attempts at restructuring these industries have been limited almost exclusively to small 
scale manufacturers, as mergers and liquidations were vehemently opposed by provincial 
governments whose vested interests were at stake (Noble, Ravenhill, and Doner 2005; 
Wu 2000). Due to the entrenched principle of tiaokuai organization and a tendency 
towards decentralization that predated Deng’s reforms bureaucratic reforms were more 
instrumental in consolidating central control over the line ministries than regional 
government. In effect, central coordination of the local economy has been by and large 
governed by the bureaucratic system which ties the interests of provincial officials to 
rates of regional economic growth. 
 
Central public industry  
By contrast, within ‘strategic’ industries, efforts to corporatize and merge enterprises 
traditionally under control of industrial ministries have resulted in the formation of 
central business groups which dominate upstream sectors. Although the central 
enterprises which were separated from the industrial ministries initially engaged in 
intensive competition, reorganization was greatly facilitated by the fact that the 
operational arms of ministries in strategic industry (such as petrochemicals and 
telecommunications) already had been consolidated to a greater degree and industry entry 
following the reforms had been stringently restricted.
142
 From the mid-1990s onwards the 
state engaged in a series of organizational restructurings which effectively partitioned 
industries in functional or geographic monopolies (Pearson, 2007; Yeh & Lewis, 2004). 
While, following their separation from the industrial ministries, these enterprises gained 
considerable fiscal and operational autonomy, the central state continues to assert its 
influence through a host of bureaucratic organs. SASAC (which straddles the functions of 
owner and regulator), the National Development and Reform Commission,
143
 and the 
Ministry of Finance hold ultimate authority on strategic issues of corporate investment, 
                                                     
142 With the coal mining being a salient outlier due to its extreme diffusion. The reason for the diffuse structure 
of the industry can be traced back to the incipience of reforms, when pervasive lack of fossil fuels prompted 
government to allow for development of a host of local-state controlled and collective mining operations 
(Thomson 1996). 
143 The latest incarnation of the Central Planning Agency. 
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mergers and acquisitions and set industrial price quota, curbing industry competition 
(OECD 2009; Naughton 2008).  
While China’s leadership has repeatedly insisted on the necessity of continued control 
over enterprises in strategic and pillar industries, it has been less articulate about the 
rationale for continued public ownership. Some have argued that the state is motivated 
chiefly by a desire to retain the most profitable elements of the Chinese economy while 
utilizing these in a strategic manner to nurture a set of globally competitive enterprise 
(Mattlin 2009; Nolan 2001; Szamosszegi & Kyle 2011). Indeed, examination of the 
distribution of state control suggests that the degree of state ownership is positively 
correlated with average rates of industry profitability. 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Enterprise ownership by industry (share of GVIO) and average firm profits (log), 2010 
Source: Calculated by author from NBS 2011, tables 14-6, 14-10, 14-14 
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Centrally-owned conglomerates have played a pivotal role in state attempts to nurture 
indigenous prowess within selected fields of technology. In 2008, China’s main industrial 
regulator, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology mandated that China’s 
largest mobile operator proceed with the construction of a 3G network, based on 
indigenous TD-SCDMA technology (EIU 2011). The decision was explicitly geared 
towards the development of international competitiveness of the domestic standard by 
nurturing economies of scale.
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 More generally, China’s SOEs have been instrumental in sustaining rapid economic 
growth by maintaining the consistently high investment rate in fixed capital. Due to the 
pre-reform focus on the development of heavy industry and subsequent selective 
trajectory of reform, public enterprises remain concentrated within asset-intensive 
industries. Below figure provides cumulative percentages of ownership for state-owned 
and privately/ foreign-owned enterprise across industry. Industries have been ranked from 
the lowest (recycling, waste disposal) to highest (water treatment and supply) capital 
intensity - that is, the proportion of capital to labor. While more than 50 per cent of 
private and foreign-owned enterprise is agglomerated in labor-intensive industry (i.e. the 
rate of labor to capital is approximately 5:1), the distribution of state-ownership is 
strongly skewed towards the right, reflecting the public economy’s engagement in heavy 
industry. As stated previously, development of these enterprises has been strongly driven 
by reinvestment of enterprise profits, and has been appended by government stimulus in 
periods of economic downturn.
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 The energy sector constitutes a consequential exception to the general relationship 
between profitability and investment (see figure 14). While SOEs account for over 90 per 
cent of output of the energy sector, depressed prices for energy have ensured that average 
profits in the energy sector have remained comparatively low. Throughout the reform era,  
                                                     
144 The state’s latest comprehensive blueprint for the technological development of industry, the Medium and 
Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology [zhongchangqi keji ] listed a total of 16 
mega-projects within electronics, ICT, energy technology, agriculture, medicine, and aerospace technology, 
Chapter 2004. 
145 Central and local stimulus, extended predominantly to SOEs in the wake of the 2008 financial have 
particularly contributed to recent growth in fixed-asset investment (Haley & Haley 2013). 
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Figure 17: Distribution of public, private/ foreign ownership (cumulative) across industry (ranked 
by capital intensity), 2010 
Source: Calculated by author from NBS 2011, tables 14-6, 14-11, 14-15 
 
central planning agencies have maintained stringent control of energy prices. Government 
subsidies for end-use energy –comprised of a host of policies depressing costs of energy 
inputs such as coal and petroleum and various consumption-based policies- were 
estimated to yuan 356.73 billion, or approximately 1.42 per cent of GDP in 2007 (Lin & 
Jiang, 2011). These subsidies have been material in sustaining high-volume, low-cost 
production (Haley & Haley 2013), and consequently the state-industrialist nexus.
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 The institutionalized relationships embedding China’s central state-owned enterprise, 
which constitute the core of the public economy, have resulted not so much in a 
predisposition towards either collusion or outright competition within industry. Rather, 
the state has sought to mitigate direct competition by allotting to these enterprises a 
particular functional domain or market. Such coordination is instrumental not only in 
ensuring the profitability of the public sector, but also in promoting national 
macro-economic objectives and industrial policies. Broadly, the concerns of the center 
have been to promote the incessant growth of the economy and development of industry 
through investment in capital construction and the subsidization of production, and more 
                                                     
146 Coal still constitutes the major source of energy for Chinese industry, which may account for continued 
above-average profitability of the petrochemical sector. 
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specifically, to build competences within technology-intensive industries which are 
considered crucial to China’s global competitiveness. 
 
Characterizing the mode of regulation in the reform-era Chinese economy 
Although the central strategy for economic reform explicitly insisted on the preservation 
of state control, institutional changes within the spheres of capital allocation, industrial 
relations and inter-enterprise coordination have nevertheless unraveled much of the 
communist mode of regulation. To wit, China’s financial system bears little resemblance 
to its communist-era system of planned allocation. Yet, the piece-meal adoption of 
capitalist institutions cannot be regarded as a transition towards a market-based system in 
any conventional sense. However, reorganization of the capital regime has been 
instrumental in resolving two pertinent problems of regulation. First of these was the 
dearth of capital which constrained industrial development. As a result of the gradual 
corporatization of agricultural and industrial enterprise, the locus of coordination of 
capital quickly shifted from government to enterprise. Self-raised funds have been 
appended by credit and equity capital. Stringent state control over China’s banking 
system and selective stock-listing have allowed for household and corporate savings and 
investment to be funneled into state enterprise. The appropriation of funds from the 
private to the public component of industry echoes the logic of the Fel’dman paradigm, 
yet has not precipitated the same crisis. Reasons for this can be found in the lesser 
absolute and relative volumes of expropriation and the voluntary nature of savings. A 
second problem was the tenuous quality of central control. In addition to the primacy of 
public over private industry within the capital markets, tax reforms, the consolidation of 
banking and the adoption of asset management in favor of bureaucratic administration of 
enterprise have reversed the decentralization of fiscal authority which characterized the 
initial period of reforms. Due to the persistent influence of the state and the comparatively 
minor importance of external capital, introduction of credit and equity markets has not led 
to the formation of an independent class of financiers, but rather paradoxically bolstered 
the influence of the center. Within China’s private sector, reliance on autonomously raised 
funds have been a necessity due to the inherent bias of capital markets towards public 
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enterprise. Within the public economy, SOEs have vehemently contested the transfer of 
capital towards government, and have as such developed a high degree of fiscal autarky.  
The peculiarly constrained influence of finance-based governance is offset by the 
persistent centrality of political and bureaucratic systems of control. Yet, within the 
sphere of labor as well, reform has resulted in a profound uprooting of inter-constituent 
relations. Corporatization and marketization have resulted in the emergence of novel 
constituents, who have become the focus of the socialist system of personnel control. The 
central nexus between the state and economic actors which developed under Jiang has 
been technocratic and elitist, and has been cultivated with the objective of incorporating 
those constituents who play a pivotal role in sustaining economic growth. This has 
entailed the extension of preferential treatment to prolific entrepreneurs willing to join the 
ranks of the CCP, and stringent nomenklatura control over central SOE management. At 
the same time, reform of labor institutions has resulted in the abrogation of the 
comprehensive communist urban welfare system. Contraction of the public economy 
coincided with liberalization of pensions, healthcare and other social services, and has 
contributed to the financial reinvigoration of the state. These changes suggest a clear 
prioritization of efficiency over egalitarianism. Yet, the distinctively political quality of 
the relationship between state and the economic elite defies conventional notions of 
liberal economies. This political aspect is expressed in a dynamic where economic 
performance begets political influence and political influence, in turn grants access to 
economic resources. 
Notwithstanding the eclectic quality of the principles coordinating competition in 
China, certain general observations can be made. Development of the formal institutional 
fabric determining patterns of competition has been skewed towards the highly 
concentrated, upstream sectors controlled by the central state. Through a combination of 
macro-economic policy, industrial policy and corporate control, the center has been able 
to direct the behavior of central SOEs towards the fulfillment of a variety of economic 
objectives. While insertion of macro-economic objectives may at times antagonize with 
the profit motive of enterprise, state and central enterprise have a mutual interest in the 
consolidation of assets within upstream industry and the perpetuation of investment in 
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fixed capital. By comparison, formal national institutions have been of lesser importance 
within the coordination of central-local economic relations. ‘GDP-ism’ constitutes the 
main aligning principle between central and local government. Although the corporatist 
nexus between provincial government and local SOEs and TVEs (Oi 1995) has been 
somewhat attenuated due to fiscal recentralization, the focus on regional economic 
growth continues to drive high investment in local industry but also impels local 
protectionism and intense inter-regional competition. Finally, institutional development 
within the private economy has been stunted, with government’s attitude towards private 
enterprise oscillating between tolerant and rapacious. With wanting property rights, 
contract law and systematic exclusion from official capital markets, amounting in effect 
to a competitive formal regime (see Jessop 1990), private enterprise have sought to 
circumvent the limits to accumulation by reliance on the indigenous social institution of 
guanxi, which transposes social associations unto relationships of production and 
exchange. Whether the ostensible recent trend towards the formal emancipation of the 
private sector will persist remains to be seen. If so, it would however erode a fundamental 
aspect of the covenant between China’s capitalists and the state (at both local and central 
levels), the tit-for-tat of economic performance and political cooperation. Although state 
coordination is thus (unsurprisingly) most palpable within the commanding heights of the 
public economy, activity within the local public and private economy continues to be 
moderated by central incentives which seek to ensure the twin objectives of economic 
growth and political allegiance. 
 
Conclusion 
At first glance, the current institutional architecture bears but little resemblance to that of 
the communist era economy. In this period, capital was allocated by plan on basis of 
production quota. Whereas the broad contours of allocation were formulated at the central 
level, specification of targets for sectors and regions, and administration of manufacturing 
units relied on an extensive sub-central bureaucracy. Bureaucratization of the economy 
also implied a comprehensive reconfiguration of the social organization of production. 
The systematic transfer of capital from agriculture to industry was premised on an 
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institutionalized dichotomy between rural and urban labor. Beyond what value could be 
created through consolidation of agricultural production into collectives, the 
expropriation of surplus value relied on depression of agricultural incomes and marginal 
welfare provision. By contrast, within industry, the need to secure the compliance of 
industrial labor impelled the development of a lavish and comprehensive welfare system. 
Although these institutions firmly established the state-industrialist nexus as the core of 
communist regulation and acquiesced with the strategy of expedited industrial 
development, they gave rise to a set of severe antagonisms. First, bureaucratic 
administration proved tremendously complex, and information gaps and managerial 
constraints curbed the center’s capacity for effective control. Second, explicit coercion 
within agricultural production precipitated widespread rural destitution and led to 
grassroots defection from state policies.
147
 Within industry, the amalgamation of political 
and economic objectives hampered efficient promotion of productivity. 
 Institutional changes which unfolded over the previous three decades have mitigated 
many of these problems. In the initial stages of reform, the relaxation and gradual 
abolishment of the system of central re-appropriation of agricultural output provided the 
impetus to the extensive growth within agriculture and light industry. In tow, the 
significance of plan-based allocation of capital and production quota diminished. 
Although decentralization initially intensified bureaucratic bargaining over capital, these 
dynamics were attenuated through the introduction of a standardized national taxation 
system and the centralization of banking.
148
 As a result of fiscal reforms, the financial 
prowess of local government much diminished while central revenues were replenished. 
However, due to the concurrent processes of marketization and corporatization, the 
greater portion of control over capital allocation has been invested in enterprise. 
Coordination between the state and enterprise has relied on extension and adjustment of 
the administrative system of personnel control which developed under socialism. The 
traditional state-industry covenant, based on the co-optation of laborers, has evolved to 
                                                     
147 In fact, the household responsibility system condoned extant practices of, rather than introduced rural 
market production (Cai & Treisman 2006). 
148 Bargaining politics have nevertheless remained important within several of the strategic industries, in which 
industrial bureaucracy has continued to play a seminal role (see Wu, 2007; Yeh & Lewis, 2004). 
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focus rather on the managerial class which owns and/ or controls capital. The shift 
towards enterprise leadership was accompanied by the attenuation and partial abrogation 
of monopolistic industrial relations . Under the guise of marketization and liberalization, 
a competitive labor regime has replaced the danwei system. Within the area of inter-actor 
relations, the influences of marketization and liberalization have asserted themselves with 
differing degrees. Within strategic industries direct competition is generally eschewed, 
with reforms having been more instrumental in wresting control from industrial ministries. 
Competition for regional growth has supplanted the bargaining-orientation of local 
government. In the private sector, stability in inter-actor relations has been achieved 
through the informal institution of guanxi.  
 Amongst the multiple bifurcations within the institutional arrangements governing 
capital, labor and inter-actor coordination amongst center and locality, public and private 
industry, the persistent emphasis on the state-industrialist relationship is the unifying 
constant. The shared interest in promoting the expansion of fixed capital is reinforced by 
the bias of fiscal allocation towards industry, local GDP-ism and the reorientation of the 
Party-state from the interests of labor to those of the capitalist/ managerial class. What’s 
more, the current mode of regulation has been more efficacious than its communist 
predecessor. During communism, the only answer to the problems of central computation 
and supervision had been to decentralize the process of allocation, which however 
induced agency problems between local and central bureaucracy. The introduction of a 
market system simplified coordination by homogenizing the value of economic 
production, while the institutionalization of universal fiscal arrangements for local 
government and enterprise mitigated the complexities associated with protracted 
bargaining over remittances. Moreover, the adoption of asset-management and 
introduction of the profit motive complemented the Leninist apparatus of personnel 
control in aligning interests between center, locality and enterprise. The perpetuation of 
nomenklatura and other institutions which link the spheres of political and economic 
control are a salient exhibit that institutional changes have neither adhered to liberal 
templates nor proceeded in hap-hazard fashion. In the wake of reforms, these institutions 
have adapted to focus on the managerial and entrepreneurial class, rendering them more 
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parsimonious. They are likewise a potent reminder that the architects of China’s 
economic reform never intended for development to spell the demise of the public 
economy, let alone endanger the perpetuation of CCP rule. Indeed, through consolidation 
of its control over capital, personnel and command over key industries, the central state 
has managed to enhance its control in comparison to the initial stage of reform, and 
arguably communism. 
 The perpetuation and consolidation of the state-industrialist nexus however bring 
with it pressing questions. In the face of pervasive technical and allocative inefficiencies 
(Qin & Song 2009), investments in fixed capital can hardly sustain recent rates of growth. 
These problems are compounded by the socio-economic tensions which have arisen as a 
result of the prioritization of the industrialist class over laborers and the primacy of 
state-owned over private enterprise. Whether the current economic regime can persist 
depends crucially on whether increases in productivity can be effectuated. The following 
chapters consider in detail the capacity for innovation within the Chinese system. 
138 
 
PART II 
 
SUSTAINABILITY AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
OVERCOMING THE LIMITS OF EXTENSIVE GROWTH: THE 
PROSPECTS FOR AN INNOVATIVE CHINA 
 
Introduction 
Previous chapters described a pattern of economic development predominantly predicated 
on the relentless expansion of industrial capital. While institutional reform provided 
scope for an attenuation of sectoral imbalances and successfully brokered a covenant 
between central and local government, public managers and private entrepreneurs, the 
limits of China’s current mode of development have become increasingly salient. The 
systemic bias towards investment in fixed capital has precipitated increasing 
socio-economic disparity and ecological degradation. However, the threat of 
over-accumulation, dependency on foreign technology and the gradual dissipation of 
labor cost advantages have brought on concerns of China’s economic competitiveness in 
the medium to long term. All these developments call into question the sustainability of 
China’s current mode of growth. The promulgation of the ‘scientific development concept’ 
onwards attested to leadership’s pertinent awareness of these problems. Prevailing 
discourse amongst the political-economic elite posits that social instability and economic 
stagnation can be avoided by means of a transition towards technology-intensive 
production. Not only ought development of higher value added industry in favor of the 
current bias towards traditional manufacturing decrease dependency on physical inputs, 
but knowledge-intensive production would impel formation of a highly skilled middle 
class, which promotes domestic purchasing power and alleviate economic disparity. 
Finally, focus on building indigenous competences within ‘emerging strategic industries’ 
would ensure continued international competitiveness.
149
 
 The stated resolve to transit to a mode of production based on the development and 
exploitation of novel technologies stands in stark contrast to patterns of accumulation, 
                                                     
149  State Council, 2010, guanyu jiakuai peiyu fazhan zhanluexing xinxing chanye de jueding [Decision 
regarding the expedited development of the emerging strategic industries]. 
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which suggest an intensification rather than mitigation of fixed capital-driven growth and 
concomitant social and economic externalities. This chapter evaluates whether China’s 
economy is indeed making progress towards realization of a predominantly intensive 
mode of accumulation. Continuous reconfiguration of productive alignments, resulting in 
increased efficiency or creation of goods and services of greater value depends on the 
nurturing of intellectual capital and secondly, ‘institutional stop-gapping’ in instances 
where the characteristics of the innovative process impede autonomous organization and 
motivation for actors to engage in the exchange, absorption and implementation of 
intellectual capital.  
The national innovation systems literature (NIS, Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992; 
Nelson, 1993) has formulated two distinct institutional models which fulfill the 
prerequisites for consistent innovation. The ‘liberal’ variety emphasizes market 
coordination, wherein reciprocity between the scientific and industrial domain impel a 
largely autonomous trajectory of technological progress (Dosi 1982; Perez 1983). In 
contrast to its liberal counterpart, the developmentalist model hinges on the promulgation 
of a select set of industries which become the focus of efforts to cultivate national 
economic competitiveness. Bureaucratic institutions established to support the project of 
socialist industrialization were poorly suited to the systematic development of intellectual 
capital or diffusion and implementation thereof. The institutional framework and 
organization of innovative activity which have taken shape during reform have sought to 
address the flaws of the communist-era system, which limited the scale and impact of 
technological development. During the last two decades of the 20
th
 century, government 
has engaged in a series of initiatives that sought to restructure the centralized planning 
mechanism for science and technology into a more encompassing set of institutions 
which are responsive to the varied demands of different types of innovative activity and 
the processes of invention and discovery, diffusion and implementation associated with 
them. The current Chinese innovation system is characterized on the one hand by the 
commercialization and decentralization of research, and on the other by central 
coordination of, and government support for key areas of industry and technology on the 
other. Emphasis on establishing an institutional framework for innovation wherein 
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enterprise is the main locus of innovation and the state provides coordination and fiscal 
support at the level of industry suggests strong parallels to Japanese, Korean and 
Taiwanese antecedents. Has the concurrent development of economic administration and 
market-based production in China then promoted the institutional convergence towards 
an East Asian variety of the developmental model (Nelson 1993; Freeman 1995; Freeman 
1987)?  
To consider whether the resultant government-enterprise nexus reflects the dynamics 
of those described in other East Asian newly industrialized economies, I examine the 
distribution of innovative activities over these actors. Indicators of innovative input and 
output demonstrate a remarkable upturn in scientific and technological activity in the 
wake of institutional reforms. Furthermore, these data support the assertion that enterprise 
has become the major site of research and development, while government continues to 
specify substantive foci of technological endeavors. However, a closer analysis reveals 
anomalies in patterns of behavior which call into question the applicability of the 
‘developmentalist’ predicate. This divergence can be attributed to the broader institutional 
architecture which supports the state-industrialist nexus. Extant systems of bureaucratic 
controls and market relations fail to furnish both the incentives for long-term investments, 
and the coordinating mechanisms which allow for the inter-constituent collaboration, 
necessary for persistent and pervasive innovation.  
 
National innovation systems: Liberalist and developmentalist models 
National innovation systems theory has been described as theoretically eclectic or even 
a-theoretical (Edquist 2005). Nevertheless, the development of the NIS perspective can be 
traced back to distinct theoretical influences. As attested by the importance of concepts of 
control, theoretical perspectives are moreover not merely an analytic concern, but are of 
direct relevance to the manner in which national governments have shaped the 
architecture of their institutional framework for innovation.
150
 Two general approaches 
                                                     
150 With respect to the Chinese case, innovation policy has been explicitly informed by the Japanese and 
Korean experiences (Liu and White 2001), which provided much of the impetus to the development of the NIS 
perspective (see Freeman 1987). Moreover, from the late 1990s onwards, the NIS perspective has been a 
consistent guideline of innovation policy. For example the, the 2001 plan for scientific and technological 
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can be outlined. The ‘liberal’ variety of NIS focuses on the subset of market failures 
identified by the new institutional economics (Williamson 1975; Williamson 1985; North 
& Weingast 1989) which arise specifically within the context of technological production 
and exchange. Such problems come in two guises, those to do with incentivization and 
coordination, and are a result of uncertainty of returns on investments in innovation, high 
positive externalities
151
 and the information paradox with emerges during the course of 
transaction of intellectual capital.
152
 Accordingly, the focus of this variety of NIS is on 
the provision of institutions which alleviate such opportunity and transaction costs, such 
as intellectual property regimes and the provision of commodities with public goods 
characteristics such as basic science and education. However within this variant of NIS, 
government generally abstains from stipulation of substantive foci or direct coordination 
of innovative activities, which are instead understood to be derived from the interaction 
of scientific and technological progress and market demand. Within this liberal variety, 
which predominates in the US and UK, the relationship between the scientific domain 
and enterprise constitutes the central dynamic of innovation (Nelson 1993).
153
 
 Another variety of NIS takes its inspiration from the political economic theory of 
Friedrich List (Freeman 1995), who argued that government planning plays an 
indispensable role in the development of national technological competence and 
competitiveness. In this view, the instrument of government coordination is to promote 
the development and adoption of efficiency and quality enhancing technology within 
industry, as well as a redistribution across industries from low to high value added 
                                                                                                                                                 
development states amongst its main objectives the establishment of “a national innovation system which 
accords with the socialist market system and the indigenous development of science and technology”, State 
Council 2001, guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shi ge wu nian jihua keji jiaoyu fazhan zhuanxiang guihua 
[Program for the development of science, technology and education of the tenth five-year plan for social and 
economic development], Chapter 2.  
151 These externalities are a result of the non-rivalrous nature of intellectual capital, i.e. its not diminishing in 
supply as a result of its consumptions (Greenhalgh & Rogers 2010). 
152 This paradox relates to the problem that, in order for a potential buyer to appropriately ascertain the value of 
a technology, he/she has to intimately understand its context. However, having such knowledge obviates the 
need for purchase. 
153 Although within the US, the directive influence of the military complex has been well documented 
(Rosenberg 1983). 
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processes. This is effectuated first through investment in the development of requisite 
competences and resources, such as skilled labor, scientific and managerial expertise and 
an intellectual capital stock. In contrast to its liberal counterpart, in which states ought to 
be in principle indifferent to whether technology is developed domestically or acquired 
from outside (save for the normal cost-related concerns which obtain during the generic 
make-or-buy decision, see Williamson, 1975) the strategic variant of NIS considers that 
the nurturing of indigenous innovative capacity is crucial to the development of 
international competitiveness and improved terms of trade and therefore even warrants 
deliberate short-term inefficiencies (set on by higher opportunity costs of indigenous 
development and/ or temporary supply-demand disequilibria) if they are counteracted by 
a future increase of efficiency and technological rents (see Schumpeter, 2010).
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Nevertheless, the market is still considered important, because domestic and international 
competition disciplines enterprise performance. The strategic variety of NIS characterizes 
development of many East-Asian economies, in which the government-enterprise nexus 
has been considered decisive (Freeman 1987; Nelson 1993).  
 
Activity Liberal NIS Developmentalist NIS 
Education The role of state institutions is predicated 
on alleviating market failures due to 
positive externalities of science and 
education 
Focus is on developing an 
indigenous base of intellectual 
capital and skilled workforce 
Research 
Development To be undertaken in concerted effort 
between science and industry 
To be undertaken in concerted 
effort between state and 
industry so as to build 
competences in designated 
industries 
Diffusion  Dependent on allocative and incentivizing 
functions of the price and market 
mechanism 
Dependent on coordination by 
plan and market competition Implementation 
Table 122: Distribution of innovation-related activities in the liberalist and developmentalist 
                                                     
154 Note however that for late developers, international markets allow for the purchase and retro-engineering of 
various technologies, allowing for a rapid catch-up rate. In this instance, efforts at building a domestic science 
and technology base are focused on advanced industry. This point will be elaborated on further in the 
subsequent section. 
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NIS
155
 
 
Although the activities of education, research and development, diffusion and 
implementation are at the central focus of both perspectives, the liberal and 
developmental varieties of NIS provide distinct interpretations on how these ought to be 
distributed amongst government, academia and industry, as well as the appropriate roles 
of bureaucracy and market. 
 
Objectives and coordination within the Chinese innovation system 
Under communism and for some time thereafter, research, production and coordination 
were subsumed within the institutional framework of the command economy. In the 
subsequent period, general tendencies towards decentralization, corporatization and 
marketization, and more recently, on the development of capacity for ‘indigenous 
innovation’ (zizhuchuangxin) have resulted in an innovation system which –much like the 
economy proper- is characterized both by enduring features of communist organization 
and market forms of association. In similar vein to the previous chapters, this section 
considers elite perceptions of the process of innovation and its role within the overall 
economy, institutional changes and novel patterns of interaction, and resultant patterns of 
investment in, and proprietorship of intellectual capital. 
 
Innovation under communism 
Guiding principles of innovation under communism: Socialist industrialization 
and science and technology planning 
With the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, efforts commenced to rebuild 
China’s institutes for science and education, which had suffered from years of neglect 
during the preceding years of war. Initially, research was exclusively dedicated to a select 
number of objectives within national defense stipulated by the central state. Following the 
promulgation of the first five-year plan for economic development, which sought to 
                                                     
155 The first column lists the primary activities within the NIS, and the second and third columns respectively 
describe the liberalist and developmentalist approaches towards the organization of these activities. 
145 
 
rapidly effectuate industrialization, the scope of research became more expansive. With 
the establishment of the State Science Planning Commission
156
 in 1956, the science 
system was integrated into the planning mechanism of the command economy. That same 
year, the commission drafted the first of China’s long term plans for science and 
technology. The plan stated that “we must wholly or in part complete the technological 
transformation of the economic departments, so as to realize the objective of socialist 
industrialization”. 157  Through a consultative process involving influential local 
researchers, overseas returnees, and a large cohort of Soviet researchers, 57 ‘national 
major scientific and technological tasks’ (guojia zhongda keji zhuanxiang) in twelve key 
research areas were formulated.
158
 Furthermore, the plan specified the organization of 
science and technology. Selection of these objectives was based on the identification of 
‘pressing bottlenecks’ within production such as mining and prospecting, and the 
construction of production plants, corresponding to a predominantly extensive pattern of 
expedited industrialization. Planning of science and technology during the command 
economy thus reflected a strong ‘demand-pull’ orientation (see Mowery & Rosenberg 
1978). However, rather than relying on the market-mechanism, the delineation of research 
objectives and allocation of capital were the prerogatives of the various commissions 
operating under the State Council.  The socialist science system would accordingly seek 
to resolve the bottlenecks identified by the commissions through a two-pronged strategy 
of absorption of results from the forefront of global science and technology and 
development of indigenous competence in basic research and strategic areas such as 
defense. Technological advances made by the research institutes would then be 
assimilated by industry, which would make the requisite adjustments to effectively 
introduce novel machinery and applications in production plants (see figure 15). 
 
                                                     
156 Merged with the State Technology Commission in 1958. 
157 State Science Planning Commission (SSPC) 1956, Long-term plan for the development of science and 
technology (1956-1967), Chapter 1.  
158gongheguo qi ge keji guihua huifang [A retrospective of the seven science and technology plans of the 
P.R.C.], Retrieved from: http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-03/21/content_232531.htm. 
146 
 
 
 
Solid arrows denote hierarchical relationships, dotted lines signify designated activities, dotted 
arrows signify conceptual relations between activities 
Figure 186: Coordination within the innovation system: Conceptual and actual organization of 
innovation under communism 
 
Notwithstanding the paucity of domestic scientific expertise, technological absorption, 
central coordination and a focus on a select number of key issues within industrial 
development were believed to not only offset any initial disadvantage vis-à-vis 
industrialized western nations, but in fact allow China to approximate global industrial 
and technological frontiers.
159
 
 
Organization of the innovative process: the linear perspective 
Technological research, experimental development and industrial application were 
organized in accordance with the principle of hierarchical administration. The State 
Science and Technology Commission (SSTC)
160
 was responsible for the promulgation of 
medium and long term plans and overall administration.
161
 However, while scientific 
                                                     
159 SPC, 1956, Chapter 1. 
160 Formed in 1958 out of a merger of the State Science Planning Commission and the State Technology 
Commission. 
161 Military research was however administered by a separate entity, the Defene, Science and Technology 
Commission. 
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policy was the remit of SSTC, it had to contend with the administrative control other 
bureaux exerted over the institutes and manufacturing plants which comprised the science 
and technology system (Gu and Lundvall 2006, see figure). The vanguard of the national 
research system was comprised of a cluster of central research institutes. At its core was 
the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), which had been established in 1949. CAS set 
out the main directions for research to be conducted by industrial ministries and academic 
institutes. Research undertaken by CAS focused primarily on fundamental issues in 
industrial research and basic and theoretical science. Research institutes under the 
industrial ministries engaged in experimental development of industrial technology and 
the diffusion of scientific and technological advances within industry. They were also to 
provide feedback on practical applications of technology to CAS. The responsibilities of 
universities were threefold; first, the foremost academic institutes and laboratories were 
to conduct research independently. Additionally, universities would carry out research 
commissioned by the industrial ministries on a contract basis. Finally, they were 
responsible for vocational training and the nurturing of a scientific talent pool. While 
research activities were in principle confined to the above-mentioned institutes, some of 
the large manufacturing plants which engaged in complex production were allowed to 
establish facilities for the testing and modification of experimental designs.
162
 
While much emphasis was given to the planning and allocation of scientific and 
technological tasks, less attention was bestowed on the diffusion of research results. In 
September of 1965, the SSTC issued the Temporary Measures on the Management of 
Intermediary Experimentation on Industrial Science and Technology, which stipulated 
that research institutes at all levels ought to report significant findings to the SSTC.
163
 
Concurrent efforts were made to systematize the organization and publication of major 
research findings, and establish dedicated units for technological evaluation and 
standardization.
164
 Nevertheless, because SSTC had not been granted authority over the 
budgets of industrial ministries, it could not enforce the adoption of novel technology. 
                                                     
162 SSPC, 1956, Chapter 5. 
163 dangdai zhongguo bianji weiyuanhui 1991. 
164 SPC, 1963, 1963-1972 nian kexue jishu fazhan guihua gangyao [1963-1972 Outline of the plan for 
scientific and technological development]. 
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Rather, the assumption seemed to be that results would naturally trickle down from the 
central research institutes at the apex of the S&T system to the industrial ministries to 
industry. 
 
Activity Socialist NIS 
Education Focus is on developing requisite skills to 
integrate advanced production technology 
and the resolution of a limited number of 
technological bottlenecks  
Research 
Development Undertaken by central research institutes, 
secondary role attributed to ministerial 
research institutes  
Diffusion  Dependent on coordination by plan 
Implementation 
 Table 13: State-science-industry relations in the Chinese socialist NIS 
 
The contribution of science and technology to communist economic development 
Due to the efforts of the central state, the science system rapidly expanded. In 1949, the 
founding year of the People’s Republic, only some fifty thousand individuals were 
engaged in scientific research nationwide and the number of research institutions totalled 
a mere thirty (Kou 2010). By 1965, the number of institutes wholly dedicated to research 
had increased to 1714, and some 2.5 million personnel were employed in scientific or 
technical capacities.
165
  
 
Year High 
school 
graduates 
(1000) 
University 
graduates 
(1000)  
Educational attainment of work force (non-student 
population ages 16-65), percentage of total  
No 
degree 
Primary Junior 
high 
Senior 
high 
Tertiary  
1952 289 32 73.9 19.6 4.8 1.4 0.4 
1965 2,325 186 56.8 30.2 9.2 3.0 0.8 
1978 23,985 165 39.6 33.4 20.6 5.7 0.7 
Table 134: Indicators of education during communism, 1952-1978 
Source: Brandt & Rawski, 2008; (China Statistical Press 2005) 
                                                     
165 zhongguo kexue keji wushi nian zongshu [Overview of fifty years of Chinese science and technology], 
Retrieved from: http://www.stee.agri.gov.cn/tjzl/nkjwzjx/t20040309_176004.htm. 
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The communist educational system was markedly successful in providing the Chinese 
work force with basic education. Within a political climate weary of intellectualism, the 
development of higher education however trailed significantly behind (see table 14). 
The strategy of ‘focusing on the key objectives’ led central research institutes to 
replicate a small number of advanced technologies.
166
 However, econometric analysis 
suggests the overall contribution of technological development during the communist era 
was marginal, with total factor productivity increasing accounting for an estimated eleven 
per cent in the period 1952-1978 (Brandt & Rawski 2008).
167
 
Several explanations combine to account for the limited role of innovation in 
pre-reform development. First, due to government’s template for industrialization 
emphasis was overwhelmingly on capital construction. This focus came at the expense of 
investments in science, technology and education. The restraining influence of this 
particular strategy on the proliferation of science and technology was compounded by 
political and ideological factors. Due to the backward state of science and technology, 
China had initially relied heavily on foreign expertise. On October 12, 1954 the Chinese 
and Soviet government jointly signed the Agreement on Scientific and Technological 
Cooperation, which laid the foundation for an intensive exchange of Soviet technology 
and scientific personnel.
168
 During this period, intensive transfer of Soviet technology 
was paired with Soviet training and collaboration between Russian and Chinese 
researchers. However, rising political tensions between Mao and Soviet leadership 
prompted Khrushchev to recall all Soviet scientists and engineers in 1960 (Schoppa 2000). 
This setback for China’s science and technology system was greatly exacerbated by 
                                                     
166 In 1964, China successfully tested its first atomic bomb. 1965, Chinese researchers had succeeded in the 
development of artificial insulin. By 1970, the launch of Satellite ‘East Red No.1’ marked the successful 
completion of the strategy of “two bombs and one satellite” which had been the shibboleth of military 
modernization. Moreover, lack of interdependency in the attributes of these isolated technologies, development 
of which requires disparate competences, further attests to the fragmented quality of the innovation system. 
167 See table 5, p. 76 
168xin zhonguo dangan:”zhongsu guanyu gongtong jinxing he sulianmeng bangzhu jinxing zhongda kexue 
jishu yanjiu yidingshu” qianshu [Records of the new China: The signing of the Sino-Soviet agreement on the 
joint implementation and Soviet assistance in Implementing major scientific and technological research], 
Retrieved from http://www.gov.cn/test/2009-09/27/content_1427664.htm. 
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Mao’s increased hostility towards ‘revisionist elements’ within society. Antagonism 
against the intellectual classes and the institution of Western science during the Cultural 
Revolution
169
 led to attrition of the scientific and academic institutes, and it would take 
until 1985 for the proportion of technical personnel within the industrial workforce to 
equal 1965 levels (Naughton 1996).  
 However, the limited relevance of innovation to the plan economy cannot only be 
attributed to patterns of expenditure and political turmoil, but also was a result of the 
structural features of the science and technology system. Within the communist 
bureaucracy, the State Science and Technology Commission was in charge of overall 
planning of research and bore responsibility for the fiscal and operational administration 
of the central research institutes. Industrial planning was however the purview of the 
State Planning Commission and State Economic Commission. Although the objectives of 
scientific research were to be informed by the broad needs of aggregate economic 
development, a lack of reciprocity between the industrial and scientific planning 
mechanisms rendered research insensitive to the concrete demands of manufacturing 
plants (Liu & White 2001). Because SSTC and the industrial ministries were situated at 
the same level of the bureaucratic apparatus, scientific constituents had no authority over 
the industrial bureaux or vice-versa. Thus, rather than attenuating information 
asymmetries between actors by ensuring a clear correlation between industrial demand 
and scientific and technological efforts, bureaucratic administration actively contributed 
to the insulation of science and industry. The juncture in bureaucratic organization also 
resulted in coordination problems within the area of implementation. Moreover, although 
the State Science and Technology Commission was nominally responsible for the 
diffusion of scientific and technological results to industry, it lacked incentives to 
proactively engage in efforts to disseminate research findings. The science and 
technology system depended on central government for funding, which evaluated the 
former’s performance in terms of completed scientific and technological items (keji 
xiangmu). Therefore, research institutes expended little effort on the development of ties 
with industry. For its part, industrial ministries were overwhelmingly preoccupied with 
                                                     
169 1966-1976. 
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increasing output, resulting in a tendency towards uncritical expenditure on technological 
procurement rather than attentiveness to complementarity and absorption. Finally, within 
the politicized climate of the 1960’s and 70’s, diffusion of scientific and technological 
results hinged on grass roots endeavors (Cao 2012) 
 All in all then, innovation was but a peripheral element of economic development 
under the command economy. Rather, as part of the ‘non-productive’ segment of the 
economy, scientific and technological activity was explicitly subjugated to the objective 
of expanding industrial capital.
170
 With the exception of issues of particular relevance to 
social or military objectives, investments in scientific and technological development 
were eschewed in favor of alternatives which were considered to contribute directly to the 
increase of output of industry and agriculture. This forestalled the development of 
intellectual capital, prerequisite to the introduction of more efficient or valuable 
technology. In spite of limited coordination between the two spheres, the organization of 
the science and technology reflected a strongly ‘linear conception of innovation’171 (see 
figure). However, lack of incentives and institutionalized relations for the diffusion and 
implementation of technology precluded the absorption of novel technologies by industry, 
or led to inefficiency due to the incommensurability of centrally developed general 
purpose solutions and the organizational and technical specificities of various 
manufacturing process (Gu and Lundvall 2006). 
 
Innovation in the reform era 
The death of Mao and subsequent ousting of the ‘gang of four’ normalized bureaucratic 
and economic relations, allowing the state to take on the task of the restoration and 
development of the dilapidated science and technology system. From the 1975 onwards, 
Deng Xiaoping advocated the principle of the four modernizations. According to this 
                                                     
170 Socialist economic theory distinguishes between productive (shengchan) and non-productive accumulation 
(fei shengchan jilei). The former encompasses contributions to industrial and agricultural capital, while the 
latter includes investments in public services, logistics and communication and science and education 
(Brødsgaard 1983) 
171 see Freeman, 1995. Note however, that in the original characterization of the linear conception, it is 
scientific progress which provides the impetus to research and development, although later the guiding 
principle of ‘technology-push’ was gradually replaced by that of ‘market-pull’ (Fischer 2001). 
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concept, science and technology constituted the ‘major productive force’. 172  Deng 
rehabilitated the rehabilitated China’s scientists, whom Mao had branded intellectual 
revisionists, by declaring them ‘mental workers for the cause of socialism’.173 However, 
implementation of organizational changes required to reposition scientific and 
technological activity from the economic periphery to the proved much more 
cumbersome. Efforts to comprehensively rebuild the national science and technology 
system commenced with the ‘national outline for scientific and technological 
development (1978-1985)’. Practices which had developed under the header of scientific 
dialecticism were abrogated. A standardized examination system replaced the plethora of 
inconsistent entrance policies of universities to promote the development of the scientific 
and technical workforce. The plan also reinstated hierarchical work-relations within 
research institutes, which had been discarded during the Cultural Revolution. 
Furthermore, a performance-based reward system for S&T personnel was introduced. The 
diffusion of scientific and technological findings within the research system was 
promoted through the development of scientific publications, and greater cooperation 
between institutes. The formation of stronger links between science and industry was to 
be promoted through a centrally coordinated system for technology transfer and the 
intensification of the engagement with research of cadres responsible for enterprise 
administration.
174
 
In spite, or perhaps, because of the focus on rebuilding China’s science and 
technology system, its centralized, hierarchical character was maintained.
175
 A total of 
                                                     
172zhou enlai zai si jie da hui baogao zhong chongshen “si ge xiandaihua” [Zhou Enlai reiterates the four 
modernizations at the fourth plenum of the national people’s congress], Retrieved from :  
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2009-09-23/113218709998.shtml. 
173deng xiaoping zai quanguo kexue dahui kaimu shishang de jianghua [Speech delivered by Deng Xiaoping 
during opening of the National Science Conference], Retrieved from : 
http://scitech.people.com.cn/GB/25509/56813/57267/57268/4001440.html. 
1741978-1985 nian quan guo kexue keji fazhan guihua gangyao (caoan) [Summary of the outline of the 
national plan for science and technology development 1978-1985], Retrieved from: 
 http://www.most.gov.cn/ztzl/gjzcqgy/zcqgylshg/t20050831_24438.htm. 
175 The 1978 plan was drafted under the auspices of Mao’s successor Hua Guofeng, who accepted the need for 
technological modernization but at the same time insisted on the correctness of the fundamental principles of 
the plan economy.  
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108 objectives within eight key areas were specified.
176
 By 1982, it had become obvious 
that the science plan had been overly ambitious, and accordingly, the number of 
objectives was reduced to 38. Although the invigoration of scientific efforts had not 
brought about the anticipated technological outcomes, several significant changes were 
made in the organization of the science system within the early years of reform. In 1981, 
the SSTC issued its Outline of the Report on Policy for the Development of Science and 
Technology. It criticized many of the structural deficiencies of pre-reform planning and 
organization of innovation, such as the lack of attentiveness to the scientific realm with 
the pragmatic challenges of economic development and the torpor of industry regarding 
implementation of novel technology. Considering the emphasis Deng had placed on 
science and technology, it was no surprise that the concerns raised in the Outline 
permeated into the apex of the bureaucracy. In 1982, State Council decided to establish 
the State Leading Group for Science and Technology (guowuyuan keji lingdao xiaozu). 
Consisting of leadership of the State planning, economic, science, defense and education 
commissions as well as CAS representatives and headed by Premier Zhao Ziyang, the 
leading group sought to consolidate control over science planning and administration.
177
 
Its deliberations led to the promulgation of the 1985 Decision on the Reform of the 
Science and Technology System which laid the foundation of China’s modern innovation 
system. The policy altered both the guiding principles and coordinative mechanisms for 
innovation. Although science and technology planning remained an essential feature of 
the Chinese innovation system, the reform era system departed from the principles of 
centralized and hierarchical allocation and instead came to envelop a host of coordinative 
mechanisms which range from the interventionist to non-intrusive. Although reforms 
clearly implied a departure from communist-era institutions, it is less obvious how best to 
characterize the system which has come to replace them or how this transformation has 
influenced the significance of innovation as a driver of broader institutional change and 
                                                     
176  These areas (not including national defense) were: agriculture, energy, material science, electronic 
engineering, laser technology, aeronautics, high energy physics and genetic engineering. 
177 CC 1982, zhonggong zhongyang, guowuyuan guanyu chengli gouwuyuan keji lingdao xiaozu de tongzhi 
[Notice by the Central Committee of the CCP and State Council on the Establishment of the State Leading 
Group for Science and Technology]. 
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economic development. The following section begins to address this question by 
discussing changes in incentives to technological development, organization of 
innovation-related activities and the scale and substantive foci of scientific and 
technological endeavors. 
 
Guiding principles of innovation in the reform era 
With the adoption of the four modernizations as the official slogan for economic 
development, the subjects of science and technology came to permeate economic 
discourse. As in the communist era, close correlation between scientific and technological 
and economic development was deemed crucial. However, the inefficacy of the 
communist system of centralized science and technology planning, geo-economic 
tendencies, and more recently, the externalities of capital-intensive growth led to a 
reconsideration of the nature of the interdependency between technology and economy. 
Under communism, planning of scientific and technological development operated under 
an economic logic of simple addition and linear progression and focused by and large on 
measures which were believed to directly increase productivity. By contrast, the rationale 
of reforms which have resulted in the current constellation of institutions was much in 
line with the basic assumptions of NIS, and addressed both ‘governance’ and ‘strategic’ 
elements. This meant a reorientation (or expansion) of the substantive focus of science 
and technology planning, as well as a reappraisal of the appropriate roles of market 
exchange and bureaucratic administration in the coordination of the constituent activities 
within the innovation system. 
 
Substantive focus of science and technology policy 
As clearly demonstrated by the concept of the four modernizations, the emphasis on 
production technology persisted in the reform era. However, the socialist approach to 
industrial upgrading, which sought to derive its guidelines for scientific and technological 
activity from the identification of bottlenecks in production has been appended by 
different concerns and rationales. Korean and Japanese precedents convinced government 
that China could ‘leapfrog’ (kuayeshi fazhan) within technology-intensive industries 
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through absorption of mature technologies (Cao, Suttmeier, and Simon 2009).
178
 
According to this concept developing nations have singular opportunities to achieve or 
approximate the technological frontier within selected sectors by skipping certain stages 
within the development trajectory of these technologies. Specifically, such development 
is possible when knowledge and technology is pervasive within international markets, 
when innovation regimes are rapid (resulting in quick commodization and low costs), 
technological development is science- rather than experience based (i.e. radical rather 
than incremental) and innovation is complementary, rather than labor-substituting (Soete 
1985). It is furthermore understood that developing nations are particularly apt to engage 
in leapfrogging because the low proportion of specialized skilled labor within the overall 
workforce reduces opportunity costs of switching from one mode of production to 
another. 
Notwithstanding the opportunities provided by China’s opening up, progressive 
integration within the global economy was believed to pose grave challenges as well. 
From the early 1990s onwards, government argued that “within the new regime of 
international competition, technological advantage is becoming a major determinant of 
the future trajectory and fate of the nation”. 179 According to this perspective, rapid 
scientific and technological advances made by developed nations (precisely within areas 
of technology which present opportunities for leapfrogging)
180
 herald a transition 
towards a novel production regime. The state thus believed that China’s sustained 
economic competitiveness hinged on matching medium-term efforts to increase 
productivity of extant industry with long-term objectives to harness competences in key 
areas of emerging industrial technology.
181
 
                                                     
178 State Council 2001, guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shi ge wu nian jihua keji jiaoyu fazhan zhuanxiang 
guihua [Dedicated program for the development of science, technology and education of the tenth five-year 
plan for social and economic development], Chapter 2. 
179 State Council 2001, Chapter 1, see State Council, 1991, zhonghua renmin gongheguo kexue jishu fazhan shi 
nian guihua he “ba wu” jihua gangyao (1991-2000) [Outline for the ten-year plan for the development of 
science and technology and the eight five-year plan (1991-2000) of the P.R.C.]. 
180 E.g. information and communication technology, new materials science and biotechnology, see State 
Council 2001, Chapter 1. 
181 State Council 2006, chapter 2. 
156 
 
In recent years, strategic motivations for the development of domestic technological 
capacity have been accompanied by concerns over the externalities of economic 
development. The ‘scientific development concept’ (kexue fazhanguan), promulgated by 
President Hu in 2003, stressed the urgency of social and environmental pressures brought 
on by industrialization. Emphasis on knowledge and technology-driven industry would 
adjust investments in favor of labor, ultimately resulting in a higher wages and greater 
consumption expenditure. Simultaneously, a transition to less capital-intensive activities 
and the development of new energy technologies would reduce environmental strain. 
Recent science and technology planning has reflected this emphasis on competitiveness 
and sustainability. Development of a select group of technology-intensive industries, 
renewable energy technology, and sustainable production methods have become focal 
points within the latest plan for the development of science and technology.
182
. 
Irrespective of the considerable substantive shift of foci within science planning, 
emphasis remains very much on the industrial component of the economy. Key areas of 
research seek to promote frugality and technological efficiency, but do not imply a 
departure from the industrialist mode of development. The central perception is that the 
current predicament of the economic system is essentially one of technical optimization 
of industrial production. 
In the wake of the introduction of the scientific development concept (which lays out 
the center’s economic problematique), and the plan for scientific and technological 
development, State Council articulated a new set of ‘emerging strategic industries’ 
(xinxing zhanlue chanye), which are to form the core of the novel industrial paradigm.
183
 
 
Organization of activities within the NIS in the reform era 
                                                     
182 State Council 2006, chapter 3 
183 These industries are: Energy saving and environmental technology, next generation information technology; 
biotechnology; advanced equipment (aeronautics and aviation, intelligent traffic systems, intelligent 
manufacturing equipment), renewable energy, new materials science, and renewable energy automobiles.  
State Council, 2010, guanyu jiakuai peiyu he fazhan zhanluexing xinxing chanye de jueding [Decision 
regarding the expedited nurturing and development of the emerging strategic industries]; State Council, 2012, 
“shi’er wu” guojia zhanluexing xinxing chanye fazhan guihua [Outline for the national development of the 
emerging strategic industries under the twelfth five-year plan]. 
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In the three decades which have passed since the initial impetus to reform was given, the 
simplistic initial rationale of innovation policy -which posits a sequential procession from 
economic need to scientific discovery to industrial application- has been supplanted by 
one of a more diverse and multi-temporal inter-dynamic between market-forces and 
technological progress (see Perez 1983). Not surprisingly, this non-linear and 
multifaceted logic is reflected within the principles which inform the distribution and 
organization of innovative activity.  
 
Education and human capital 
While during the initial period of reform, focus was on the reorganization of industrial 
research, the development of education was assigned greater importance from the 
mid-1990s onwards. At the Fourth Session of the Eight National People’s Congress,184 
President Jiang Zemin’s concept of ‘revitalizing the nation through science and education’ 
(kejiao xing guo) was adopted as the official guideline for economic development. The 
importance attached to the new policy was explicated by the establishment of the 
National Leading Group for Science, Technology and Education (guojia keji jiaoyu 
lingdao xiaozu), chaired by Premier Zhu Rongji.
185
 Accordingly, State Council stipulated 
that governmental outlays for science and education ought to increase at a rate above the 
growth of budgetary revenue.
186
 Although this heuristic has not been consistently 
enforced, the new emphasis on education, caused government outlays toincrease as a 
proportion of GDP, from 2.65 to 3.7 per cent between 1995 and 2010(NBS 2011, tables 
2-11, 20-38). 
However, policy was not geared towards the uniform expansion of educational 
attainment. Driven by the objective to rapidly increase the stock of highly skilled labor, 
considered a precondition for the transition of productive activity towards high 
                                                     
184 1996. 
185 State Council 1998, guowuyuan guanyu chengli guojia kexue jiaoyu lingdao xiaozu de jueding [Decision on 
establishing the National Leading Group for Science, Technology and Education]. Retrieved from: 
http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=67295. 
186 (Xinhua 2003). 
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value-added industries, focus has particularly been on development of tertiary education. 
In response to Jiang’s new line for economic development, the Ministry of Education 
stated in its 1998 plan that “[We must] actively develop higher education, and the 
enrolment rate in tertiary education must achieve approximately eleven per cent; and in 
accordance with the objectives of the national innovation system, [we must] develop a 
pool of highly educated talent capable of innovation.”187 Increased government spending 
was accompanied by the marketization of tertiary education. Tuition fees were introduced 
in 1997, allowing for household contributions to further drive expansion (Bai, 2006). 
Regulation resulted in the of rapid increase university education proportionate to overall 
education (see table 15). 
 
  Level 1978 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Enrollments 
  
  
Primary 52.59  55.86  53.47  45.17  35.96  35.12  
Secondary 47.10  43.20  45.35  52.90  58.87  57.00  
Tertiary 0.31  0.94  1.18  1.93  5.17  7.88  
Graduates 
  
  
Primary 32.43  39.66  39.04  37.17  25.14  22.79  
Secondary 67.34  59.04  59.36  61.37  71.04  69.67  
Tertiary 0.23  1.31  1.60  1.46  3.82  7.54  
Table 145: Enrolment and graduates in primary, secondary and tertiary education as share of total, 
1978-2010 
Source: NBS, 2012, tables 20-8, 20-9  
 
Fearing general efforts to develop tertiary education would fail to ensure sufficient supply 
and quality of human capital to furnish the immediate demands of the innovation system, 
government policy reverted to the principle of focusing on major bottlenecks. In response 
to the dearth of human capital within the science and technology system, government 
initiated a variety of programs intended to effectuate the return of distinguished 
foreign-educated scientists of Chinese origin. These returnees have come to constitute the 
                                                     
187 Ministry of Education 1998, mianxiang 21 shiji jiaoyu zhenxing xingdong jihua de tongzhi [Action plan for 
the Vitalization of education in the 21st century]. Bai (2006) provides a more pessimistic rationale for the uptake 
of tertiary education, stating that government’s emphasis on university training was rather intended to defer the 
pressing problem of youth unemployment. 
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core of China’s science and technology system.188 National state-sponsored programs 
were established to nurture a select class of academic institutes of global standard, which 
could provide the scientific talent which in the longer term would comprise the core of 
the Chinese science system.
189
 The selective manner in which policies addressed the 
issue of educational development clearly suggest a developmentalist rather than liberal 
approach. Rather than intervening when high opportunity costs prevent optimal supply of 
education,
190
 the state has sought to concentrate its efforts on the establishment of a 
consolidated pool of talent which may directly contribute to the realization of the 
objective of a robust innovation system.  
 
Research and Development 
The policy of opening up and reform had effectuated the rise of a ‘dual track economy’ in 
which market demand appended central stipulation of production quota (Lau et al. 2000), 
and the center gradually rescinded from promulgating mandatory quota in favor of 
issuance of guidelines as reform progressed (Naughton 1996). The development of an 
economic compartment governed by principles of market exchange provided 
opportunities to reconsider the efficacy of bureaucratic administration of research and 
development. The 1985 Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China on the Reform of the Science and Technology System had dispensed with the view 
of all S&T as non-productive and instead regarded the results of applied and experimental 
research as tradable commodities.
191
 Accordingly, the contract responsibility system 
which had been introduced within industry in the early 1980s was extended to the area of 
industrial research. Under this system, institutes conducting applied research were 
                                                     
188 According to Prevezer (2008), returnees comprises 54% of academicians within the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences and 72% of scientific directors within the national program for the development of high-tech research 
in 2003. 
189 The ‘985’ Program of 1998 provides central funds to foster the development of an approximate 100 elite 
universities. 
190 For consumers with comparatively low expendable income, investments in education constitute a major 
cost both in terms of tuition and foregoing more immediate returns of labor.  
191 CC 1985, zhonggong zhongyang guanyu kexue jishu tizhi gaige de jueding [Decision of the Central 
Committee on the reform of the science and technology system], Chapter 1. Retrieved from 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/134902/8092254.html. 
160 
 
required to become financially independent by engaging in contracting with enterprise. 
Market mechanisms were introduced so as to foster greater efficiency through 
competition, and encourage institutes to proactively seek out opportunities within 
industry beyond planned items, thus contributing to the alleviation of the problem of poor 
science-industry reciprocity.
192
  
As reform progressed, the relationship between planning and market became 
characterized by the principle of ‘stabilizing the vanguard and opening up a portion’ 
(wenzhu yi tou fangkai yi pian).
193
 Within the realm of science and technology, this 
implied releasing bureaucratic control over the majority of industrial research. In 1999, 
the Decision for Strengthening Technological Innovation, Developing High Technology 
and Realizing Commercialization gave the impetus for the privatization of the greater part 
of industrial research institutes.
194
 These were either corporatized, or merged with 
existing enterprise and required to finance their operations solely by engaging in 
contracted research or commercial exploitation of research results (OECD 2008).  
Maintaining the vanguard meant “to consistently support basic and high tech 
research and major R&D concerning the long term development of the economy, society 
and national defense, to create excellent capacity and diligently strive for major 
breakthroughs, so as to elevate overall national scientific and technological prowess[.]” 
195
 Within the planning system, direct fiscal allocation was replaced by a tender 
mechanism. Funds were disbursed through several central programs whose scope 
coincided with the substantive emphases of the strategy for science and technology 
                                                     
192 State Council 1988, shenhua keji tizhi gaige ruogan wenti de jueding [Decision on certain issues regarding 
the deepening of reform of the science and technology system] 
193 CC, State Council 1993, guanyu jianli shehui zhuyi shichang jingji tizhi ruogan wenti de jueding [Decision 
on certain Issues regarding the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economy], Chapter 8. 
194 CC, State Council 1999, guanyu jiaqiang jishu chuangxin, fazhan gao keji, shixian chanyehua de jueding 
[Decision for strengthening technological innovation, developing high technology and realizing 
commercialization].  
195 State Commission for Science and Technology, Commission for Economic Restructuring 1994, guanyu 
fabu <shiying shehui zhuyi shichang jingji fazhan, shenhua keji tizhi gaige shishi yaodian> de tongzhi [Notice 
concerning the promulgation of the main action points for deepening reform of the science and technology 
system in accordance with the requirements of the development of the socialist market economy], Retrieved 
from http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66700/4495209.html. 
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development. Chief of these are the national key technology program, and the national 
program for key projects in basic research. Moreover, planning was complemented with 
an expansive variety of instruments which sought to prompt institutes and enterprise to 
engage in research and development in designated priority areas, most important of which 
has been the national program for the development of high-tech research (see figure).  
 
 
Figure 197: The Chinese system of science and technology planning 
Source: Adapted from MOST 2006, zhongguo kexue jishu fazhan baogao 2006 [China science and 
technology development report], Chapter 2 
 
As a result of the reform of science and technology policy, subsidies, infrastructural 
investments and procurement mechanisms now comprise the major part of government 
outlays. The state continues to provide the funds for virtually all basic and advanced 
research (which enterprises is loath to undertake considering the lack of immediate 
commercial applications, but is nevertheless considered of crucial importance to China’s 
future economic competitiveness). However, within the industrial sphere, the state has 
limited itself by and large to indirect investment, while enterprise funds the greater part of 
research and development (see table 16). Contraction of the scope of direct allocation, 
corporatization and marketization, and an emphasis on promoting industrial innovation 
have resulted in a gradual shift, with the majority of expenditures for research and 
development now accounted for by enterprise. Combined with the emphasis on central 
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Program Total Funds 
(yuan million) 
 
of which 
government funds 
National Program for Key Projects in Basic Research  9.71 9.62 
National Program for the Development of High-tech 
Research 
8.88 3.44 
National Key Technology Program 19.33 5.39 
Programs for National Development of Basic Conditions 
for Science and Technology 
3.19 3.19 
Incentivization Programs 74.89 1.39 
Total 116 23.03 
Table 156: Outlays for main research programs and incentivization programs, 2009 
Source: MOST, 2010 
  
coordination of scientific and technological efforts, the distribution of R&D related 
activity calls to mind the government-enterprise nexus which characterizes the 
developmental NIS. 
 
Diffusion and implementation 
Commercialization of science and technology necessitated the development of novel 
institutions for technology diffusion and industrial policy measures. State Council’s 
‘Provisional Regulations on Technology Transfer’ of 1985 encouraged research institutes 
and enterprise to actively engage in the sale and procurement of technology within 
‘technology markets’. Exchange proceeded on a contractual basis and institutes were 
entitled to retain revenues from technology sales.
196
 That same year, China’s Patent Law 
came into effect.
197
 Consecutive policies expanded the scope of the technology market to 
include not only the sale and licensing of patents and research services, but also design, 
intelligence and intermediary services, as well as technical training (Baark 2001). Official 
data indicates that, although the volume of trade within the technology market was 
                                                     
196 State Council, 1985, guowuyuan guanyu jishu zhuanrang de zanxing guiding [State Council’s provisional 
regulations on technology transfer], Retrieved from: 
http://www.hncd.gov.cn/portal/dzzw/zcfg/zh/webinfo/2004/09/1226649672655059.htm. 
197
 Under the Chinese patenting law, invention patents are valid for 20 years and design and utility patents 
last 10 years (Kou 2010). 
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initially marginal, it has consistently accounted for a considerable proportion of 
extramural expenditure on science and technology. Amongst services traded, research, 
development and technological services (i.e. design) have comprised the major part,
198
 
suggesting technology markets have indeed contributed to government’s objective of 
promoting technological diffusion. Nevertheless, actors within China’s NIS have 
generally opted to develop technology internally rather than purchasing it on the market. 
This preference for autonomous development suggests the failure of these markets to 
alleviate many of the uncertainties inherent in technological transactions. Chief amongst 
these is the risk of expropriation. Although China’s intellectual property regime was 
established concurrently with its technology markets, protection of proprietary 
technology has been notoriously inconsistent (Cao, Simon, and Suttmeier 2009). On the 
demand side, uncertainty about the technological functionality, lack of expertise in 
appraising technology and limited absorptive capacity of enterprise may have inhibited 
the growth of technology markets (OECD 2008). 
 Judging technology markets incapable of autonomously realizing the desired upturn 
in the diffusion of technological results, additional measures were taken (Gu 1996). 
Drawing on precedents in the United States, government proceeded to set up a host of 
high technology development zones, which provided enterprises engaged in 
technology-intensive industry with infrastructural support and a variety of fiscal benefits. 
The Torch Program, established in 1988, has provided the main vehicle for the 
establishment of these zones. Its objectives were two-fold; in addition to promoting the 
diffusion and commercialization of scientific and technological research, development 
zones and science parks were to ensure an increase of the proportion of 
technology-intensive products within overall industrial output and within export goods in 
particular.
201
 Subsequently, a great number of such development zones have been 
established. In 2013, at the national level alone, China boasted 88 high-tech development 
zones and 86 university science parks, targeting a variety of actors and technologies (see 
                                                     
198 Between 70-80% in the period 2000-2009, NBS, MOST 2010. 
201 State Science Commission 1991, guojiaji huoju jihua xiangmu guanli banfa [Measures for management of 
national-level objectives of the Torch Program]. 
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table 17). 
 
Name Number Supervising 
Ministry 
Function Objectives 
National 
High-Tech 
Industrial 
Development 
Zone 
88 (2011; 
35 added 
since 
2007)
202
 
Ministry of 
Science and 
Technology 
Provide 
infrastructure and 
fiscal incentives to 
high-tech 
enterprises 
Intended to foster the 
development and diffusion 
of domestic commercial 
technological capacity 
through indigenous 
development and adoption of 
foreign technology in 11 key 
areas
203
 
National 
University 
Science and 
Technology 
Parks 
86 
(2013)
204
 
Ministry of 
Education, 
Ministry of 
Science and 
Technology 
Provide tax 
incentives and 
subsidies to 
academic spin-offs 
Intended to foster indigenous 
innovation, develop and 
diffuse commercial 
applications for S&T
205
 
Table 17: Overview of China's national level science and technology areas 
 
These areas have rapidly evolved to become a key component of China’s economy. 
Nevertheless, while the zones have clearly spurred on the development of 
technology-intensive industry, it is questionable to what extent they have truly 
contributed to the objective of integrating China’s scientific and industrial spheres. The 
vast majority of revenues of enterprises in development zones and science parks derive 
from production, with technological activities comprising only some 7 per cent of overall 
income. Moreover, average outlays for research and development within the development 
zones have only been marginally higher than elsewhere (see table 18). Finally, the major 
part of production has been undertaken by foreign enterprise of Sino-foreign joint 
                                                     
202http://book.smeif.cn/a/dibaqi/tebiebaodao/20110527/304.html, Accessed February 14, 2012, MOST, 2012 
203 These areas are electronics and telecommunication; biological engineering and new pharmaceuticals; new 
materials; advanced production; aeronautics; nautical engineering; nuclear (civilian) applications; new energy 
and energy efficiency; environmental protection; modern agriculture and applied manufacturing and 
technology in other reforming traditional sectors. 
204 http://www.moe.edu.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/s3335/201001/82289.html, Accessed February 
14, 2012. 
205  http://www.moe.edu.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/moe_784/200612/14718.html, Accessed 
February 14, 2012. 
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ventures, which have tended to focus on low-value added activities.
206
 It thus appears 
that the objectives of increased production in technology intensive sectors has detracted 
from efforts to increase the innovative capacity of domestic enterprise (Yu et al. 2009). 
 
 HTDZs % of 
national 
total 
Enterprise (1,000) 57.03 17.5%* 
Revenue (yuan billion) 13,342.5 28.2% 
 from products 79.1%  
 from merchandise 8.5% 
 from technological activities 6.9% 
 misc. 3.5%  
Exports 2,064.6 16.8% 
 general trade, % 16.4%  
 processing with supplied materials 7.2% 
 processing with imported materials 69.7% 
Intramural R&D expenditure 226.9 34.7% 
Average expenditure on R&D** 2.1% 1.8%† 
*As proportion of enterprises over designated size (annual sales of yuan 20 million and over) 
** As proportion of sales revenue; † national average  
Table 168: Indicators of enterprises in high-technology development zones 
Source: Compiled by author from data from MOST 2011, zhongguo kexue jishu fazhan baogao 
[China science and technology development report], Chapter 13; sts.org.cn; NBS 2012 
 
The institutions for diffusion within the Chinese NIS seem peculiarly at odds with the 
organization of education and research and development. While the latter demonstrate a 
drive to nurture competences in selective areas and state coordination, consistent with the 
developmentalist perspective, the indigenous invention of the technology market is 
characterized by the absence of central direction or a particular focus. Rather, it seems 
that the decision to regard technology as a resource prompted government to draw a 
parallel to the experience of broader economic reform. The 1985 Decision which 
provided the impetus for the technology market espoused a conviction that the disjuncture 
                                                     
206 In 2010, foreign enterprise and joint ventures accounted for 65.1 % of total GVIO in high-tech industries 
(MOST, NBS 2011). 
166 
 
between the S&T system and industry could be surmounted by allowing research 
institutes to undertake research assignments directly from enterprise, much like 
sanctioning market production within agriculture and industry resolved shortages for 
commodities which had been neglected under the command economy.
207
 However, this 
comparison neglected the aforementioned uncertainties which characterize exchange of 
technology. In the face of the modest volume of technology transactions, reform has 
sought to motivate actors -research institutes and enterprise alike- to engage 
autonomously in the development and commercialization of technology. For an answer to 
this predicament government has looked to the West, rather than the East for inspiration. 
However, while in the Unites States and Europe, science parks were established with the 
explicit objective of facilitating interaction between and within science and industry, in 
China this qualitative orientation was substituted by an emphasis on a more immediate 
upturn in productivity in high-technology industry. Combined with the decentralization of 
fiscal responsibility towards enterprise and research institutes, it is unsurprising that 
pursuit of the more immediate returns of production has predominated over investment in 
innovation. 
 Preoccupation with increasing output has also guided more direct interventions. In 
order to expedite the modernization of industry, central government promoted technical 
renovation (jishu gaizao), that is, importation of foreign technology to improve backward 
production facilities.
208
 Purchases of turnkey installations within priority areas of 
industry quickly came to account for a major part of science related expenditure of local 
governments, particularly in coastal areas which had opened up to foreign trade. Direct 
purchases were complemented with a ‘market for technology’ policy, were access to 
Chinese markets was made conditional on the transfer of foreign technology.
209
 However, 
                                                     
207 CC 1985, Chapter 3. 
208 CC, State Council 1984, guanyu pizhuan <yanhai bufen chengshi zuotanhui jiyao> de tongzhi [Notification 
regarding the symposium of a portion of coastal cities]. Note that, somewhat confusingly, government 
differentiates between technological renovation (jishu gaizao) and technology introduction (yinjin jishu). The 
former refers to the purchase of turnkey solutions (i.e. machinery), while the latter refers to the purchase of 
technology (patents, licenses, etc.).  
209 NPC 1979, zhongwai hezi jingying qiye fa [Law on Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures]; State Council 1986, 
guanyu guli waishang touzi de ruogan guiding [Some regulations regarding the promotion of foreign 
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these strategies have not been without difficulties. Core technology for many of China’s 
key strategic industries has not been readily available for purchase due to competitive 
concerns of foreign enterprise. Moreover, even in instances when technology was shared, 
advances have been stilted by the limited absorptive capacity of Chinese enterprise (Kim 
& Mah 2009). The limited success of technological renovation and the market for 
technology strategy in improving the technological capacities of Chinese enterprise, along 
with an upturn of concerns over future competitiveness have recently resulted in a shift 
towards import-substitution. Technology procurement constituted a core element in the 
latest of government’s plans for scientific and technological development. The objectives 
of procurement policy have been twofold. First, government sought to establish 
preferential conditions for indigenous enterprises, and secondly it hoped to promote 
development of proprietary technological standards.
210
 This has led to a two-pronged 
strategy. Some 16 national scientific and technological major objectives (minkou keji 
zhongda zhuanxiang) were defined at the national level. The focus of this program was 
consistent with the overall substantive priorities of science and technology policy, i.e. the 
areas of generic industrial technology, industries of national strategic importance and high 
technology.
211
 Although detailed information on expenditures for the objectives is not 
available, the Ministry of Finance stated that it expected to raise some 700 billion yuan 
over the course of the projects, over 200 billion of which would be provided by national 
government.
212
  
Many of the relevant industries are dominated by the centrally-managed 
conglomerates. Far from being mere happenstance, these business groups were 
considered instrumental to the realization of Chinese technological competitiveness 
                                                                                                                                                 
investment]. 
210 MOST 2005, guojia zhongchangqi kexue he jishu fazhan guihua gangyao (2006-2020) nian [Outline for the 
national medium and long-term plan for the development of science and technology, 2006-2020], Chapter 8. 
211 MOST 2005, guojia zhongchangqi kexue he jishu fazhan guihua gangyao (2006-2020) nian [Outline for the 
national medium and long-term plan for the development of science and technology, 2006-2020], Chapter 4. 
212 MOF 2009, caizhengbu jieshi minkou keji zhongda zhuanxiang zijin guanli zanxing banfa [Ministry of 
Finance explains the temporary measures on the management of funds for the national scientific and 
technological major objectives], Retrieved from:  
 http://www.china.com.cn/policy/txt/2009-09/25/content_18597639.htm. 
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(Nolan 2001; Pei 2005).
213
 By centering procurement policies on these industrial 
conglomerates, government hopes to leverage their considerable market share to create de 
facto international technological standards. Centrally coordinated initiatives have been 
complemented with local policies. In the wake of the promulgation of the long-term plan, 
government issued its Measures on Management of the Approval of Indigenous 
Innovation Products. Subsequently, procurement catalogues extending preferential 
conditions for domestic manufacturers in government procurement tenders were 
developed at both national and local levels. Catalogues focused on electronics, ICT, 
software, new energy and energy-saving technology (McGregor 2011). As an 
incentivizing instrument, procurement has some advantages over less interventionist 
approaches. By guaranteeing payment for innovative efforts, procurement eliminates the 
uncertainties inherent in innovative activity (or rather, transfers associated risks to the 
state). However, the scope of procurement and related industrial policies has clearly 
traversed the boundaries of liberalist interpretations, which hold that such measures are 
appropriate when there exists a pertinent societal need for services or products which is 
however left unfulfilled by the market (Edquist et al. 2000). Rather, with a view towards 
ensuring China’s future economic competitiveness, government has focused its 
procurement efforts on indigenous provision of advanced technology, thereby potentially 
foregoing more immediate needs or more efficient foreign technological alternatives. The 
strategic orientation of these policies reiterates the developmentalist logic. However, 
whereas in other East Asian nations, protection of domestic technology-intensive industry 
was accompanied with a strong emphasis on international competition, development of 
innovative capacity and indigenous technology
214
 in China has rather focused on 
exploitation of the scale of its domestic markets. 
 
                                                     
213 The ‘program for the development of science, technology and education under the tenth five-year plan for 
national economic and social development stated: “In order to increase the innovative capacity and core 
competitiveness of enterprise[…] we must promote large enterprise and conglomerate enterprises and let them 
become the major force within international competition”, MOST 2000, guomin jingji he shehui di shi ge wu 
nian jihua keji jiaoyu fazhan zhuanxiang guihua , Chapter 3. 
214 As mentioned previously, high-tech products have come to account for a major portion of Chinese exports, 
but the indigenous technology component in those exports is generally marginal. 
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Institutional change and patterns of innovative activity within the socialist 
market economy 
After three decades of reform, China’s innovation system has increasingly diverged from 
the centralized hierarchical science and technology system of the command era. Prior to 
reform, science was considered a non-productive activity, and no economically 
meaningful distinction was made between physical instruments of production and the 
knowledge embedded therein. This changed when the 1985 Decision designated 
technology a tradable commodity. This conceptual change, along with the development of 
a market economy, resulted in a profound restructuring of the organization of 
technological development. Driven by a concern over the perennial rift between science 
and industry, initial reform of the science and technology system sought to exploit the 
allocative function of the market. The marketization of research, corporatization of 
institutes and decentralization of a host of relevant policies closely resembled broader 
institutional changes. In agreement with the concept of the socialist market economy, this 
has resulted in a system where government sets out the overall direction for technological 
development but operational aspects have been largely devolved unto enterprise. More 
recently technology has come to be considered not merely an economic commodity but a 
fundamental prerequisite for national economic competitiveness. This is strongly 
reflected in the latest of government’s plans for the development of science and 
technology, the current preoccupation with technological standard setting and a 
preponderance of recent policy geared towards the accumulation of a technological 
repository within designated areas of industry.  
The Chinese model of governance, in which the state actively seeks to promote the 
technological competitiveness of indigenous enterprise, clearly diverges from the 
liberalist orientation and invokes comparisons to the developmental policy of East Asian 
counterparts. The current innovation system reflects an understanding of innovation 
which has departed from the simplistic linear perspective and rather seeks to account for 
the complex nature of interactions between different relevant actors. Accordingly, the 
institutions of the socialist science and technology system have evolved into a more 
expansive constellation which encompasses elements of central coordination, - 
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administered by the Leading Group for Science, Technology and Education and the 
various functional ministries- protectionism – in the guise of a variety of fiscal and 
non-fiscal regulations implemented by the industrial and regional bureaucracies - and 
incentivization – notably in the form of the various programs established by government 
from the mid-1980s onward -(see figure 17). The post-1985 organization of 
innovation-related activity for the most part accorded with a developmentalist logic. 
Educational reforms have focused on the development of a university system capable of 
supplying scientists and engineers who can complement and gradually supplant the 
foreign-educated researchers who still constitute the vanguard of China’s science and 
technology system. Within research as well, emphasis has been on actively encouraging 
the formation of crucial intellectual resources, by aiming for breakthroughs within a 
select set of fundamental industrial technologies and emergent technological fields. 
 
 
Figure 208: Organization of China’s innovation system, present 
Source: Compiled from various sources by author 
 
Technological development has been explicitly geared towards increasing the efficiency 
and quality of industrial production. To this end, a two-pronged approach of technological 
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renovation and enterprise-led research has been pursued. Through a combination of 
industrial policy and fiscal incentives, government has sought to incentivize enterprise to 
hone its innovative capacities.  
Activity Market-socialist NIS 
Education Impel household investment through liberalization; state 
nurtures elite S&T talent 
Research Impel enterprise investment through marketization; state funds 
and research institutes target industrial research within 
‘bottleneck’ areas 
Development Undertaken by corporatized research institutes, enterprise, 
subsidized through S&T parks 
Diffusion  Within emerging strategic industry, central SOEs are mandated 
with implementation by administrative fiat, complemented with 
industrial policy; traditional industries rely considerably on 
‘technological renovation’ 
Implementation 
Table 17: State-science-industry relations in the market socialist NIS 
 
The result has been a rapid upturn of entrepreneurial R&D. From the turn of the 21
st
 
century onward, corporate technology-related expenditure has shifted from purchase of 
foreign technology to autonomous development (figure 18). 
 
Figure 219: Expenditure on R&D and technology in large and medium-sized enterprise, 
1995-2010 (billion yuan)
215
 
Source: Compiled from NBS, MOST 2006, 2009, 2010, table 2-1-1; NBS 2011, table 20.44 
                                                     
215 (Intramural) R&D expenditure relates to efforts autonomously undertaken by enterprise to research and or 
develop new technology, or improve extent technology. Technology imports comprise the transfer of 
knowledge (patents, blueprints, other codified intellectual capital) from foreign to domestic constituents. 
Domestic technology relates to such transfer between Chinese actors. Finally, technology absorption denotes 
expenses incurred while learning to use novel, externally acquired technology, such as training, consulting etc. 
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However, the Chinese innovation system also has its peculiarities, which are difficult 
to reconcile with conventional models of national innovation systems. First, although the 
public sector plays a major part in the performance of basic research in virtually all 
national innovation systems (Nelson 1993), the remit of Chinese public research institutes 
extends to applied research as well. Enterprises, by contrast, have focused almost 
exclusively on experimental development of existing technologies. Thus while enterprise 
has indeed come to account for the greatest part of R&D expenditures, it seems 
unwarranted to conclude that it therefore has become the main innovative actor within the 
national system (see table 20).  
 
 Total 
Basic  
Research 
Applied  
Research 
Experimental 
Development 
Enterprises 73.2% 1.6% 11.6% 86.6% 
# LMEs 55.3% 0.8% 6.4% 65.8% 
RI  17.2% 40.9% 48.0% 11.1% 
HEI 8.1% 53.8% 34.2% 1.5% 
Table 180: Distribution of R&D expenditure by performer, 2009 
Source: NBS, MOST 2009, table 1-6 
 
Two reciprocal factors can be put forward to explain the prevalence of public institutes 
within the area of applied research. First, due to the CCP’s particular interpretation of the 
appropriate functions of planning and market exchange, the state has insisted on 
maintaining control over the overall trajectory of technological development. The 
guidelines of planning are, on the one hand to ensure the commensurability of the 
progress of Chinese science with major global developments, and on the other to 
selectively work towards the resolution of perceived industrial bottlenecks and 
socio-economic pressures. The former notion has indeed been shared by many of the 
Chinese state’s East Asian counterparts, who pursued a two-sided strategy of building 
competences in advanced upstream technologies, while increasing the technological 
competence of industry through reverse engineering (Nelson 1993). However, the notion 
on addressing ‘reverse salients’216 within the national production system is a legacy of 
                                                     
216 In his seminal study of the development of the electricity network, Hughes (1993) put forward the military 
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socialist industrial planning, and as such particular to China. The consequence has been 
an approach towards science planning which is remedial, rather than truly strategic. 
The second, arguably more straightforward explanation is that indigenous enterprise 
simply lacks the requisite competences to engage extensively in applied research. 
Enterprise investment in R&D proportionate to revenue still remains low in comparison 
to developed nations (Gu et al. 2009), as does the share of enterprises which 
systematically engage in research (OECD 2008). Due to the emphasis on consolidation of 
scientific human capital within the public S&T system and industry’s narrow focus on 
production, research conducted within domestic enterprise has overwhelmingly focused 
on incremental modifications or variations on existing technology. This in stark contrast 
to foreign enterprise, which continues to account for the majority of registered inventions 
(see table 21). 
 
1985-2010 Invention Utility
217
 Design 
Domestic 9.9% 50.2% 39.9% 
Foreign 75.2% 2.7% 22.2% 
2010 Invention Utility Design 
Domestic 10.77% 46.21% 43.02% 
Foreign 74.6% 3.0% 22.43% 
Table 21: Distribution of Chinese patent grants by type and applicant, 1985-2010 
Source: SIPO, 2011 
  
While limited entrepreneurial engagement in applied science clearly separates the 
Chinese model from the liberalist NIS, such a pattern is not uncharacteristic for 
developmentalist systems (at least in their incipient stages). Within these models, 
entrepreneurial efforts tend to be focused rather on building technological competences 
through a ‘reverse trajectory’ of purchase, assimilation, modification and indigenous 
development (Perez & Soete 1988; Westphal et al. 1985). Chinese patterns of 
                                                                                                                                                 
analogy of ‘reverse salients’ (referring in its original meaning to that section of an advancing front which lags 
behind) to explain how such bottlenecks functioned as focal devices for innovative activities aimed at 
improving the efficiency of the overall system.  
217  Granted for a shorter term than invention patents, the utility model generally covers incremental 
innovations. 
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technology-related expenditure seem to acquiesce with this model; the purchase of 
turnkey installations (i.e. technological renovation) has been accompanied by an increase 
of intramural R&D (see figure 19). 
 
 
Figure 22: LME expenditure on intramural R&D and technological renovation, 2000-2010 (billion 
yuan) 
Source: NBS, MOST 2006, 2009, 2010, table 2-1-1; NBS 2011, table 20.44 
 
However, further examination into the distribution of expenditures suggests that China’s 
business system has not adhered to the ‘reverse trajectory’ of competence building. 
Instead, it appears that technological renovation and research and development have been 
pursued as substitutes rather than complements. From its incipience in the mid-1980’s the 
policy of technological renovation has been embedded within the operational mandate of 
state-owned enterprises. Under the contract responsibility system, SOEs were allowed to 
retain their revenues only after they had obligated government-stipulated objectives for 
technological renovation.
218
 By contrast, private enterprise has been more prone to 
engage in research and development. As below figures demonstrate, within state-owned 
enterprise the ratio of outlays for renovation compared to research and development has 
on average been markedly higher than that in private enterprise. A comparison of output 
metrics further suggests the limited relevance of research activities within the operations 
                                                     
218  State Council 1988, quanmin guosuoyouzhi gongye qiye chengbao jingying zerenzhi zanxing tiaoli 
[Temporary regulations for the contract responsibility system of all industrial state-owned enterprises], Article 
8. 
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of the majority of state-owned enterprises (see table 22).
219
 
  
 Firm average (1000 yuan) Patent 
application/ 
1000 firms 
Revenue 
from new 
products (%) 
 
R&D R&D Technology Technology 
(intramural) (extramural) renovation acquisition 
SOE 3,735.74  344.94  9,506.91  343.89  3.95 13.04 
Private 230.07  11.05  270.32  8.55  14.27 5.75 
Foreign 1,561.05  133.80  741.74  417.05  6.05 17.09 
Table 19: Average expenditure on R&D, technology renovation and relevant output metrics (by 
ownership), 2009 
Source: Calculated from NBS, MOST 2010, tables 2-15, 2-21, 2-39, 2-45, 2-51 
 
To an extent, the discrepancy between public and private enterprise can be accounted for 
by their distribution over different industries. To wit, due to the pre-reform emphasis on 
the development of heavy industry, state-ownership has remained concentrated within 
traditional capital intensive sectors which generally fall within the range of moderately 
technology-intensive industries. China’s high-tech industries, by contrast are 
predominantly comprised of private enterprise, such as corporatized research institutes or 
university spin-offs (see table 23). 
   
 
R&D 
/revenue 
Renovation 
/revenue 
State share  
of GVIO  
High tech 1.49% 0.58% 8.88% 
Medium-High 1.18% 1.12% 23.18% 
Medium-Low 0.53% 1.51% 32.77% 
Low 0.32% 0.50% 9.18% 
Note: Sectoral classification according to ISIC rev.3 technology classification of manufacturing 
industries into categories based on R&D intensities (OECD, 2011) 
Table 203: Expenditure on R&D and technology acquisition by sector, 2009 
Source: Calculated from NBS, MOST 2010, table 2-18, 2-53; NBS 2010, 14-2, 14-6 
 
                                                     
219 Note that the high ratio of revenue from new production among SOEs confirms this postulation since the 
statistical definition for new products includes products manufactured with new production technology. 
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Although Chinese patterns of technology-related spending thus conform to the intrinsic 
characteristics of industry, the essence of the developmentalist model is not to simply 
follow the general techno-economic features of various industries, but rather to 
deliberately coordinate the allocation of both physical and intellectual capital to a 
selective host of strategic industries. The disjunction between spending on research and 
development and technological renovation within sectors and amongst private and public 
enterprise suggests a failure to coordinate efforts at industrial modernization with the 
development of indigenous innovative capacity. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter started out by asking how to best characterize the Chinese system of 
innovation, and to what extent the pursuit of innovation and technological development 
has provided a guiding influence for the overall trajectory of institutional reform and 
economic development. In the preceding sections, I discussed how the hierarchical and 
centralized S&T system, whose purpose was to support the project of socialist 
industrialization gradually transformed into a set of institutions which are more sensitive 
to the complexities of the innovative process (i.e. the iterative and non-linear interrelation 
between research, development, diffusion and implementation). Comparing the 
organization of innovation-related activities to the archetypal liberalist and 
developmentalist models, it was clear that the overall orientation of the current system 
has considerably more affinity with the latter. Through a combined strategy of 
devolvement and consolidation, the state has sought to build an indigenous base of human 
and intellectual capital capable of fulfilling its technological objectives. In part, these 
goals have been articulated with reference to the experiences of Japan and East Asia’s 
newly industrialized economies (i.e. Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore). A focus 
on technological leapfrogging (accelerated development within selected fields of 
technology with a strong foundation in basic science) and reverse development (the 
building of competences through the assimilation, modification and development of 
engineering-based technologies) has come to replace the command-era perspective that 
the intrinsic advantages of socialist planning would suffice to ensure China’s eventual 
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technological competitiveness. 
Regardless, institutions for innovation display a variety of peculiar inconsistencies. 
For example, while in Japan and Korea, development, diffusion and implementation of 
technological results depended much on coordination within diversified business 
conglomerates (so-called keiretsu and chaebol, see Fligstein and Feeland 1995), within 
China recourse has been taken to market-appending forms such as the technology market 
and science parks. Although from the 1990s onwards government has pursued a strategy 
in which state-owned conglomerates are to compose the vanguard of China’s 
internationally competitive economy (Keister 1998; Nolan 2001), SOEs have relied 
overwhelmingly on a strategy of technological renovation (i.e. the application of turnkey 
solutions). Poor performance within the area of research and development could be 
interpreted as an outcome of the path-dependent fissure between public science and 
industry. Because efforts to integrate the two realms (such as technology markets and 
science parks) have predominantly targeted the market economy, it seems plausible that 
they have had but little influence on public enterprise. Second, because of government’s 
insistence on stipulating and coordinating key areas of scientific and technological 
activity (e.g. industrial bottlenecks and frontier technologies), the public S&T system, 
comprised of CAS and other central research institutes has continued to undertake the 
majority of applied research. Finally, incentives for public enterprise and local 
government have emphasized short-term growth over investments in long-term, 
cumulative processes of learning and technological specialization. 
This last point hints at two other pertinent aspects of China’s innovation system. 
Emphasis on immediate upturns in production explains in part why enterprises within 
China’s science parks and technology development zones have mostly eschewed research 
and development and instead focused on manufacturing (Yu et al. 2009). The influence of 
incentives for production is compounded by the tenuous quality of the intellectual 
property regime, which renders the profitability of innovation highly uncertain. Overall, 
the particular organization of state planning and market forces has been a result of the 
Chinese conception of the ‘socialist market economy’, which reserves for the state the 
prerogative of identifying the most pressing societal and economic needs, while 
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‘allocative efficiency’ ought to be ensured through the profit incentive and market 
competition. Yet, rather than strategically guiding the development of competences within 
a select host of industries, planning has been predominantly concerned with maintaining 
the overall industrial orientation of economic development in the face of emerging threats 
and opportunities within the international economy (such as the appearance of new 
production regimes) and internal socio-economic developments (such as increasing 
disparity and the negative externalities of capital- and energy-intensive production). This 
reactive policy however seems to ignore the cumulative and path-dependent nature of 
technological development and the organizational requirements of different types of 
technology. 
Lack of a clear overarching objective or regular interaction between China’s 
innovative actors suggest that the conceptual framework of the innovation system, while 
illuminating various aspects of innovation policy, fails to provide a coherent explanation 
for the constellation of economic institutions or the current trajectory of economic growth. 
Although China has absorbed elements of East Asian developmentalism, these have been 
embedded within a broader institutional context which has continued to espouse 
incentives for extensive accumulation, at the expense of the development of the 
technological and organizational competences which allow for the continual 
reconfiguration of productive processes. This at once explains the marked discrepancy 
between central discourse of ‘scientific development’ and actual patterns of accumulation 
over the last decade, and prompts pressing questions regarding the potential for the shift 
towards an intensive pattern of accumulation within the constraints of the current 
institutionalized state-industrialist nexus. Nevertheless, this general picture is contrasted 
by dynamics within a set of upstream industries, where bureaucratic planning, industrial 
policy and enterprise activity have effectuated rapid technological development. The final 
empirical chapter examines in detail the institutional conditions and resultant patterns of 
allocation of labor and capital, and inter-constituent interaction responsible for this 
success, and ponders whether they might constitute the blueprint for a novel mode of 
economic development. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
A CHINESE INSTITUTIONAL ADVANTAGE? 
TECHNOLOGY-INSTITUTIONAL RECIPROCITY IN NETWORK 
INDUSTRY 
 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, it was argued that the considerable upturn of expenditure on 
research and development and comprehensive change of the institutional framework for 
innovation have failed to bring about the necessary conditions for a shift towards an 
intensive pattern of accumulation. The developmentalist model promotes the nurturing of 
competences and intellectual capital within selected industries through strong reciprocity 
between state and enterprise, guided by comprehensive planning (Westphal 1990; Wade 
2003). These qualities appear to be absent within China. The overall orientation towards 
extensive accumulation of the state-industrialist nexus has interspersed with the 
incentives and mechanisms for coordination furnished by China’s national innovation 
system, resulting in a tenuous relationship between scientific and technology planning 
and the development of the technological competences of industry. Nevertheless, the state 
has played an important role in shaping patterns of innovative activity, and indeed, 
contributed to its success. Examination of the distribution of intellectual capital across 
industry suggests concentration of technological competences within a select set of 
upstream sectors. An explanation for the development of technological competences 
within these upstream sectors is sought in the manner in which institutional conditions 
acquiesced with the technical and organizational demands of the industry.
220
 Besides 
constituting major compartments of the centrally-managed public economy, these 
industries share other significant commonalties. Based on technical systems characterized 
by high complexity and integration, they possess certain organizational and 
                                                     
220 Indeed, the reciprocity between the organizational-technological characteristics of industry and national 
institutions for labor, finance and inter-actor relations is a basic assumption within the varieties of capitalism 
and regulation literatures. 
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techno-economic characteristics which set them apart from those industries where 
production is a predominantly autonomous endeavor.  
This last empirical chapter provides an analysis of the telecommunications industry, 
which has been the central locus of innovative activity. This chapter will commence with 
an exposition of the notion of industry-institution reciprocity which underpins 
explanations of technological performance in both the regulationist and VoC varieties of 
comparative political economy. The subsequent section provides a brief description of the 
organizational and technological characteristics which characterize network industries 
such as telecommunications. This is followed by an overview of the contours of the 
development of China’s telecommunications sector. This development was enabled by the 
complementary institutional environment which took shape during the reform era. The 
notion of ‘informatization’ (xinxihua), which gained support amongst top Party-state 
leadership, rendered development of the telecommunication sector a major imperative for 
China’s economic bureaucracy. However, the institutional configuration of the 
telecommunications industry was also much influenced by the broader dynamics which 
determined the relations between China’s main economic constituents. Consolidation, 
plan-based fiscal allocation, and ‘orderly competition’ (youxu jingzheng) within the 
operations segment has combined with exposure to international competitors and 
advantageous industrial policy within the equipment segment, providing domestic 
industry both with the means and incentives to hone its innovative capacity. A similar 
reciprocity between institutions and organizational characteristics obtains in China’s other 
network industries, and may constitute the basis for a Chinese ‘institutional comparative 
advantage’. 
 
Technology, industrial organization and institutions 
Within the previous chapter, aggregate patterns of innovative activity were examined with 
reference to the framework of national innovation systems. This perspective stipulates a 
variety of general institutional conditions which furnish incentives for actors to engage in 
such pertinent activities as research, development, diffusion and implementation, and 
moreover for coordination between these processes. At least two general approaches can 
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be outlined. The liberalist variety seeks to ensure that production and exchange of 
technology (understood as productive intellectual capital, rather than the capital which is 
its embodiment)
221
 can proceed without friction through enhanced property rights, 
specialized finance and accreditation of human capital and research which alleviates the 
information paradox.
222
 The developmentalist model rather focuses on the expedited 
establishment of technological competence by directing research and human and physical 
capital towards the achievement of a select number of planned objectives. However 
insightful, these approaches only highlight generic issues of the economic and social 
organization of innovation, and by and large ignore the diversity of methods of 
production and application amongst different types of technology. As such, the line of 
enquiry pursued by the NIS literature has centered on issues of whether and to what 
degree innovation and technological development take place, rather than how innovative 
activity is distributed across various industries. 
Recently, the literature on comparative capitalism has tended towards an explanation 
of innovation that emphasizes how technology instills organizational and economic 
constraints on industry actors (Amable 2000; Boyer 2005; Boyer 1988; Hall & Soskice 
2001). For example, the archetypal distinction between liberal and coordinated market 
economies (LME and CME respectively) within VoC has a counterpart in the dichotomy 
of radical and incremental technology. Within LMEs coordination between the various 
subsystems is achieved predominantly through market exchange. Because within markets, 
affiliation between constituents (based on spot-contracts) tend to be transient and 
coordination is achieved chiefly by way of the price system, finance, labor and education 
tend to be of a generic variety, allowing for maximum fungibility. This in turn allows for 
the rapid organization and dispersion of disparate resources and competences, resulting in 
an institutional comparative advantage in sectors which rely on the reconfiguration of a 
varied array of intellectual capital and resources into techniques and products which 
differ significantly in nature to extant ones (i.e. 'radical innovations', see Dewar & Dutton, 
                                                     
221 See Orlikowski, 1992. 
222  To this last point, consider how educational standards, research awards and reputation serve as 
uncertainty-reducing heuristics when information about the quality of services, trustworthiness of actors is not 
readily available (Arrow 1963; Podolny 2001). 
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1986; Freeman, 1995). Within CMEs by contrast, coordination within the economic 
system is less mediated by the market mechanism and instead effectuated through 
reciprocal interaction between economic actors. Strong and long-term ties between 
enterprise, labor and finance prompt specialization in industries where progress builds 
cumulatively on prior knowledge and change in the technologies and resources utilized 
within production occurs gradually (i.e. ‘incremental innovation’, ibid). The following 
figures reproduce the results of Hall and Soskice’s 2001 study (using updated data from 
the World Intellectual Property Organization on patent families
223
 granted between 2001 
and 2005). The figures map the ‘relative specialization index’224 of intellectual capital for 
the U.S. (the quintessential LME) and Germany (the exemplary CME). 
 
                                                     
223 Patent families are clusters of patents grouped around a particular technology filed in a variety of nations. 
Compared to single patents, patent families ought to provide a better indication of national specialization in 
intellectual capital because the complexity and expenses associated with the application for patent families and 
 greater scrutiny exerted in patent examination ought to deter the inclusion of purely strategic ‘junk patents’. 
224 Specifically, the index indicates the logarithm of the proportion of a country’s patents within industry i as a 
share of total industry j, compared to the share of patents within that same industry within the global aggregate 
of patents.  
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Figure 231: Relative specialization in radically and incrementally developing industries (U.S., 
Germany), 2001-2005 
Source: Compiled by author on basis of (World Intellectual Property Organization 2008, p.55, 
annex C) 
 
A positive score indicates that enterprises within a nation hold an above-average share of 
intellectual capital associated with that particular industry, while a negative score denotes 
the opposite. Patterns of specialization within the U.S. and Germany are largely opposite 
of one another. Whereas U.S. enterprises agglomerate in ‘radical’ industries, such as 
biotechnology and ICT, German firms concentrate on incremental sectors such as 
chemical and mechanical engineering. 
The inferred relationships between institutions and technological specificities which 
impel, and allow for a particular pattern of industrial organization are conceptualized as 
follows. The predominant characteristics of technology will exert demands on economic 
organization, and more specifically, industrial organization. Alternatively, the formal 
institutions for labor, capital and inter-actor alignment will act as a constraint on the 
patterns of organization which can actually be achieved. Thus, in order for commensurate 
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degrees of static and dynamic performance
225
 to obtain, reciprocity between formal 
institutions and the technological demands on organization needs to exist (or in the 
regulationist idiom, “organizational/institutional isomorphism”, Boyer, 2005, p. 545). 
 
Figure 242: Sectoral patterns of specialization: technological-organizational and 
organizational-institutional reciprocity 
Source: Adapted from Boyer 2005, p. 545 
 
These postulations provide the analytic framework for the subsequent examination into 
the distribution of innovative activity within the Chinese economy. The Chinese pattern 
(see figures 38, 39) is neither skewed towards incremental nor radical technology. This is 
to be expected, considering that China’s mode of regulation, founded upon an 
idiosyncratic state-industrialist nexus, deviates considerably from both the market-based 
arrangements of LME and the bureaucracy
226
-appending institutions which characterize 
the CME. An explanation of China’s patterns of innovative activity thus requires 
identifications of pertinent socio-economic technological qualities which acquiesce with 
the Chinese mode of regulation discussed in preceding chapters. Not only does this 
advance conceptualizations of comparative economic organization by elaborating the 
taxonomy of organizational-institutional interdependencies beyond the market- and 
firm-centered variety, but it also provides a potential answer to the pressing question of 
                                                     
225  Static performance relates to allocative efficiency and x-(in)efficiency (see Leibenstein 1966) while 
dynamic efficiency relates to technological progress (Schumpeter 2010). 
226 To be understood here in the sense of the Williamsonian dichotomy between market and bureaucracy (i.e. 
firm), see (Williamson 1991). 
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whether an intensive mode of accumulation could take shape within the constraints of 
China’s extant economic system.  
 
The distribution of intellectual capital across China’s industries 
The previous chapter enumerated the factors detracting from the developmentalist 
strategy of pursuing creation of a designated set of technological capabilities through 
close state-industry cooperation. The distribution of intellectual capital amongst China’s 
industries reaffirms that science and technology planning has not sorted its desired effects. 
Below figures depict the relative specialization of Chinese patents within different classes 
of technology for the years 2001 and 2009 respectively. Grey bars represent technological 
areas corresponding to the foci of S&T planning as stated within the 1991 ‘national 
outline for the development of science and technology and the eigth five-year plan’ (first 
figure), and the 2001 ‘program for the development of science, technology and education 
of the tenth five-year plan for social and economic development (second figure), which 
first articulated the technological foci which are to form the foundation of China’s novel 
industrial paradigm.
227
 
 
Figure 253: Relative specialization for foreign-oriented patent families, 2001 
                                                     
227 Technology-industry concordance as per ISIC rev.3 technology classification of manufacturing industries 
and WIPO 2013, IPC-Technology Concordance Table. 
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Figure 264: Relative specialization for foreign-oriented patent families, 2009 
Source: Calculated from data obtained through private correspondence with WIPO 
 
As can be gleaned from the above figures, patterns of relative specialization have been 
peculiarly volatile
228
 and do not seem to accord with the foci of science and technology 
planning in any straightforward fashion. This is however not to say that the state doesn’t 
exert considerable influence over the indigenous development of technology. With the 
exception of certain marginal or miscellaneous categories (furniture, assorted consumer 
goods, machine tools), accumulation of intellectual capital has been concentrated within 
spheres of technology which are strongly related to upstream state industry. 
 
 
                                                     
228 Based on the cumulative and path-dependent qualities of learning, knowledge would be expected to develop 
in consistent and self-reinforcing manner (Breschi et al. 2000; Teece 1996). 
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Technology Field Industry 
Digital communication; Telecommunications 
Computer technology; Audio-visual technology 
Information and telecommunications 
technology (office equipment, 
telecommunications) 
Electrical machinery, apparatus, energy Energy generation 
Thermal processes and apparatus Utilities (i.e. gas, water supply)  
Figure 275: Technological specialization in China, 2001-2009 average 
 
A preliminary observation is that innovation appears to cluster around technologies that 
serve as inputs for centrally controlled network industries. A pertinent question is what 
factors have resulted in an environment conducive to the development of technological 
competences within these industries. Deeper understanding of the conditions which have 
impelled this particular focus requires in-depth consideration of the patterns of interaction 
between central government, industrial bureaucracy and public and private enterprise. In 
the subsequent section, focus is on telecommunications, a subsector of information and 
communication technology (ICT), in which China’s comparative share of intellectual 
capital is the largest. The ICT sector is a rather eclectic composite, comprising a plethora 
of communications, broadcasting and computing technologies. Although recently, 
digitalization has led to increasing convergence between these technologies (Casper & 
Soskice 2011), they are rooted and within China, remain enveloped in disparate 
technological trajectories and regulatory frameworks (Ma 2009). 
Industry 
Expenditure 
on R&D 
( million 
yuan) 
R&D 
Personnel 
Patents 
in 
Force 
Revenue 
from 
New 
Products 
million 
yuan) 
R&D 
Expenditure/ 
Revenue (%) 
R&D 
Personnel/ 
100 
Employees 
Average 
Patents/ 
Firm 
Revenue 
from 
New 
Products/ 
Total 
Revenue 
(%) 
Telecommunication Equipment 26994 99380 15611 426055 3,16 11,12 9,73 49,89 
Computers and Office Equipment 661 46861 5016 230094 0,04 2,87 2,99 14,00 
Broadcasting and TV Equipment 664 5539 307 8184 1,62 5,53 0,64 20,01 
Domestic TV Sets and Radio Receivers 10639 22324 1348 157833 2,72 4,13 1,24 40,32 
Table 214; Comparative data on innovation in- and outputs in ICT, 2009 
Source: MIIT 2010, NBS 2010, tables 1-1-4, 2-1-3, 
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While production of computers and components accounts for the largest share of 
industrial revenue and exports among ICT (MIIT 2010), the telecommunications industry 
has by far been the most innovative. (table 24). 
In accordance with the overall approach of this thesis and the conceptual framework 
presented above, the following section commences by explicating the organizational and 
techno-economic qualities particular to network industries such as telecommunications, 
and then continues to discuss elite conceptions, patterns of accumulation and the mode of 
regulation within the telecommunications industry. 
 
Accounting for the innovative prowess of China’s telecommunications 
industry  
The organizational and techno-economic particularities of network industries 
Network industries differ from conventional industries in that creation and delivery of 
services or goods necessitates development of complex and integrated technical systems. 
In principle, such systems have three main components
229
 (Davies 1996; Antonelli 1995; 
Hughes 1993): 
 
1) Terminal systems provide end-users with a means of receiving (or transmitting) 
commodities (e.g. data, energy). 
 
2) The transmission system comprises the network through which the commodity is 
routed to the receiver. Switching equipment connects any two points between 
which transmission need occur.  
 
3) Finally, a control system coordinates traffic flows so as to ensure most efficient 
use of network capacity. 
From these technical features derive (or, until recently were commonly believed to 
derive)
230
 a certain set of specific economic conditions (Armstrong 1997; Antonelli 
1995): 
                                                     
229 An important distinction between telecommunications and traditional utility services such as energy and 
water supply being that within the former the flow of traffic is bi- rather than unidirectional. 
230 see Liebenau & Bourdeau de Fontenay, 2006. 
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1) Economies of density refer to the mitigating influence of concentrated utilization 
on the costs of network provision. Per unit costs of delivery are lower when 
network assets are used to deliver services to a larger number of users. 
 
2) On a more general level, scale economies are particularly significant in network 
industries. These derive from the indivisibility (or imperfect divisibility) of 
technology.
231
 A network is comprised of dedicated sub-systems (described 
above), which are required irrespective of network size. However, in networks of 
sufficient size, associated expenses can be spread out over a multitude of users, 
bringing down average costs. 
 
3) On account of their specificity and interdependency, capital items cannot be put 
to alternative use or disposed of in the market. Such sunk costs serve as a 
deterrent to market entry, since initial investments are irrecoverable in case of 
failure. 
 
4) Network externalities or disproportionalities imply increasing returns to scale on 
the consumer side. Disproportionality occurs when each additional node in the 
network yields an increment of utility not only to that constituent, but all users in 
the network. The property of increasing utility sets ‘many-to-many’ networks 
such as telecommunications apart from ‘one-to-many’ systems such as 
broadcasting and energy (although recent developments such as network 
convergence and smart grid technology are undermining such traditional 
distinctions). It follows that the greatest social utility is obtained from a network 
which mutually connects all users.
232
 
These techno-economic qualities insert particular organizational demands on processes of 
production and innovation. The sunk costs of constructing network infrastructure require 
long-term financial commitment of operators (Davies 1996), which in turn creates a 
desire for operational stability on part of these actors.
233
 Absent constraints on 
                                                     
231 Indivisibility refers to the “discreteness of factors” (Schwartzman 1958, p.102) which render it more 
efficient for such factors to be employed in productive processes of large scale. 
232 Specifically, Metcalfe posited that the value of a connection equates to n∙ (n - 1), supposing a fully meshed 
network. 
233 The rapid expansion of networks within the U.S. during the 1990s ought to be regarded as an anomaly 
explicable by 1) ubiquitous supply of equity capital, which allowed enterprises to effectively transfer the risk to 
investors and 2) misguided investor expectations of exponential returns of the internet economy. 
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competition, perceived risk may deter industry entry or subsequent investment in 
development. Compounding this mitigating influence on competition is the need to 
preserve economies of density and scale economies. If this impels not direct restriction of 
competition, it at least requires close collaboration on issues of network interconnection 
and technological standardization amongst rival operators. This holds true to a yet greater 
degree when network externalities are pervasive. Historically, the aforementioned 
characteristics have prompted an organization of network industries along lines of a de 
jure monopoly. Despite, or perhaps, because of transition towards more liberal regimes 
–predominantly within telecommunications and to a degree, energy- within Western 
nations, the need for regulatory coordination of technological standards and inter-actor 
alignment has remained (Gentzoglanis & Aravantinos, 2010; Wu, 2010). 
 The sunk costs associated with network construction and the need for expansive 
coordination in order to ensure efficient interconnection bear on processes of innovation 
too. However, the incremental-radical juxtaposition cannot exhaustively describe these 
implications. Another dichotomy, that of autonomous and systemic innovations is of avail 
(Teece 1996). Within the ‘science-based’ industries (dominated by U.S. firms), innovation 
is not only radical, but also largely autonomous. This is to say that innovations constitute 
discrete technologies, which in principle can be used independent of other productive 
alignments. Circumstances of low interdependency emphasize flexibility and fungibility, 
and success in innovation hinges on the capacity for actors with disparate capabilities to 
coalesce and then quickly disband. Production processes predicated on chemical and 
industrial engineering
234
 (which constitute the vanguard of the German economy) draw 
on a foundation of common scientific knowledge. Innovation occurs predominantly as 
actors make independent, predominantly incremental alterations to established production 
processes. Such innovation can consequently be called semi-autonomous. This requires 
that enterprises furnish workers with intensive vocational training (i.e. long-term labor 
contracts) (Dore et al. 1999). Capital is provided either by banks which maintain intimate 
links with enterprise, or raised by enterprise itself (Porta et al. 1999). The implications of 
autonomous and semi-autonomous innovation for each of the institutional domains are 
                                                     
234 Transport, machine tools etc. 
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listed in the below table. 
 
 Autonomous Semi-autonomous 
Finance Equity-based Bank-based/ industrial 
Labor Flexible employment, 
fungible competences 
Long-term employment, 
specialized skills 
Inter-actor 
alignment 
Market-coordinated Enterprise-coordinated 
Table 25: Institutions for autonomous, semi-autonomous innovation 
 
By contrast, within sectors such as telecommunications and energy, innovation is 
overwhelmingly systemic. Due to the myriad technological components of systems, 
innovation depends on specialized actors within a wide range of disciplines. The 
interdependency of these components however necessitates a high degree of coordination 
(Teece 1996). Interdependency has economic implications too. Innovation within one 
sub-system often requires adjustments in other parts of the system (Davies 1996). The 
holistic nature of innovation, compounded by the sunk cost quality of expenses requires a 
capacity to take on financial risk which often traverses that of banks or single enterprises. 
Following sections examine how China’s institutions for finance, finance and inter-actor 
alignment were able to furnish conditions under which such coordination and 
entrepreneurial risk-taking could take place. However, first attention is directed to how 
changing evaluations of the role of telecommunications by China’s political-economic 
elite provided scope for requisite institutional changes.  
 
The telecommunications sector and concepts of control 
Within the socialist template of expedited industrialization, there was but little impetus to 
the development of the telecommunications system. A mere 0.8% of budgeted outlays for 
industrial ministries was allocated to the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications under 
the first five-year plan.
235
 Considered a non-productive element of the economy, 
construction was by and large limited to dedicated networks for bureaucratic and military 
                                                     
235 SPC 1952, Chapter 1. 
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use (Yu & Li-Hua 2010). This appraisal changed first with the introduction of the four 
modernizations in the early years of reform. Emphasis on the development of heavy 
industry was believed to have constrained the modernization of energy, 
telecommunications and logistics. In the face of rapid expansion of production and 
decentralized exchange, expedited development of these upstream sectors was given a 
prominent position within economic planning.
236
 Foreign direct investment in equipment 
manufacturing was considered the primary means of technological modernization. 
However, concerns over national security and the techno-economic particularities of the 
telecommunications network espoused a conviction that service provision ought to 
remain under strict central control.
237
  
In the early 1990s, the strategic significance of telecommunications was elevated as 
China’s economic administrators came to regard it as a key component of an unfolding 
‘global technological revolution’.238  Related to this general perception of changing 
technological paradigms was the concept of ‘informatization’ (xinxihua). Informatization 
was understood as a holistic process of techno-economic transformation. Rapid 
development of information and communication technologies would result both in a shift 
towards production of information services over traditional processes of manufacturing. 
Moreover, information would come to comprise a key input in industrial production 
processes. The notion of informatization entered central discourse in the late 1980s 
(Mueller & Tan 1997). The subsequent increase in importance of the concept owed no 
                                                     
236 State Council 1985, guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di qi ge wunian jihua (tiyao) [Outline of the seventh 
five-year plan for national social and economic development], Chapter 6. 
237 In June 1979, State Council approves of MPT’s proposal to recentralize telecommunication administration, 
stating that: “Post and telecommunications are the Party’s and nation’s nerve system, and are a vanguard of the 
economy, they possess the special characteristics and construction of the whole network must proceed in 
integrated fashion ” (Anonymous 2008). 
238
 State Council 1990, guomin jingji he shehui fazhan shi nian guihua he di ba ge wunian jihua (tiyao) 
[Outline of the ten-year plan and eight five-year plan for national social and economic development], Chapter 
2: “[We must] actively follow the trajectory of global technological revolution, and strenuously obtain new 
technological results in such high technology areas as biological engineering, electronic messaging, 
automated control, new materials, new energy sources, aeronautics, nautical engineering, lasers, 
superconductors and telecommunication. [We must] continue to promote the implementation of the Torch 
programme, establish high-technology development zones, and push forward the commercialization and 
industrialization of high technology results and expedite the diffusion towards traditional industries”. 
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doubt much to the influence of Jiang Zemin, who had served at the helm of the Ministry 
of Electronics Industry (MEI) in the 1980s. Speaking at the national congress of the CCP 
in 1997, Jiang emphasized the need to “transform and enhance traditional industry, 
develop emerging and high-technology industry, and push forward with the 
informatization of the economy”.239 The following five-year plan provided an expansive 
enumeration of application for information and communication technology within 
industrial production and the service sector.
240
 In order to execute this strategy of 
‘bringing about industrialization through informatization’ (xinxihua daidong chanyehua), 
the state maintained that it was necessary to strictly adhere to centralized planning of 
technological standards and network construction (Ure & Liang 2000).  
Recently, emphasis on international competitiveness has caused the state to focus on 
a number of strategic emerging industries. Telecommunications technology is considered 
not only a crucial input for domestic industry but increasingly also an arena for global 
competition.
241
 Nurturing indigenous intellectual property is believed to depend on the 
promotion of domestic standards, increased investment in research and development and 
leverage provided by domestic markets.
242
 As such, informatization continues to drive 
industrialization, but the reverse is also held true. 
 
Development of the telecommunications industry 
The growth of China’s telecommunication sector has been remarkable, even by Chinese 
standards. In 1978, the number of telephone subscribers totalled approximately 1,93 
million, and a mere 0.2% of the population owned a telephone set (NBS 1988). By 2010, 
the telephone penetration rate (the number of fixed and mobile telephone sets per 100 
persons) had reached 86.4 % and the number of subscribers had risen to 1.15 billion, 
rendering China’s telephone network the largest in the world (NBS 2012). Between 1990 
                                                     
239 Jiang 1997. 
240 State Council 2000, guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shi ge wu nian jihua gangyao [Outline of the tenth 
five-year plan for national social and economic development], Chapter 4. 
241 State Council 2005, guojia zhonchangqi kexue he jishu fazhan guihua gangyou (2006-2020 nian) [Outline 
for the medium and short-term national development of science and technology], Chapter 6. 
242 State Council 2006, 2006-2020 nian guojia xinxihua fazhan zhanlue [National strategy for the development 
of informatization], Chapter 5. 
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and 2010, the telecommunications industry has grown at an average of 31.3%, almost 
double the overall average rate of growth of the economy. Currently, revenues from 
telecommunications services alone make up close to a fifth of the value of the whole 
service sector (NBS 2012), making the telecommunications sector not only one of 
China’s fastest growing, but also one of the most profitable (DeWoskin 2001). 
Growing at a steady but slow pace in the initial phase of reforms, rapid expansion 
commenced in the 1990s. Introduction of mobile telephony was a primary driver of 
accelerated growth. While initially high prices of mobile services prohibited wide-spread 
adoption, lower fixed costs of mobile network construction and enhanced economies of 
density in comparison to fixed line services agreed with China’s geographic conditions.243  
Network expansion in turn promoted economies of scale and provided further growth 
(NBS, 2012).
245
 
 
Technological development and innovation 
Technological development kept steady pace with the overall expansion of the network. 
Following Deng’s reforms, efforts to modernize China’s telecommunications 
infrastructure intensified. Rapid growth fueled demand for transmission and control 
technologies with greater capacity, prompting increasing convergence with the global 
technological frontier. As can be gleaned from table 26, the Chinese telecommunications 
network has incorporated novel technologies at an increasing pace. The catch-up process 
with the international technological frontier reached a new stage at the turn of the 
millennium, when China commenced with commercial development of its first 
proprietary technological standard for mobile communications. 
                                                     
243 Lower costs of infrastructure obtain from wireless signal transmission, obviating the need to engage in 
costly ducting. This is particularly relevant in remote and/or inaccessible areas. On the other hand, enhanced 
economies of density result from cellular technology, which allow for reuse of the radio frequencies along 
which signals are carried. For further information on the techno-economic characteristics of 
telecommunications, see (Rosston & Teece 1995; Armstrong 1997). 
245
 The transition from fixed towards mobile technology implied a commensurate redistribution of revenues 
amongst the two technologies. While in 2001, revenues from fixed line transmission services were slightly 
higher than those of mobile services, they had fallen to about a third of mobile revenues by 2009 (ITU 2010).  
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System Global * China* Notes 
Fixed  
Micro-wave relay 1947 1964 Reduced costs of (long-distance) transmission 
Stored program control 
switching 
1965 1976 Reduced costs of routing; In 1989, China 
produced its first SPC switch 
Fibre optic relay 1983 1990 Reduced costs of (long-distance) transmission 
ISDN 1988 1991 Integrated communications system with 
enhanced data transmission capabilities 
Mobile  
TACS 1985 1987 First analog cellular mobile technology 
GSM 1991 2001 First digital cellular mobile technology, 
enhanced efficiency of spectrum usage, 
roaming capabilities 
3G 2000 2009 Enhanced data capabilities; In 2000, China’s 
proprietary standard, TD-SCDMA was 
approved by the ITU 
4G 2006 2011 Enhanced data capabilities; China’s 
proprietary standard, TD-LTE was approved 
by the ITU in 2010 
IP/TCP 
World-wide web 1993 1995 In 1995, China commenced operation of 
CHINANET 
VoIP 1995 1997  
* Date of first commercial deployment 
Table 226: Global and domestic development of telecommunications technology 
Source: Compiled from various sources by author 
 
In tandem with the rapid expansion of telecommunications services, China developed a 
thriving telecommunications technology industry. From 1990 to 2009, China’s share in 
global trade in telecommunications and office equipment grew from roughly 1 to 26.2 per 
cent (WTO 2010). Undeniably, much of this astonishing growth has been the result of 
direct investment of foreign equipment manufacturers, seeking to profit from comparative 
labor cost advantages or lured by the prospects of China’s burgeoning consumer market. 
Indeed, in 2009, 62 per cent of industrial output of the telecommunications equipment 
sector was produced by foreign-invested enterprise (NBS, NDRC, MOST 2010). 
Nevertheless, the output of the indigenous telecommunications sector is formidable, 
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reaching 318 billion yuan in 2009 (USD 46.6 billion). Moreover, indigenous 
manufacturing is not unequivocally relegated to the low value-added increment of the 
industry; while overall labor productivity of domestic firms still trails behind that of 
foreign firms, Chinese manufacturers appear to have been rapidly catching up in the last 
decade (table 27). 
 
 Labor Productivity 
(Revenue/ Personnel 
1000 yuan) 
Domestic (1995) 180.54 
Foreign (1995) 406.04 
Domestic (2005) 303.88 
Foreign (2005) 1292.69 
Domestic (2009) 848.07 
Foreign (2009) 1036.04 
Table 237: Productivity of foreign and domestic telecommunication equipment manufacturers, 
1995-2009 
Source: Compiled from MIIT 2009, 2005; NBS, NDRC, MOST 2010, table 1-2-5 
 
This increase in productivity has been paired with comparatively high expenditure on 
research and technology acquisition. While domestic enterprise accounted for about a 
third of industry revenues, its share of expenditure on research and development almost 
reached two thirds in 2009 (NBS, MOST 2010). Moreover, in contrast to general 
tendency, state-owned enterprise within equipment manufacturing has foregone 
investment in ‘technological renovation’ in favor of research and development.246 
 The rapid expansion and modernization of the telecommunications network and the 
emergence of a domestic equipment manufacturing sector capable of innovation has been 
underscored by a number of marked successes. In 1989, Zhongxing Telecommunications 
Equipment (ZTE) developed the ZX-500, China’s first stored program control switch. By 
the end of the decade, virtually all newly installed switches were produced by domestic 
                                                     
246  Note that the apparently marginal presence of state-owned enterprise is attributable to the fact that 
state-controlled firms within telecommunications have been restructured into limited liability shareholding 
companies, in which the state nonetheless retains a controlling stake. 
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Figure 26: Patterns of technology expenditure in local equipment manufacturers (total), 2009 
(million yuan)
247
 
Source: MOST, NBS 2010, tables 2-1-4, 2-1-5 
 
manufacturers (Xinlang 2004). In 1995, China Telecom’s efforts to merge China’s 
emergent data-networks into a national digital infrastructure culminated in CHINANET. 
TD-SCDMA, a third generation mobile technology developed primarily by Datang, was 
recognized as an international standard by the accreditation body of the International 
Telecommunication Union in 2000. By 2012, China Mobile’s TD-SCDMA network 
boasted over 128 million subscribers. The continuous development of competences in 
cellular telecommunication technology was attested to by the introduction of TD-LTE, 
one of three candidate systems for 4G. Given that the general lack of incentivizing and 
coordinating mechanism within the Chinese economy militates against innovation, what 
allowed for these successes in the development of systemic technologies? The following 
                                                     
247 Domestic enterprise includes all Chinese (i.e. non-foreign invested) enterprise other than pure SOEs. 
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section describes how the institutions which envelop the telecommunications sector 
allowed for the coordination of human capital, finance and inter-firm coordination 
conducive to such innovation. 
 
Institutional development within the telecommunications sector 
Development and deployment of human capital 
During the communist era, research on telecommunications focused predominantly on the 
absorption of foreign technologies in order to facilitate the modernization of China’s 
obsolete infrastructure.
248
 As such research was delegated to a large degree to industrial 
institutes. The Ministry of Post and Telecommunications established the Research 
Institute of Post and Telecommunications (youdian kexue yanjiuyuan) in 1957 to oversee 
functional and regional institutes pertained with both technological research and issues of 
network planning. While MPT’s joint administration of research, infrastructure 
construction and network operation ensured for strong science-industry reciprocity, the 
peripheral status of telecommunications within economic planning and bureaucratic 
volatility hampered progress.
249
 Changes to the bureaucratic administration of research 
commenced in the second half of the 1980s. Under the sixth five-year plan (1981-1985) 
the development of the electronics industry was designated a national priority. While 
MPT remained responsible for network construction and operation, production of 
telecommunications equipment manufacturing became the purview of the Ministry of 
Machine and Electronics Industry (Ma 2009).
250
 Seeking to expedite development of the 
sector, the ministry pursued a liberal regulatory approach and actively encouraged foreign 
direct investment. These policies coincided with a drive for network modernization by 
MPT, which struggled to ensure sufficient capacity due to its outdated infrastructure. Low 
labor costs and lucrative market prospects prompted an influx of world class equipment 
                                                     
248 Science Planning Commission 1956, 1956-1967 nian kexue jishu fazhan yuanjing guihua gangyao [Outline 
for the Plan on Long-term Development of Science and Technology, 1956-1967], Chapter 7. 
249 Due to the militarization of the economy in the 1960s following the abrogation of Sino-Soviet diplomatic 
relations, control of the telecommunications network was entrusted to the People’s Liberation Army. The MPT 
was reinstated in 1973 (Anonymous 2008). 
250 Reorganized into the Ministry of Electronics Industry in 1992. 
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manufacturers, and provided the Chinese telecommunications sector with access to 
advanced technology. Simultaneously, the upturn in demand for modern equipment, 
combined with the greater mobility provided by the trends towards corporatization and 
marketization resulted in a host of public-private initiatives from actors in contiguous 
industry. 
Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) was incorporated in the Special 
Economic Zone of Shenzhen in 1985 as a collaboration between plant 691 of the 
State-owned Military Industry Enterprise, specializing in semi-conductor manufacturing, 
and Hong-Kong based Yunxing Electronics Trading Company. Initially engaging in 
value-added assembly of a variety of electronic products, the company decided to 
establish a research unit in 1986. Through reverse engineering, ZTE succeeded in 
development of a small capacity digital switch in 1989 (zhongxing tongxun anli yanjiuzu 
[ZTE case study research] 2012). The first large stored program control switch was 
jointly produced by Post and Telecommunications Industrial Corporation, a conglomerate 
of production plants and research institutes owned by MPT (Fan 2006) and the 
telecommunications research institute of the PLA. Ren Zhengfei, former deputy head of 
the telecommunications research institute of the PLA, established Huawei in 1988. 
Initially operating as a trader of telecommunications equipment, its research efforts 
resulted in the development of its C&C08A switch in 1993. Following Huawei and ZTE, 
China’s third largest equipment manufacturer was established in 1998 when MPT’s 
Research Institute was incorporated as Datang Telecom Technology (Xinlang 2004). 
Notably, the three enterprises that came to dominate the domestic equipment industry all 
precipitated out of the public research system, providing them with a fundamental 
appreciation of the advanced technologies introduced by foreign enterprise. Corporate 
efforts were appended by research within educational institutes. In tandem with the 
emergence of indigenous human and intellectual capital as a government priority in 
mid-1980s, outlays for research and training were increased. Among 39 universities that 
form the vanguard of the national 985-programme for the advancement of Chinese 
academia, five operated under the direct control of the Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology (MIIT), the latest incarnation of the MPT. 
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The organization of research and training within the telecommunications industry 
has facilitated its technological advancement in a number of ways. The initial integration 
of network construction, operation and technological research within the MPT prevented 
the onset of a rift between science and industry and provided the ministry with the 
experience of complex technological coordination. In the 1980s, liberalization of 
equipment manufacturing, along with the concurrent trend of corporatization of public 
industry allowed for autonomous association between actors with relevant competences, 
who heretofore had been obstructed by bureaucratic divisions between sectors. Faced 
with competition from technologically advanced foreign enterprise, these enterprises 
initially focused singularly on the development of digital switching technology, which 
presented a pertinent bottleneck in China’s outdated telecommunications network.251 
Successful local enterprise chose to forego joint-ventures with foreign technology leaders 
in favor of a trajectory of gradual competence building through a process of reverse 
engineering. Moreover, their ties with public industry or research allowed them to 
effectively coordinate with the MPT. These companies have continued to allocate large 
portions of their resources to research and development, diversifying their repositories of 
intellectual capital and corporate talent in order to provide end-to-end solutions. 
Concurrently specialized academic departments ensured a steady flow of engineering 
graduates. Nevertheless, as demonstrated by the development of China’s national 
innovation system, without further conducive conditions, an increase in skilled labor and 
research is a necessary but not sufficient condition for successful innovation. 
 
Corporate investment, industrial policy and government procurement 
As stated previously, due to the relevance of sunk costs and scale economies, systemic 
innovation necessitates substantial (and largely non-recoverable) investment and 
long-term financial planning. While often, the requirement to take on financial risks 
associated with systemic innovation surpasses the capacity of single firms, within the 
                                                     
251 Prior to the introduction of the stored program control switch, telephone traffic was routed through centrally 
controlled mechanical switches, which was both costly and time consuming. Introduction of intelligent 
switching technology greatly alleviated these costs. 
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Chinese telecommunications industry (as elsewhere prior to liberalization) regulatory 
constraints on competition provided operators with rents sufficient to fund rapid 
expansion and modernization of the network. In 1979, State Council allowed MPT to 
charge installation fees equivalent to costs to expedite network expansion.
252
 In 1982 the 
‘three 9-1 remittance’ policy allowed PTBs to retain ninety per cent of revenues from 
taxes, non-operating income from foreign activities and interest on intra-budget loans. As 
a result of these and related policies, retained revenues of the operational arm of MPT 
increase rapidly. Funds obtained in this manner came to comprise the main source of 
capital for network expansion in the initial stages of network development (Ou 2000, 
p.94). 
 
Supply-side fiscal transfers were appended by subsidies for the equipment industry. 
In September of 1993, the Ministry of Finance decided to accelerate the rate of 
depreciation of switching technology. Such indirect procurement promoted sales of more 
moderately priced domestic equipment in rural areas in particular, where low population 
density rendered the limited capacity of switches but a minor concern. In late 1996, MPT 
convened national operators and equipment manufacturers to participate in a consumer 
alliance, exhorting alliance members to purchase domestically produced equipment. 
Subsequently, by end of 1997, 90 per cent of newly installed stored program control 
exchanges were domestically produced (Xinlang 2004). 
Increasing concerns over international competitiveness and the transition towards 
higher-value added economic activity caused the premises for fiscal allocation to shift to 
the development of indigenous intellectual capital. In 2004, NDRC, MOST and MII 
jointly instiated the TD-SCDMA R&D and Industrialization Programme, which extended 
798 million yuan to further development of the indigenous standard, research on which 
had been instigated by Datang (Yu & Li-Hua, 2010). Because much of the fundamental 
technology had been researched over the course of development of foreign 3G technology, 
                                                     
252 MPT, Ministry of Finance, State Pricing Office 1979, guanyu dui shinei dianhua xinzhuang yonghu shouqu 
zhuangfei de lianhe tongzhi [Joint notification on charging costs for new telephone installation to urban 
subscribers]. 
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TD-SCDMA was realized at a low cost. However, the largest portion of expenses was 
incurred in construction of the network. Upon completion of field testing, the state 
mandated China Mobile (which had been given control of China Telecom’s mobile 
network assets), with the roll-out of a national network operating on the national standard. 
China Mobile extended significant subsidies to Datang, Huawei, ZTE and software 
companies to develop network and terminal equipment, and value-added services 
(Anonymous 2009a). Mandated corporate transfers have been complemented by further 
subsidies for products containing indigenous intellectual property. Following the 
promulgation of the 2006 ‘plan for scientific and technological development’, the 
Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Science and Technology issued regulations for 
procurement by local government and state-owned enterprise of ‘indigenous innovation 
products’ (zizhu chuangxin chanpin). 253  These regulations prioritize products with 
Chinese technology within strategic emerging industries.
254
 Central government has 
taken a similar approach. Focus has been on 13 major projects (guojia zhongda keji 
zhuanxiang) co-funded by the state and enterprise, amongst which development of a 
next-generation wireless broadband infrastructure based on TD-LTE, TD-SCDMA’s 
successor. 
High, non-recoverable costs, accompanied with considerable uncertainty pertaining 
to the appropriability of returns on investment in research and development (Mitchell & 
Teece 1995) tend to prompt under-financing in systemic technologies (Berggren & 
Laestadius 2003). Within this context, active government support has served as an 
indispensible expedient. State investment has come in two guises. Initially, supply-side 
stimuli focused on the accelerated modernization of the core network. Price subsidies and 
favorable taxation policy led to the rapid increase of retained earnings of the Directorate 
General, which utilized this capital to expand network capacity to keep up with rapidly 
growing demand for telephony services. From the 1990s onwards, public finance has 
                                                     
253 Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Science and Technology 2008, zhizhu chuangxin chanpin zhengfu caigou 
yusuan guanli banfa [Measure on management of the budget for government procurement of indigenous 
innovation products]. 
254 Modern office equipment and software; new energy sources and devices; energy-saving and high-efficiency 
products (McGregor 2011). 
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increasingly come to emphasize import-substitution. Procurement by upstream 
state-owned enterprise and local government has been appended by central support for a 
host of major scientific and technological projects. Product and technology procurement 
are mutually reinforcing. The latter eliminates uncertainties regarding appropriability of 
returns of technology (provided of course that functional requirements are met) by 
creating a market for new products and services (Edquist et al. 2000). At the same time, 
procurement reduces risks of rent-seeking because returns are conditional on performance 
of innovation.
255
 Product procurement promotes economies of scale in production, and 
thereby bolsters competitive potential. Notwithstanding the indispensible role of 
long-term finance, it cannot instill the inter-actor coordination required for systemic 
innovation. As will be related below, the concurrent existence of a state-controlled 
upstream sector and liberalized equipment manufacturing industry provided apposite 
conditions. 
 
Vertical and lateral coordination and competition 
Technological systems require a multitude of functionally distinct but interconnected 
components to interact in regular fashion. Effective deployment and operation of such 
systems hinges on a capacity for complex coordination. However, development and 
change of (the various elements within) the system requires an altogether different and 
heterogeneous set of technological competences. While it is not unimaginable that a 
single actor possesses both the necessary technological and coordinative capabilities,
256
 
the increase in the pace of systemic innovation over the last three decades and 
coalescence of previously separate industries have impelled a shift away from the 
centralized, monopolistic model of technological development.
257
 China’s regulatory 
                                                     
255 By contrast, corporate subsidies may prompt enterprise to forego innovation in favor of more immediate 
returns, as seems to be the case in many of China’s science and technology parks. 
256 As was indeed the case with AT&T which commenced as a technology company and went on to be the sole 
network operator in the United States for almost a century (Vietor 1994). 
257 This upturn in systemic innovation was prompted by advances in electronic engineering and subsequently in 
computer science. Convergence of mobile and fixed telecommunications technology, internet and broadcasting 
is the result of a standardization of transmission protocols (specifically, TCP/IP) which operates irrespective of 
the transmission medium (radio wave, optical fiber, etc.). 
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particularities have combined with intra-industry dynamics to create conditions conducive 
to this transition within development and implementation of innovation within 
telecommunications. 
 
Inter-actor alignment in the telecommunications service sector 
A first beneficial condition was the consolidation of control over China’s network assets 
within the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications. Although during the Third Front, 
control over telecommunications was transferred to the People’s Liberation Army, the 
broad remit of the MPT was reinstated in the late 1970s. Contrary to the general trend 
towards industrial decentralization, State Council ordained that, due to the particular 
economic and organizational requirements of the sector, the bureaucratic authority of 
MPT’s line branches was to supersede that of local post and telecommunications bureaus 
(Mueller & Tan 1997). This approach was maintained throughout the first phase of 
reforms. Issued in 1988, the ‘sixteen character’ policy insisted on “overall planning, 
integration of the lines and branches [of government], the hierarchical division of 
responsibilities and united construction” (Hexun 2008).258 Due to continued central 
administration of network development, tendencies towards fragmentation (which, in 
light of the importance of interconnection would have been particularly detrimental to 
telecommunications) and overcapacity which plagued other sectors were averted.  
Unfortunately, MPT’s monopoly on the provision of telephony services led it to be 
indifferent to the efficiency with which network expansion occurred (Wu, 2009). A 
second factor beneficial to technological development has been the gradual introduction 
of competition within the upstream segment. Central government’s emphasis on the 
accelerated development of telecommunications provided opportunity for other actors to 
enter the telecommunications market. Despite vehement objection by the MPT, State 
Council approved of the establishment of two additional operators, China Unicom 
(zhongguo liantong) and Jitong in 1993.
259
 In 1995, MPT’s regulatory and operational 
                                                     
258 This policy covered telecommunications as well as other network industries, see the ninth five-year plan, 
Chapter 4. 
259 guowuyuan guanyu tongyi zujian zhongguo lianhe tongxin youxian gongsi de pifu [State Council official 
reply: Approval of the establishment of China United Telecommunications Ltd., Co.], December 14, 1993. 
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responsibilities were officially separated when the latter were invested in the newly 
established China Telecom. In 1998, the MPT and MEI were merged into the Ministry of 
Information Industry. A third bureaucratic reform saw the creation of the Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology which took on responsibility for all but those 
upstream industries in which vested bureaucratic interest was particularly strong 
(Brødsgaard 2010).
260
 While MIIT has continued to restrict private and foreign entry into 
the telecommunications market,
261
 practices of preferential treatment of one state-owned 
operator over the other have abated as the ties between enterprise and (former) industrial 
ministries have diluted (Fu & Mou, 2010; Wu, 2009). Seeking to establish a condition of 
‘orderly competition’ (youxu jingzheng), NDRC engaged in a series of bouts of industrial 
restructuring.
262
 The latest round of reorganization, in 2008 saw the formation of three 
telecom operators (China Unicom, China Mobile and China Telecom). Notwithstanding 
limited direct competition,
263
 the introduction of novel technology has resulted in a 
significant change in industry structure. As a result of the rapid diffusion of mobile 
telephony services, China Mobile has now come to replace China Telecom as the largest 
state-owned operator. This in turn impelled China Telecom to focus increasingly on 
development of its fixed broadband network (see table 28). Intra-industry dynamics thus 
                                                                                                                                                 
China Jitong was established by direct order of Zhu Rongji (then Vice-Premier of the State Council). China 
Unicom was jointly established by the Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI), Ministry of Railway (MOR) 
and Ministry of Electric Power (MEP). 
260 Thus, the MIIT failed to integrate the Ministries of Railway and Energy (which were however demoted in 
official stature) and the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, which continues to regulate 
China’s broadcasting industry 
261 Under current regulations, non-state entities seeking to engage in service operation require registered 
financial assets of at least 100 million yuan for local or regional service operation and assets of at least 1 billion 
yuan for national service operation. Moreover, the state is to maintain a minimu 51 per cent share in all basic 
service operators (MIIT 2009, dianxin yewu jingying xukezheng shenpi guanli banfa [Measures on the 
management of the examination and approval of telecommunications service operation licenses]. Voon and 
Mitchell (2010) note that further liberalization is unlikely as no binding commitment to this effect were made 
under WTO agreements. 
 
263 In 2001, China Telecom’s northern fixed line assets were transferred to China Netcom (now China Unicom), 
while China Telecom retained its assets in the south, effectively creating two regional monopolies. Similarly, 
China Telecom’s mobile assets were transferred to China Mobile, which currently holds approximately 60 per 
cent of the mobile market. Pearson (2007) further notes that the experience within telecommunications 
prompted a like bout of industrial reorganization in the energy industry. 
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provide another major impetus to technological development  
 
 Fixed Mobile Internet 
 
Subscribers 
(million) 
Revenue*  
(billion yuan) 
Subscribers 
(million) 
Revenue*  
(billion yuan) 
Subscribers 
(million) 
Revenue*  
(billion yuan) 
China 
Telecom 163.0  43.34 
160.62 
(3G: 69.05) 49.17 90.12 87.67 
China 
Mobile   
710.3  
(3G: 87.9) 364.19   
China 
Unicom 91.96 43.84 
239.31  
(3G: 76.46) 126.04 63.87 36.37 
Table 248: Distribution of market share in telecommunications, 2011 
Source: China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom annual report, 2012 
 
At the same time, restrictions on price competition and state-stipulated operational 
mandates appear to have averted the onset of reckless expansion. Since market 
distribution is ultimately the prerogative of the state, operators have little to gain from 
excessive investment in capacity. What evidence is available suggests that capital 
construction has closely followed demand, limiting the destabilizing effects of 
technological implementation on short-term supply (see figure 26). 
  
 
Figure 27: Growth of subscriptions and network capacity (percentage), 1991-2009 
Source: Calculated from NBS 2010 
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Inter-actor alignment in the equipment sector 
While within service operations, a condition of ‘orderly competition’ has asserted itself, 
the situation within equipment manufacturing has been somewhat different. Due to MEI’s 
initial strategy of attracting foreign direct investment the equipment market quickly 
became saturated with technologically superior imports, and domestic enterprise was 
predominantly occupied with trading or low-value added assembly. However, foreign 
entry was crucial to attraction and absorption of technology. When a small number of 
domestic enterprises able to engage in the autonomous production of digital switches 
emerged in the 1990s, the state sought to promote further development through import 
substitution. Shortly upon its establishment in 1998, MII promulgated a licensing regime 
covering fixed and mobile systems and terminal equipment as well as internet 
technology.
264
 The ministry has used its regulatory discretion to promote the objective of 
indigenous innovation by prioritizing licensing of domestic manufacturers. Nevertheless, 
foreign manufacturers have continued to play an important role in the technological 
development of China’s telecommunications sector. The disparate specialized skills 
required for successful development of systemic technology, have prompted intensive 
cooperation between domestic and foreign enterprise. Within the mobile sector, 
development and deployment of third and fourth generation technologies have been 
pushed forward by industry alliances. These consortia comprise local and foreign 
enterprise with dedicated capabilities in such areas as terminal development, chipset 
manufacturing and wireless transmission equipment.
 265
 Within these alliances, China’s 
service operators have assumed a central position, coordinating the various technological 
endeavors to ensure compatibility between sub-systems and the existing network (Kwak 
et al. 2012). 
 Innovation within network technology is complicated by the need for significant 
inter-actor coordination, sunk costs and economies of scale. The Chinese amalgamation 
of market forces and bureaucratic controls has resulted in patterns of organization, within 
                                                     
264 MII 1999, dianxin shebei jinwang shenpi guanli banfa [Measure for management of approval of network 
access of telecommunications equipment]. 
265  http://wwwen.zte.com.cn/en/products/wireless/td_scdma/200709/t20070926_351968.html, accessed 
October 10, 2013. 
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and across telecommunications service operation and equipment manufacturing, 
conducive to technological development. Because control over the network construction 
and operation remained firmly vested within the industrial bureaucracy even as other 
industry underwent far-reaching decentralization and marketization, the 
telecommunications sector did not experience the kind of overinvestment and 
fragmentation which beset many locally controlled industries. Simultaneously, ‘orderly 
competition’ has promoted faster and more efficient expansion of the network and 
accelerated diffusion of novel technologies. Liberalization of the equipment industry 
prompted entry of foreign enterprise. While unable to compete, domestic enterprise 
nevertheless was able to access and absorb advanced technology, resulting in the 
emergence of indigenous manufacturing capability. Emerging local industry was 
subsequently supported through preferential industrial regulation and procurement by 
state-owned service operators. Linkages between the service and equipment sector have 
been of equal importance for inter-actor coordination. Innovation has been initiated 
predominantly in the downstream sector, where domestic enterprise competes with 
advanced foreign manufacturers. Further technological development has been guided by 
China’s telecommunications operators, who coordinate between equipment manufacturers 
with disparate skills and ensure compatibility through technical specification and 
standard-setting. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter commenced with an important qualification to the general observation that 
the state-industrialist emphasis on growth through the addition of fixed capital has 
detracted from the pursuit of technological development. Examination of the distribution 
of Chinese intellectual capital demonstrates a comparative specialization in a cluster of 
technologies closely related to a number of state-controlled network industries. 
Technology in such industries is systemic (i.e. strong interdependency exists between the 
many diverse components which make up the overall technology) and characterized by 
scale economies and sunk costs. Due to these factors, innovation requires a capacity for 
coordinating the activities of a large number of specialized actors and the ability to 
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sustain concomitant financial risks over an extended period of time. 
An explanation for the ability of the Chinese economic system to engender 
development of systemic technologies was sought in the manner in which the 
techno-economic particularities of network industries acquiesced with China’s mode of 
regulation. Pertinent characteristics of the institutional architecture are the concentration 
of capital within centrally controlled industry, the apparatus of bureaucratic and political 
instruments of control by which the state seeks to ensure the alignment of managerial and 
state interests and the institutional focus on industrial organization within China’s pillar 
industries. Nevertheless, without further elaboration of economic incentives to substitute 
simple investments in fixed capital for the pursuit of innovation, or the development of 
competences for complex coordination, it remains unclear why China’s upstream industry 
has come to exhibit such dynamism. These issues were further explored within the 
context of the Chinese telecommunications sector, which has been the primary locus of 
comparative technological specialization.  
Several factors were found to contribute to the rapid expansion and technological 
development of the telecommunications sector. While under communism, 
telecommunication was considered a non-productive element of the economy, the 
discourse of the Four modernizations and subsequently the advent of the notion of 
informatization, and emphasis on domestic intellectual capital caused key political figures 
to take an active interest in rapid development of the sector. Regulation of 
telecommunications services has resulted in a condition of ‘orderly competition’. 
Stringent demarcation of regional and operational boundaries has allowed state-owned 
operators to accumulate significant retained earnings. Nevertheless, competition between 
fixed and mobile telephony has forced operators to invest in novel technologies, while 
simultaneously curbing expansionary tendencies. Industrial investment has been 
appended by public finance, in the guise of direct research funding, technology 
procurement (i.e. orders for development of entire systems) and equipment procurement. 
This has mitigated the financial risks inherent within systemic innovation and ensured 
economies of scale within equipment manufacturing (see Edquist et al., 2000).  
The organization of skilled labor likewise contributed to the innovative capacity of 
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the telecommunications sector. Initially, research, production of equipment, network 
construction and operation all fell under the purview of the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications. This not only ensured reciprocity between research and production, 
but also provided MPT with experience in technological specification and standardization. 
The subsequent split and liberalization of equipment manufacturing allowed engineering 
and managerial staff from research institutes and contiguous industry to focus on market 
production and development, and provided the mobility to associate with other 
specialized actors. Entry of foreign enterprise provided access to advanced technology 
while upstream procurement and state subsidies shielded domestic manufacturers from 
full global competition.  
Finally, regulators and state-owned operators have been instrumental in coordinating 
the technological initiatives which originate within the equipment segment. Under the 
header of developing capacities for indigenous innovation, government has actively 
supported and guided processes of technological standardization. Service operators 
occupy nodal positions in industry alliances by providing technological specification and 
arbitrating amongst the various domestic and foreign participants. 
From the experience of the telecommunications sector, some general postulations 
can be made about the necessary reciprocity between institutional conditions and 
systemic technologies. The requirement for financiers to be intimately familiar with the 
relevant technologies signifies a large role for industrial actors. At the same time, due to 
pervasive financial uncertainties and the necessity of long-term commitment, systemic 
innovation tends to be under-financed by markets (Berggren & Laestadius 2003). As such, 
investment needs to be appended through state funding. In China, upstream state-owned 
enterprise has played a strategic role in the financing of systemic innovation. 
Development of network technologies (terminal, transmission and control systems) 
requires a diversity of specialized competences. Science-industry linkages for systemic 
innovation to some degree resemble those of the coordinated market economy, where 
academic departments and industrial research institutes provide specialist training and 
scientific research, while enterprises engage in development and production. However, 
because the technologies embedded in networks are highly interdependent innovation 
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requires intensive coordination. Through technological specification and standardization, 
network operators and regulators provide the parameters which ensure the overall 
compatibility of disparate technologies. Moreover, operators’ downstream relationships 
allow them to intermediate between the various equipment manufacturers and thus serve 
as nodal points in technological consortia. Thus, a third category of technological 
development can be added to the distinction introduced at the beginning of this chapter 
(table 29). 
 
  
 Autonomous Semi-autonomous Systemic 
Finance Equity-based Bank-based/ industrial Industrial/state-funded 
Labor Flexible employment, 
fungible competences 
Long-term employment, 
specialized skills 
Cluster-based mobility, 
specialized skills 
Inter-actor 
alignment 
Market-coordinated Enterprise-coordinated Enterprise/ 
state-coordinated 
alliances 
Table 29: Institutions for autonomous, semi-autonomous and systemic innovation 
 
Further in-depth analysis is required to corroborate whether the institutional-industry 
reciprocity found within China’s telecommunications sector obtain in other network 
industries, However, a cursory examination of research on China’s renewable energy 
sector suggests that many of the factors relevant to development of innovative capacity 
within telecommunications apply there too. As with telecommunications, interest in 
technological development commenced with the four modernizations,
266
 and increased in 
the new millennium due to concerns over energy-efficiency and identification of 
renewable energy as a potential area for leapfrogging.
267
 Development of a domestic 
market for renewable energy technology commenced with the attraction of foreign direct 
investment and domestic enterprise gradually from low-value added assembly to 
                                                     
266 State Council 1978, 1978-1985 nian quan guo kexue keji fazhan guihua gangyao (caoan) [Summary of the 
outline of the plan for the national development of science and technology], Chapter 3. 
267 State Council 2001, guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shi ge wu nian jihua keji jiaoyu fazhan zhuanxiang 
guihua [Dedicated program for the development of science, technology and education of the tenth five-year 
plan for social and economic development]. 
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upstream processes in the industrial chain. Chinese manufacturers were supported 
through research subsidies and preferential procurement by state-owned energy enterprise 
which in turn have enjoyed supply-side stimuli to expedite on-grid implementation (Liu 
& Goldstein, 2013; Wang, Yin, & Li, 2010; Yu, Ji, Zhang, & Chen, 2009).  
Nevertheless, these studies also note pervasive problems as policies distort supply 
and demand conditions, leading to build-up of inefficient capacity. The 
telecommunications sector has not been impervious to these problems. Due to a 
low-income domestic market and the concurrent introduction of fourth generation 
technology abroad, development and implementation of TD-SCDMA has been a 
commercial failure (Vialle et al. 2012). Such concerns, whether understood as a 
temporary trade-off between market-equilibrium and dynamic efficiency cast doubt on 
the long-term feasibility of the Chinese variety of state-developmentalism. Moreover, the 
question still remains whether the promulgated strategy constitutes an appropriate 
response to extant social and economic tensions. Although such predictions remain 
tentative, parallels with the Leninist strategy of expedited industrialization ought to instill 
considerable reservations about the plausibility of a sustainable variety of the current 
economic system. These issues will be considered in more detail in the concluding 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Coordination within the Chinese economy 
The foregoing analysis of China’s technological dynamism suggested that the magnitude 
and rate of growth of the Chinese economy do not necessarily provide an adequate 
representation of its competitiveness. This holds true for analyses focusing solely on 
metrics of innovation inputs and output, also. By recasting China’s innovation system 
within the conceptual framework of regulationism, and considering its interdependencies 
with the broader institutional architecture, it becomes clear that current incentives and 
instruments of coordination do not only produce a pattern of economic activity that is 
subject to patent constraints, but also inhibit the potential towards the requisite transition 
towards an intensive mode of accumulation. If the Chinese economy is to overcome 
impediments to sustainable growth, it will do so by adoption of a form of social 
organization of innovation that accommodates the path-dependent parameters of its 
institutional architecture.  
This argument built on an extensive analysis of Chinese economic governance and 
its innovation system. This thesis commenced by noting how China’s rising stature in the 
global economic order has not been accompanied by a commensurate appreciation of the 
dynamics and structure of its economic system. Long the purview of specialist 
researchers, only recently has the Chinese economy come to attract the attention of the 
field of comparative capitalism, - which seeks to account for the diversity of national 
economic systems by way of a set of general postulations about the organization of 
production and exchange. Together, expectionalist, transitionalist and universalist 
perspectives have made important contributions in elucidating respectively the persistent 
directive influence of China’s distinctive cultural and political legacy, the remarkable 
transience of institutional configurations and certain salient regularities in the interaction 
between the institutional spheres of labor, finance and inter-actor alignment. 
Notwithstanding the utility of these insights, the diversity of factors held to account for 
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the general character of, and overall dynamics within, the Chinese economy begs the 
question of how the respective literatures account for the totality of interdependent social 
behaviors and interactions which constitute the economic system proper and the role 
therein of the various described institutions and dynamics. 
Accordingly, the first section of this thesis was occupied with identifying a main 
coordinating mechanism. While market exchange and network-based affiliation play 
prominent roles within the organization of production and exchange, it was the 
state-industrialist nexus which accounted for regularities within and across the 
distribution of capital, the organization of labor and the coordination of constituent 
interaction. Maintenance of its particular covenant with society, - premised on continuous 
and rapid growth - and a preoccupation with expansion of its own economic prowess 
have furnished the main mandates for the state. Industry seeks to perpetuate and 
embellish its control over capital through the incessant expansion and utilization of 
productive capacity. The objectives of state and industry are aligned through joint pursuit 
of a mode of economic development predicated chiefly on rapid and continuous 
investment in fixed capital.  
 
Conceptual and institutional foundations of the state-industrialist nexus 
The state-industrialist nexus has asserted itself in various manners. The concept of control 
comprised the cognitive and normative program under which the bureaucratic and 
industrial spheres coalesce into coherent political-economic configurations. Short from 
directly determining the outcome of Chinese economic development, the concept of 
control has delineated the basic discursive parameters wherein policy changes could 
unfold. The chief immutable principle has been the primacy of the state. Despite the 
gradual co-option of relevant economic constituents (notably the emergent constituency 
of private entrepreneurs) the state reserved for itself the prerogative of formal institutional 
development, with other parties retaining consultative status. Moreover, the concept of 
macro-control, though ill-articulated, provides the state with extensive direct economic 
control. Moreover, although the concept of primitive socialist accumulation has given 
way to the notion of the socialist market economy, the primacy of industrial development 
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has been harbored through the emphasis on the nurturing of pillar industry and the 
cultivation of the advanced elements of society.  
Under communism, the Fel’dman-Preobrazhensky paradigm furnished the 
theoretical underpinnings for a strategy of expedited industrialization supported through 
the extraction of agricultural surplus value. The passing of power from Mao to Deng 
heralded the departure from the unequivocal prioritization of heavy industry in favor of 
the construction of a socialist market economy in which planned industrial development 
would be appended by organic market-driven growth of agriculture and light industry. In 
trying to construct a concept which acquiesces with the general requirements for 
productivity, stability and sustainability, - while tending to both the interests of the 
political establishment and industry - government has promulgated an economic system 
in which the state is assigned the function of macro-control, - a broad prerogative which 
in addition to fiscal and monetary control, includes direct allocation of capital to 
perceived strategic objectives or industrial bottlenecks and ownership of pillar industries - 
and the organization of production and exchange is considered the purview of enterprise. 
Although central influence initially waned due to rapid expansion of the market 
component, the central state reprised its role in the subsequent era, - when upstream 
public industry was designated the lifeline of the economy and large state-owned 
conglomerates the vanguard of globally competitive Chinese enterprise. Concerns over 
the tenability of extant dynamics of growth have prompted a reorientation from 
traditional industry towards a set of strategic emerging industries. The development of a 
novel industrial foundation is believed to hinge on the concerted efforts of upstream 
central SOEs and state allocation of capital. Although the ‘scientific development concept’ 
stresses the need to transit from traditional manufacturing to technology-enhanced 
production and to assign greater importance to domestic consumption, it also reaffirms 
the perceived necessity of pervasive state control and the continuing accumulation of 
industrial capital. 
Patterns of accumulation have largely accorded with these precepts. Accumulation 
under communism was characterized by an excessive rate of transfer from agriculture to 
industry, precipitating a worsening imbalance between the economic departments. The 
216 
 
expropriation of agricultural surplus value resulted in a lack of consumption power, 
which in turn resulted in the limited production of producer goods for the primary sector. 
Because productivity remained stagnant, the agricultural sector could not bear the 
demands for capital exerted upon it by heavy industry. Yet even after the economic 
reforms of 1978, accumulation continued to be overwhelmingly extensive. More even 
sectoral development alleviated the excessive concentration of capital in industry. Due to 
the swift upturn of market activity within sectors outside the purview of the state capital 
accrued increasingly within the hands of regional government and non-public actors. 
High demand for consumption goods, supply of which had been depressed under 
communism fuelled investment in fixed capital within light industry. This in turn 
promoted expansion of productive capacity in locally controlled sectors producing inputs 
for manufacturing. As such, the structural changes which had made possible China’s 
remarkable economic growth over the last four decades were accompanied by the 
development of a private component which eventually would come to exceed the size of 
the public sector and the formation of a novel economic constituency of private 
entrepreneurs. 
The patent tendencies towards the decentralization of capital within the first period 
of reform abated in the mid-1990s. The distribution of capital over national and local 
government and public and private industry demonstrated a countervailing trend in 
central-local fiscal relations, and a proportional increase of the concentration of capital 
within state-owned enterprise. The latter held particularly true for the hundred or so 
central SOEs (zhongyang qiye) that dominate China’s lifeline industries. In spite of the 
changes in the distribution of capital over sectors and actors, accumulation has retained 
its industrial orientation. Indeed, the proportion of fixed capital formation within overall 
economic growth has not only been consistently higher in the post-reform era than it was 
under communism, but has even exhibited a marked increase in recent years. Credit and 
equity finance has augmented the continuous expansion of productive capacity within the 
public sector. The appropriation of individual and corporate surplus coincided with the 
devolution of expenses towards the private sector as state-owned enterprise divested itself 
of surplus labor and its central function in welfare provision. The relation between the 
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private and public sector evokes comparisons with the dynamics between the economic 
departments under communism. However, appropriation of rents originating within the 
private economy has not brought on the type of sectoral imbalance which impeded 
growth under communism, but did reinvigorate state industry. The maintenance and 
expansion of extensive growth under the purview of the state has been possible due to a 
profound reconfiguration of the mode of regulation. Under communism, transfer of 
agricultural surplus to industry depended on a centrally administered system of capital 
allocation. However, the distributive process involved a great number of regional and 
functional bureaux (a result of the idiosyncratic pattern of tiao-kuai organization), whose 
influence resulted in sub-central bureaucracy’s emergence as a separate economic 
constituent. Systemic bias towards heavy industry was reinforced by the development of 
an indigenous system of industrial relations. The household registration system 
segregated the rural and urban workforce. The state cultivated its nexus with the 
industrial workforce through the institution of the danwei, or work unit, which severely 
curbed the autonomy of industrial labor. Administrative staff was managed by way of the 
nomenklatura system of personnel control. These institutions jointly cultivated a strong 
hierarchical dependency of labor and management on the Chinese Communist Party. 
A first precondition for the upturn of economic activity in the post-communist era 
was the gradual abolishment of the system of material planning and introduction of 
market production and exchange. The stringent constraints on agricultural organization 
and production were allayed through introduction of the household responsibility system. 
Collective enterprise provided a conduit for excess rural labor, which took to the 
production of under-supplied consumption goods. The proliferation of non-public 
enterprise promoted organic growth of upstream state industry, rendering self-raised 
funds the predominant form of capital. As reforms progressed, the quota system was 
altogether abandoned in favor of a unified tax system. Abolishment of bureaucratic 
constraints on production furnished the incentives and scope for the rapid expansion of 
economic activity. 
However, introduction of capitalist institutions did not imply the decline of the state. 
Rather, changes to the fiscal regime proved instrumental in reasserting central control. 
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Transition towards a system of standardized taxes obviated the need for the center to 
engage in protracted negotiation with local government and enterprise over the 
distribution of revenues and reversed the fiscal dependency of the center on sub-central 
bureaucracy. State monopolization of upstream industry and the credit and equity markets 
introduced novel mechanisms of expropriation, resulting in a countervailing trend of 
consolidation. Due to extensive control over listing and stringent restrictions on non-state 
ownership of public enterprise, the introduction of shareholder capital has not resulted in 
the formation of a separate rentier class. Consolidation of the bank sector strengthened 
central government’s influence over credit allocation by severing the ties between 
provincial administrations and local bank branches, and allowed for corporate and 
individual savings to be funneled into state-owned enterprise. All in all, rather than 
effectuating the convergence towards a conventional form of capitalism, the financial 
mechanisms introduced from the mid-1990s onwards provided a novel means by which 
state-owned industry could appropriate surplus value. As capital flowed towards public 
industry, much of the costs of loss-making enterprise, of which those associated with the 
‘iron rice-bowl’ system of urban social welfare, - which constituted the crux of the 
state-industrial worker nexus -, comprised no small part were devolved unto the private 
sector. In its stead, the state sought to solidify its ties with the managerial class that had 
developed in the wake of corporatization and marketization. Through its Leninist 
bureaucratic apparatus, the Party-state perpetuated relationships of hierarchical 
dependency with leaders of public industry and regional government, while 
simultaneously seeking to co-opt private-sector entrepreneurs. The aligning principle 
between these constituents and the center is the shared interest in the continuous 
development of industrial production. 
Insights into the nature and interrelation of China’s institutions can be recast in the 
universalist conception of economic systems. The Chinese concept of control, wherein 
the perceived need for active coordination validates extensive state control while routine 
exchange and production are organized in accordance with the allocative function of the 
market, subsumes both motives of efficiency and entitlement. Likewise, ownership and 
exchange are predicated on both economic and political principles. However, within the 
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hierarchy of institutional principles, status and obligation supersede property and contract. 
The multiplicity of institutional principles is reflected in the concurrent operation of 
coordinating mechanisms. However, the scope and influence of market, hierarchical, state 
and societal coordination are unequal within the overall economy and across its 
components. Although the larger proportion of production and exchange now occurs 
within the market economy, development of the formal institutional architecture has been 
skewed towards the state-controlled component. As a consequence, formal market 
institutions within the private economy have been substituted with relational mechanisms 
of association, creating a dyad between market and society. State control over finance, 
labor and inter-actor alignment has emphasized the fortunes of large conglomerates 
within the public sector and has more recently extended to private enterprise, also. While 
encouraging expansion of productive capital, bureaucratic and political instruments 
simultaneously seek to ensure adherence to principles and directives of the Communist 
Party. The state-hierarchy nexus dominates China’s upstream industries and credit and 
equity markets, and therefore supersedes the influence of the market-society dyad even 
though it is less encompassing. The results are schematically presented in below table, 
itemizing the character of institutional motive, principle and coordinating mechanisms for 
Chinese capitalism.  
 
 Chinese capitalism 
Institutional Motive Efficiency/ Entitlement 
Institutional 
Principles 
Ownership 
 
Exchange 
1.Status 
2.Property 
1.Obligation 
2.Contract 
Coordinating Mechanism 1.State-Hierarchy 
2.Market-Society 
Table 250: Institutional motives, principles and coordinating mechanisms in the Chinese economy 
 
The Chinese economic system gleaned from the vantage point of comparative 
capitalism 
The Chinese economy traverses the boundaries of VoC’s dichotomy of liberal and 
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coordinated economies. While the coordinated form is also characterized by intensive 
ex-market interaction between corporation and state, the normative egalitarian orientation 
and extensive institutionalized mechanisms for inter-constituent bargaining found within 
the German system bear but little resemblance to the admixtures of meritocratic and 
clientelistic principles, and bureaucratic controls and economic incentives that 
characterize the Chinese economy. Beyond these obvious differences in attributes, the 
coordinated form within the varieties of capitalism emphasizes how incrementally 
developing production processes influence institutional configurations by requiring 
patient capital, long-term employment and cooperation within industry. Within the 
Chinese economy, the quality of institutions which coordinate labor, capital and 
inter-actor alignment has depended primarily on the relational hierarchy of center, locality 
and enterprise, rather than the organizational and technical qualities of production.  
However, when typologies considered extend beyond those that focus 
unambiguously on the economics of institutions and allow for the contemplation of 
political factors, the discrepancy between the Chinese case and postulated archetypes is 
assuaged. In particular, the ‘statist’ variety (Amable 2000) captures many of the salient 
attributes of the Chinese system. Schmidt’s claim that within this model “the 
state…intervene[s]…by taking the place of the markets through nationalized industries, 
or by orienting the markets through planning and industrial policies” (2007, pp.5, 6) 
accords with the concept of macro-control which guides the Chinese state’s intercession 
in the process of market allocation. Similarly, in expounding the statist French system 
Schmidt argues that although “adjustment is firm-led in…strategy, investment, 
production[,] the logic of interaction [between enterprise and state] is one of hierarchical 
authority rather than joint-decision or unilateral action” (Schmidt, 2002, p. 143). The 
organization of coordination described by Schmidt is strongly reminiscent of manner in 
which coordinative authority is deposited between industry and state in the Chinese 
system.
268
 According to Becker, due to such a “hierarchical conception of politics and 
economy…[t]he direct relation between capital and labor tends to be adversarial” (2009, 
                                                     
268 Thus at once corroborating Fligstein and Zhang’s comparison of China and France and repudiating their 
characterization of both as coordinated market economies. 
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p.58). Indeed, within the Chinese case, institutional changes, such as the abrogation of the 
iron-rice bowl in favor of a system furnishing but minimal levels of welfare has put the 
interests of industrialists before those of workers, which is duly reflected in the greater 
growth of fixed investment compared to consumption expenditure. 
Notwithstanding the patent applicability of statist characterizations of the scope, 
organization and implications of state coordination, they cannot wholly account for the 
idiosyncrasies explicated within exceptionalist research. The development of central state, 
sub-central bureaucracy and public and private industry as China’s primary economic 
actors, as well as their inter-dynamics can only be understood within the context of the 
organizational precepts and particular constraints of the Leninist-Maoist economic system 
and the socialist market economy. Organic development of a market component in 
addition to the state-owned industrialist core resulted in institutional fragmentation - or a 
‘polymorphous capitalism’ (Peck & Zhang 2013) - wherein the boundaries of the various 
institutional configurations coincide with the respective spheres of influence of the center, 
provinces and private actors. In accordance with the longstanding bias towards the 
centrally controlled lifeline industries, monopolistic arrangement of finance and 
inter-actor alignment has promoted the preservation and expansion of capital under 
central purview. The mantra of regional economic growth has impelled fierce competition 
amongst local governments. Promotion of high local investment in industry is further 
fuelled by the link between fiscal revenues and production. The mode of regulation 
within private industry has remained highly competitive. In order to alleviate competitive 
pressures and secure access to finance, enterprise has relied on informal institutions such 
as guanxi and political patronage.  
Similarly, the ‘statist’ archetype does not explain the observed institutional 
impermanence within the Chinese system. Analysis of the communist-era development 
exposed a mismatch between an extensive accumulation regime and an essentially 
monopolistic form of regulation which necessitated a (temporary) shift towards a more 
extensive institutional arrangement. Liberalization and decentralization mitigated the 
excessive concentration of capital within industry and instilled more efficacious 
incentives and mechanisms of coordination, allowing extensive accumulation to continue. 
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Once the constraints on accumulation exerted by the economic planning system were 
removed, intensification of fiscal control and industrial protectionism reasserted the 
authority of the central state, prompting progressive consolidation of capital under SOE 
control. 
The centrality of state coordination within the Chinese economies is not only relevant to 
understanding of the structure of institutional economies, but is also of avail in further 
probing the fundamental principles of association among the political-economic elite. The 
transition from a totalitarian administrative economic system to one where the state 
intervenes selectively corroberates Przeworski and Limongi’s postulation that states are 
indifferent toward the tradeoff between the size of the bureaucracy and overall economic 
output, - since both furnish it with rents. If this general imperative can account for the 
orientation of the Chinese state, the overall mechanism of institutional change and 
patterns of allocation reflect the logic of its particular state-industrialist nexus, whereby 
the interests of bureaucratic and industrial actors are aligned through the shared objective 
of expansion of production. However, the covenant between state and industry which 
comprises the main coordinating principle within the Chinese economy is but one of a 
variety of possible arrangements. Within the ‘collective capitalism’ of 1960s Japan, the 
hierarchical relation between firm and state was reversed, so that the state supported 
industrial growth, but its rent-seeking tendencies were contained (Lazonick & O’Sullivan 
1995). Systems predicated on a reciprocal state-society or state-market dyads can 
likewise be postulated (see Boyer 2005, p.536).  
The consequentiality of the dynamics between coordinating mechanisms ought to be 
considered irrespective of whether state, market, hierarchy or society constitutes the 
dominant principle (ibid), but can be considered particularly relevant in light of the 
conditionality of the prowess of the state. Since within the political sphere ownership and 
exchange are founded in principles of obligation and reciprocity, state legitimacy depends 
ultimately on the support of key constituents. Status and obligation are always the 
expression of some predetermined relationship between particular constituents. By 
contrast, property and contract are the meta-principles which allow for the development 
of economic relationships (Williamson 2000). Stated differently, the institutional 
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principles of status and obligation are a function of social organization, whereas the 
principles of property and contract provide the preconditions for organization. 
Accordingly, whereas a universal and unambiguous logic can be attributed to the 
coordinating mechanism of the market, the quality of state coordination is expressed only 
in the relational ordering between economic constituents.  
The implications for comparative capitalism is that further effort needs to be expended to 
articulate, in greater detail, the variety of statist types. While this does not bode well for 
the prospect of a parsimonious taxonomy of economic systems,
269
 the proliferation of 
ideal types is less of a concern than incomplete understanding of the underlying qualities 
of institutional motives, principles and coordinating mechanisms. After all, ideal types 
serve only as a heuristic and cannot provide insights within the regularities and persistent 
divergences in economic organization.
270
 Moreover, the level of detail with which the 
interaction between coordinating mechanisms needs to be explored is chiefly an empirical 
issue, depending on the knowledge interests of the researcher. In a more general sense, 
analysis of the Chinese system suggests the relevance of the political sphere - regardless 
of the quality of the main coordinating mechanism. Echoing the longstanding 
understanding of regulationist analysis, the institutions which come to guide and 
constrain the distribution of capital over actors cannot be considered separate from the 
interests of these constituents. To insist on the universality of principles of property and 
contract exist does not mean that their corresponding mechanisms (market and hierarchy) 
do not favor certain constituents over others. Thus, the relationship between economic 
classes and their respective interests need to be considered in conjunction with the nature 
of interdependency of coordinating mechanisms. 
                                                     
269 For example, if we consider a taxonomy wherein systems are defined by a hierarchical dyadic relationship 
between the four coordinating mechanisms (e.g. state-hierarchy, market-society etc.), the number of potential 
forms is  = 12. When analysis is extended to a triadic or four-way interdependency, the number of forms 
increases to .and  respectively, or 24. 
270 The different understandings the two approaches can provide reflect the differences in the modes of 
inference. The taxonomical exercise employs relational thinking, whereas the analysis of intra-system 
dynamics requires logical thought. Logical thought considers universality and consistency in terms of 
categories and relationships between them, whereas relational thinking turns on assertions of the sameness or 
likeness of one phenomenon to another. 
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Innovation and institutional advantage 
The state-industrialist nexus has resulted in perpetuation of a predominantly extensive 
accumulation regime. The intrinsic limitations of a pattern of growth based on the 
continuous expansion of extant production processes have bared themselves within the 
Chinese economy in the form of increasing socio-economic divergence, tendencies 
towards over-accumulation in a variety of industries (primarily controlled by local 
government) and increasing strain on natural resources and the ecology. Recent 
exacerbation of these phenomena has provoked a redefinition of the concept of control. 
The ‘scientific development concept’ seeks to supplant the current emphasis on 
capital-intensive, traditional processes of manufacturing with a focus on 
technology-intensive, higher-valued added production and services. Yet, in spite of a 
marked upturn of expenditure on research and development and the gradual formation of 
an extensive institutional framework for innovation, progress towards the development of 
capacity for indigenous innovation - considered a prerequisite for the transition towards a 
sustainable model of economic growth - has been limited. Examination of the 
arrangement of the constituent activities of innovation demonstrated the persistence of an 
entrenched bifurcation between science and industry, obstructing the commercial 
development and diffusion of technological advances and, vice-versa, preventing the 
guiding influence of market demand on technological endeavors to fully assert itself. Due 
to the peculiar combination of pervasive state influence and lack of intensive coordination 
between upstream and downstream actors, the Chinese system of innovation can neither 
be considered liberalist, nor truly developmentalist. The intrinsic obstacles within the 
innovation system are compounded by the overall orientation of the mode of regulation. 
Market-appending institutions such as science parks, intended to allay the economic 
uncertainties and coordinative complexities of innovation have been more instrumental in 
promoting the expansion of industrial output. In similar fashion, state-controlled industry 
has continued to rely extensively on the procurement of turnkey installations, - even as 
institutional conditions render them better equipped to engage in innovation then their 
private sector counterparts. This antagonism between the institutions of China’s 
innovation system and those coordinating the allocation of capital, labor and inter-actor 
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alignment effectuates a divergence between the conceptual template for the transition 
towards intensive accumulation and actual patterns of economic development. 
Reciprocity between the innovation system and the economic system proper 
constitutes an indispensable link in the analysis of the technological links of national 
systems. The national innovation systems literature has focused on the matters of 
incentivization and coordination which, due to the peculiar economic qualities of the 
knowledge/ technology commodity, cannot be exhaustively understood merely by 
consideration of the institutions which direct common processes of production and 
exchange. In proffering the liberal and developmentalist constellations, NIS has provided 
a systematic description of the institutional configurations which provide the requisite 
conditions for innovation. However, conceptual framework of NIS does not explain why 
different systems exhibit distinctively varied capacities to sustain such necessary 
institutions, which may account for charges that the literature is a-theoretical. This hiatus 
is addressed by examination of how coordinating mechanisms and corresponding 
institutional domains within economic systems promote or detract from the establishment 
of institutions for innovation.
271
  
The reciprocity between the mode of regulation and institutions for innovation was 
reiterated in analysis of the substantive distribution of innovative activity. Since 
development of technologies employed in disparate processes of production differ in 
regard of their epistemic continuity and the interdependency of its components, 
innovation in dissimilar industries calls for diverging incentives and methods of 
coordination. Examination of the Chinese distribution of intellectual capital demonstrated 
specialization in technologies closely related to a set of state-dominated network 
industries. Closer inspection of the institutions enveloping the telecommunications sector 
(which has exhibited both rapid growth and particular technological dynamism) revealed 
a set of general conditions which accorded with the particular organizational and 
economic demands for systemic innovation. Within the service segment, central 
ownership, moderate competition and joint industry and state funding provided scope and 
                                                     
271 For a similar perspective, see Amable (Amable, 2000; with Barre, & Boyer, 1998) on social systems of 
innovation and production. 
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motivation for network development. Exposure to foreign competition and selective 
industrial policy compelled domestic equipment manufacturers to hone their skills 
without having to instantly match the superior technology of global manufacturers. The 
technological and operational experience and broad remit of the industrial bureaucracy 
allowed for intensive coordination between the two segments. The manner in which the 
commensurability of the organizational and technological characteristics of the 
telecommunications industry and its institutional environment account for the innovative 
prowess of the sector corroborate the concept of industry-institution reciprocity, central to 
the varieties of capitalism. 
However this analysis refutes the functionalist assumption that the superordinate 
objective of economic efficiency will without fail impel a co-evolutionary process of 
industrial-institutional alignment. Within the Chinese case, complementarity rather 
appears to have been the serendipitous outcome of a process of institutional 
reconfiguration intended to perpetuate accumulation within the confines of a 
predetermined socio-economic hierarchy. 
 
The prospects for China’s economic system 
In this thesis, China’s economic development from 1978 onwards has been explained in 
terms of a process of institutional reconfiguration which brought the communist mode of 
regulation in line with the extensive quality of accumulation. This general alignment has 
not prevented the onset of grave economic and social tensions, resulting from the inherent 
destabilizing tendencies of extensive accumulation and compounded by institutional 
changes promoting the consolidation of capital within state-controlled industry. For one, 
the current covenant between state and industrialists has neither encompassed peasants 
nor workers, leading to increasing socio-economic disparity and undermining stability 
and institutional legitimacy. Recent attempts to address these issues by direct central 
fiscal transfers seem as yet incommensurate with the institutionalized pattern of 
promoting growth through continuous addition to the fixed capital stock. The same bias 
undermines developmentalist efforts to promote innovation amongst China’s enterprises. 
The lack of compensatory mechanisms for disenfranchised constituents and the dearth of 
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indigenous innovation are mutually reinforcing. On the one hand, without a continuous 
increase in relative surplus value (i.e. output per worker) a more egalitarian distribution of 
income seems unlikely, while on the other, the lack of individual purchasing power 
subverts intentions to transit towards a model of growth premised on domestic 
consumption. 
The institution-industry reciprocity which obtains in China’s network industries 
suggests potential for a model of development premised on market-competition 
supplemented by government coordination of and investment in infrastructure and 
development of systems technology.
272
 The recent development of indigenous 
telecommunications standards and rapid proliferation of China’s photovoltaic industry 
provide a marked contrast with the general dearth of capacities for indigenous innovation 
and emphasis on low-value added assembly. However it is unlikely these achievements 
will mitigate social and economic pressures in the short term. The commercial failure of 
TD-SCDMA demonstrates how technological advancement sometimes comes at the 
expense of allocative efficiency because it can imply foregoing adoption of more mature 
technological alternatives which at some present point are more efficient (Rosenberg 
1983). In this sense, pursuit of dynamic efficiency (i.e. the increase of productivity over 
time) can aggravate, rather than alleviate economic imbalances. 
Additional qualifications exist. Due to the capital-intensive nature of network 
industries, their expansion is unlikely to directly result in pervasive wage increases. A 
balance between investment and consumption may be struck through social redistribution 
of an increment of the relative surplus value derived through increases in productivity.
273
 
A second precondition for stable intensive accumulation is persistent, high demand. 
                                                     
272 Amable (2003) comes to a similar conclusion on basis of analysis of the public economic varieties of France, 
Germany and the Netherlands, stating that these countries tend to perform strongly in sectors linked to public 
infrastructure. 
273 Aglietta’s study of U.S. Fordism (2000) described an economic system in which an entrepreneurial class 
combined Taylorist organization of production with standardized manufacturing (enabled by the introduction of 
novel technology), allowing for an increase of surplus value. In tandem a ‘mode of regulation’ developed which 
ensured stable employment and increasing wages, serving to simultaneously attenuate tensions between capital 
and labor and create a pattern of mass consumption, ensuring a steady market for the system’s standardized 
output. 
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Demand for network commodities and services such as energy, logistics and 
telecommunications is to a large extent derivative of production in downstream industry. 
Without a commensurate upturn in demand for consumption goods - produced 
predominantly within the private sector - the concentration of resources into state-owned 
upstream will cause over-accumulation, risking re-occurrence of the type of economic 
destabilization that characterized the Leninist-Maoist economy. Effectuating greater 
demand requires adjustment between the ratios of industrial investment and consumption 
expenditure, promoting a more egalitarian distribution of surplus value.
274
 Given the 
resilience of the state-industrialist nexus, reconfiguration of the wage-labor nexus can be 
expected to prove highly problematic. Undeniably, the Party-state’s capacity for 
engendering institutional change is formidable, as attested to by the continuing trajectory 
of reform. However, if the Chinese economic system is to benefit from the full dynamism 
of the private sector and actualize the upturn in productivity required to capitalize on its 
particular institution-industry reciprocity, current exclusivist, clientelistic arrangements 
have to be substituted by unambiguously enforced property rights and labor contracts. 
These would motivate industrialists to focus on efficient production and innovation rather 
than rent-seeking and expropriation of low-cost labor, and provide workers with 
incentives to engage in training by ensuring appropriate compensation. Although not 
necessarily entailing retraction of the prerogatives of economic planning and ownership 
of China’s economic lifelines, this would attenuate the political control the state can 
assert over private market actors. Thus, in order to support ongoing economic 
development, the Party-state may well have to compromise its other immutable principle, 
that of political hegemony. 
 
Key contributions 
This thesis was motivated by a desire to advance appreciation of the drivers and dynamics 
of the Chinese economic system and innovation through reconciliation of diverging 
theoretical approaches and substantive foci. In particular, two disparities were held to 
                                                     
274 Ceteris paribus, diminishing marginal utility would imply lesser demand for consumption goods when the 
income distribution is heavily skewed. 
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impede more profound understanding. A lack of conversance between the literatures 
examining economic governance and innovation left the former ill-suited to explain 
endogenous dynamics in the organization of production and its implications for 
performance, while the latter has largely neglected the manner in which national 
capacities for innovation are shaped by the incentives and coordinating influences of the 
broader institutional architecture.  
With regards to the dynamics of economic development, analysis of the 
accumulation regimes and modes of regulation during and following communism 
explains why, after 1978, economic growth proceeded rapidly without this acceleration 
demanding a commensurate shift from extensive to intensive accumulation. Likewise, 
this analysis suggests that the current crisis of Chinese development is of a fundamentally 
different nature than that which brought on the end of the planned economy. The 
transition towards intensive accumulation is however beset by constraints, resulting from 
the entrenched dynamic of investment-driven growth. China’s institutions for labor, 
finance and inter-actor alignment, promoting the shared interest of the state and 
industrialists in the expansion of production, are ill-equipped to deal with the uncertainty 
and requirements for coordination inherent within innovation. This observation casts 
serious doubts on arguments that an upturn in expenditure on research and development 
and a narrow focus on the innovation system will provide the conditions for sustainable 
growth. Rather, this research corroborates the importance of reciprocity between industry 
and institutional architecture. Although within the Chinese case, such reciprocity has not 
come about as a result of invisible market coordination, success within the 
telecommunications sector nevertheless stresses the necessity of alignment between the 
attributes of technology and the organization of finance, labor and the inter-actor 
coordination. 
A second concern related to the discrepancy between generalist and specialist 
interpretations of Chinese governance. Whereas the former is prone to neglect 
phenomena inconsistent with the focal scope of purportedly general theories, the latter - 
finding its raison d’être in the explanation of indigenous phenomena- is primed to 
overstate the relevance of salient idiosyncrasies. Through unpacking of the assumptions 
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of the varieties of capitalism framework, which has made a particularly strong impact on 
the broader comparative literature, this thesis was able to provide an analysis that allowed 
for consideration of the generic attributes of economic systems and the interdependencies 
thereof. This allowed for examination of how general requirements for coordinating 
mechanisms - which distribute capital over processes and actors – have been in part 
fulfilled by idiosyncratic institutions, as well as how Western institutions introduced over 
the course of reforms have been assimilated within a distinct mode of regulation. The 
Chinese hybrid - combining a Leninist institutional legacy with a variety of market 
instruments - has resulted in a set of institutional dynamics defying conventional 
expectations of capitalist patterns of development.  
For one, institutional developments have not progressed uniformly, but rather have 
unfolded in a manner corresponding to the distribution of control over China’s chief 
economic constituents (central state and enterprise/ local government and enterprise/ 
private enterprise), resulting in a ‘variegated capitalism’. Additionally, processes of 
corporatization, privatization and marketization commencing in the mid-1990s have often 
been interpreted as a continuation of a 'liberalization programme', but rather consolidated 
the state-industrialist nexus. Nor have market reforms prompted a self-reinforcing 
dynamic, spelling the gradual irrelevance of the state. The respective scopes of 
bureaucratic control and decentralized market have oscillated in iterative manner, in line 
with the patently political foundations of Chinese economic organization (i.e. based on 
notions of entitlement and obligation). Institutional change has been initiated at the 
central level to ensure the continuation of the state-industrialist nexus while seeking to 
tend to normative and functional requirements. Gleaned from such a perspective, 
currently proposed changes to the effect of a redistribution of capital to laborers/ the 
private sector are a logical consequence of the political and economic strain of the 
preceding period of centralization.  
 
Limitations and avenues for future research 
The analysis presented in this thesis scrutinized concepts and causal relationships 
proffered by the existing literature and sought to retain and reconcile those deemed 
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plausible and relevant. Care was taken to account for idiosyncratic institutions and 
patterns of social organization (identified by exceptionalist studies) by way of a 
framework built on universal attributes of economic systems (institutional motives, 
principles and so on), generic components (labor, capital and technology) and common 
dynamics (reciprocity, complementarity, antagonism etc.). As such, the universalist and 
exceptionalist approaches were demonstrated to be mutually appending. Universalist 
frameworks promote the compete articulation of economic systems within a common 
idiom and safeguard against a lack of theoretical degrees of freedom. Exceptionalist 
approaches aid in uncovering the implicit assumptions inherent in much purportedly 
universalist theoretical constructs.  
Nevertheless, the embeddedness of China’s economic system within the global 
economy could be further explored. Undeniably, export and foreign direct investments 
have played major roles in China’s development, by expanding demand such as to stave 
off over-accumulation within industry (Boyer 2012) and introducing additional financial 
and technological capital. However, ‘opening up’ (kai fang) has been deemed less 
consequential to the current institutional configuration of the Chinese system and patterns 
of capital distribution than ‘reform’ (gaige) and consequently, emphasis has been on the 
latter. In spite of China’s progressive integration into the world economy, - of which its 
accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 is perhaps the most salient indicator - 
the state has steadfastly resisted any external pressures to retract its extensive control over 
industry and finance. Nevertheless, the interrelation between domestic developments and 
reforms, global economic dynamics and China’s behavior within foreign markets forms a 
key part of a complete understanding of the Chinese economic system, and the intent is 
for this analysis to be subsequently expanded to deal with these issues in due manner. 
Another dimension considered in-depth by certain varieties of comparative capitalism is 
that of business organization. Unfortunately, knowledge of the internal structure and 
dynamics of Chinese enterprise is incomplete and eclectic, particularly in areas of key 
interest such as central state-owned enterprise. 
This thesis provides ample opportunities for ensuing research. Additional analysis of 
the Chinese economy, focused on the aforementioned issues will complement and expand 
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the research presented here, contributing to a more encompassing interpretation. A related 
issue which clearly merits further consideration is the future development of the Chinese 
economy and the potential trajectories along which this development may occur. Another 
fruitful avenue relates to the further theoretical and conceptual specification of 
comparative frameworks. This research chose to forego taxonomical comparison on basis 
of predefined, discrete constellations of the institutional domains (along the lines of VoC) 
in favor of an emphasis on the interrelation between the coordinating mechanisms of state, 
market, hierarchy and society. The focus of ensuing work within this area would be on 
further specification of regularities in dynamics and outcomes of different hierarchies of 
coordinating mechanisms, and further exploration of their efficiency-related and political 
implications (i.e. the manner in which different configurations champion the interests of 
different constituents). Such efforts will not only further promote a more profound 
appreciation of the workings and global implications of the Chinese economy, but 
likewise contribute to the advancement of the comparative study of capitalism. 
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